Martin v. Pifer

• Decision Date: 23 April 1884
• Docket Number: 10,038
• Citation: 96 Ind. 245
• Parties: Martin et al. v. Pifer
• Court: Indiana Supreme Court

96 Ind. 245

Martin et al. v. Pifer

No. 10,038

Supreme Court of Indiana

April 23, 1884

Petition for a Rehearing Overruled June 21, 1884.

From the Elkhart Circuit Court.

Reversed, with costs, with instructions to the court below to sustain each of the appellants' demurrers to the complaint.

J. M Vanfleet, for appellants.

R. M Johnson, E. G. Herr and C. S. Henderson, for appellee.

Hammond, J. Elliott, J.

OPINION

Hammond, J.

This was an action by the appellee against the appellants to have a judgment rendered before a justice of the peace declared void, and to enjoin its collection. Separate demurrers were filed by the appellants to the complaint and overruled. They then answered in two paragraphs, to the second of which the appellee's demurrer was sustained. Trial by the court; finding for the appellee, and judgment on the finding over the appellants' motion for a new trial. The rulings referred to were severally excepted to by the appellants, and are assigned for error in this court.

The appellee alleged in his complaint that the appellant Martin sued him in tort before the appellant Walters, a justice of the peace, claiming damages in the sum of $ 10; that a summons was duly issued and served on the appellee to appear before the justice on July 9th, 1881; that he appeared at the time named before said justice in said action; that the cause was regularly submitted to a jury, duly empanelled and sworn; that the jury, after hearing the evidence and considering the same, returned a verdict, in proper form, in favor of said Martin against the appellee on the day aforesaid, in the sum of $ 1.40; that immediately upon the return of the verdict the appellee filed a motion for a new trial, which the justice then overruled; but that the justice did not render or enter judgment in said case until after July 14th, 1881.

It is further alleged that on August 9th, 1881, the justice issued an execution upon the judgment, commanding its collection, with costs, without the benefit of appraisement laws, and placed said execution in the hands of the appellant Seiss, a constable of the township where the judgment was rendered; that the judgment was not collectible without the benefit of appraisement laws; that the verdict of the jury was wrongful, made upon insufficient evidence, and that the appellee was in no manner indebted to said Martin.

So far as the execution commanded the constable to make the collection without appraisement, it was erroneous. The judgment was not rendered without relief from valuation and appraisement laws; nor would such a judgment have been authorized upon a cause of action growing out of tort. Smith v. Davis, 58 Ind. 434. But the appellee had a proper remedy by motion before the justice for the correction of the execution, to make it conform to the judgment. An injunction will not be granted in such case except when necessary to stay proceedings on the execution until the motion can be determined. Lasselle v. Moore, 1 Blackf. 226; Walpole v. Smith, 4 Blackf. 304; Culbertson v. Milhollin, 22 Ind. 362. The complaint does not allege that the motion to correct the execution had been made before the justice, nor does it attempt to make a case for the stay of proceedings on the execution until such motion can be made and determined.

The fact that the verdict was rendered upon insufficient evidence does not, of itself, entitle the appellee to injunctive relief. If he was dissatisfied with the result of the trial before the justice, the law gave him an appeal to the circuit court.

The only possible ground upon which the appellee's complaint can be sustained is upon its averments with regard to the delay of the justice in entering the judgment. The trial was had, the verdict returned, and the motion for a new trial made and overruled on July 9th, 1881. The judgment was not entered upon the justice's docket until after the 14th of the same month. When it was entered does not appear. It may have been on the 15th of that month. At all events, it is not alleged that the entry of the judgment was delayed so as to prevent the appellee from taking an appeal within thirty days from the time when it should have been entered.

The question is elaborately and ably argued by counsel upon both sides as to whether the present action is a direct or a collateral attack upon the judgment complained of. We deem it unimportant to enter into this discussion. The law upon the subject may be stated briefly. If the judgment before the justice is not void, but simply irregular, the appellee has no remedy by injunction. But if the judgment is void, then he may properly have it so declared and its collection perpetually enjoined. We proceed, then, to consider the question whether the judgment is void or merely irregular.

Section 58 (section 1489, R. S. 1881), regulating proceedings before justices of the peace in civil actions, provides that "When a suit shall be dismissed, judgment confessed, the verdict of a jury returned, or the defendant be in actual custody, judgment shall be entered and signed immediately; in all other cases, judgment shall be entered and signed within four days after the trial."

The judgment in question having been rendered upon the verdict of the jury should have been entered immediately. It is claimed that the justice failed to do this, and that his failure makes the judgment void. If we are to apply to the word immediately the meaning as defined by lexicographers, then the justice upon the return of the verdict was required to enter judgment "without the intervention of any other cause or event." He would have been required to disregard the appellee's motion for a new trial, and, instantly, before doing anything else, to enter judgment. But we are not inclined to the belief that the Legislature used the word with this meaning. The construction, as given generally by courts to the words "immediately" and "forth with," when they occur in contracts or in statutes, is, that the act referred to should be performed within such convenient time as is reasonably requisite. In Pybus v. Mitford, 2 Lev. 75, decided more than two centuries ago, it was said: "The word immediately, although in strictness it excludes all meantimes, yet to make good the deeds and intents of parties, it shall be construed such convenient time as is reasonably requisite for doing the thing." This construction has prevailed since in most cases which have come to our attention. In Re Blues, 5 El. & Bl. 290; Snowball v. Dixon, 4 Y. &. C. 511; Thompson v. Gibson, 8 M. & W. 281; Richardson v. End, 43 Wis. 316; New York Cent'l Ins. Co. v. Nat'l Pro. Ins. Co., 20 Barb. 468; Rokes v. Amazon Ins. Co., 51 Md. 512, S. C., 34 Am. R. 323; Railway, etc., Co. v. Burwell, 44 Ind. 460.

In the case under consideration the justice's delay, for at least six days, in entering the judgment on the verdict, was quite unreasonable, unless explained by circumstances showing that an earlier entry of it was impracticable. But we have to consider whether such delay rendered the judgment void. The object of the statute in requiring the justice to enter judgment immediately upon the return of the verdict was manifestly for the benefit of the party obtaining the verdict. It was to enable him to reap the advantages of his litigation. The early entry of the judgment could be of no benefit to the other party. In the present case it is not averred in the complaint, nor claimed by the appellee's counsel, that the mere delay in entering the judgment did the appellee any harm. A judgment is the decision of a court upon questions of law or fact. The rendition of a judgment is a judicial act, but the making of a record of it is merely ministerial. Freeman Judg., section 38. The judgment follows the return of a verdict before a justice of the peace as a matter of law. The act of entering it is only ministerial. The delay in making the entry of the judgment for an unreasonable time may subject the justice to a suit for damages by the party in whose favor the verdict was rendered, but it certainly does not render the judgment void where no harm by the delay resulted to the judgment defendant. It is said in Freeman upon Judgments, section 53a: "Under the general rule that the entry of a judgment is a ministerial act, the failure of a justice to comply with this part of the law within the time required, has, by repeated decisions, been held to leave the judgment in full force."

In Matthews v. Houghton, 11 Me. 377, it was held that a judgment was valid, the record of which was completed by the justice three years after he was out of office. The court said: "A magistrate does not act judicially in making up and completing his record. In doing this he performs himself, what this court does by the agency of their clerk. It is a mere ministerial act."

In Walrod v. Shuler, 2 N.Y. 134, the Court of Appeals, under a statute which required a justice of...