Martin v. Randolph County Bd. of Educ.
| Decision Date | 17 November 1995 |
| Docket Number | No. 22680,22680 |
| Citation | 195 W.Va. 297,465 S.E.2d 399 |
| Court | West Virginia Supreme Court |
| Parties | , 105 Ed. Law Rep. 1306 Sarah MARTIN, Plaintiff Below, Appellant, v. RANDOLPH COUNTY BOARD OF EDUCATION, Defendant Below, Appellee. |
2. Unlawful employment discrimination in the form of compensation disparity based upon a prohibited factor such as race, gender, national origin, etc., is a 'continuing violation,' so that there is a present violation of the antidiscrimination statute for as long as such compensation disparity exists; that is, each paycheck at the discriminatory rate is a separate link in a chain of violations. Therefore, a disparate-treatment employment discrimination complaint based upon allegedly unlawful compensation disparity is timely brought if is filed within the statutory limitation period after such compensation disparity last occurred.
3. A plaintiff can establish a prima facie case of intentional salary discrimination if she proves that she is a member of a protected class and that she receives a lower salary than an individual who is not a member of the plaintiff's class and who is similarly situated to the plaintiff in terms of experience and the comparability of job content. The employer may rebut the inference by coming forward with some legitimate explanation for the salary discrepancy.
4. A nonsensical and arbitrary justification for disparate treatment seriously undercuts an employer's claim that it did not rely on a forbidden motive and tends to show that the purported justification was pretextual. Still, it is possible for an employer to act 5. W.Va.Code, 18-29-2 (1992), allows an employee to contest a misclassification at any time (although only once). As with a salary dispute, any relief is limited to prospective relief and to back relief from and after fifteen days preceding the filing of the grievance.
[195 W.Va. 302] arbitrarily, but not necessarily on the basis of an illicit motive.
6. The policy underlying a grant of special deference to agency decisions and similar agency pronouncements does not extend to every agency action. It does not extend to ad hoc representations on behalf of an agency, such as litigation arguments.
Marjorie Martorella, Charleston, for Appellant.
M. Drew Crislip, Clarksburg, for Appellee.
Sarah Martin, the plaintiff below and appellant herein, appeals the May 2, 1994, order of the Circuit Court of Kanawha County, which affirmed the administrative law judge's decision to deny her grievance against her employer, the Randolph County Board of Education (Board), the defendant below and appellee herein. She raises numerous assignments of error and argues the judgment of the circuit court is clearly wrong both factually and legally. After reviewing the record and briefs of the parties, we find it necessary to remand this case for further development.
In 1981, the plaintiff began employment with the Board as an Assistant Fiscal Officer, which position was classified as professional. The plaintiff worked at the Board's central office finance department. She holds a degree in business education and business administration and has additional credit hours in education administration. It is undisputed the plaintiff's work history is commendable.
Due to cutbacks in personnel faced by the Board during the 1988-89 and 1989-90 school years, 1 several employees received notices in the Spring of 1990 that they were being considered for reduction in force (RIF). In March of 1990, the plaintiff was informed that she was recommended for reduction in force based on lack of need for the position and due to reorganization of the central office.
On March 29, 1990, the plaintiff agreed to a change in contract. Her job title was changed from Assistant Fiscal Officer to Accountant III/Employee Benefits Specialist. The new position was classified as service personnel. She suffered a reduction in salary from $28,494 to $24,500, but her job duties remained essentially the same. The plaintiff stated she had no real choice in the matter; she was faced with the option of accepting the lesser position or losing her job. She did not protest the transfer.
It should be noted that two other Accountant IIIs in the central office, Irene Marstiller and Sharon Howell, perform duties that are mostly clerical in nature. However, the plaintiff receives a substantial salary supplement, $7,100 per year, as opposed to $840 per year received by Ms. Marstiller and Ms. Howell.
Prior to the plaintiff's reclassification, Roger Brady, associate superintendent and personnel officer, informed the plaintiff that other employees in the central office finance department would also be affected by the budget cuts. Joyce Hutton, coordinator of computer services, was to be reclassified to the position of computer specialist, a service position, and would suffer a reduction in pay along with the plaintiff. However, Ms. Hutton transferred to a higher paying teaching position and never worked under the terms of the reclassification.
The plaintiff asserts that Mr. Brady informed her that Chriss Kiess, a purchasing agent in the finance department, would also By letter dated April 2, 1992, the plaintiff was advised she was being considered for possible transfer and subsequent assignment for the 1992-93 school year. She was notified that the reason for the anticipated change was due to the retirement of an accountant in the finance department and the probable abolishment of that position. The plaintiff requested a hearing on this matter. She received notice of the April 22, 1992, hearing by letter dated April 20, 1992.
[195 W.Va. 303] have his salary reduced the following year. Mr. Kiess was not reclassified, however, as he was always classified as service personnel. The evidence shows that Mr. Kiess did not suffer a pay reduction. 2 Mr. Kiess and the plaintiff have approximately the same number of years of service. During the 1989-90 school year, Mr. Kiess's salary was $28,070 while the plaintiff earned $28,494. In the 1992-93 school year, the plaintiff's salary was reduced to $26,456, but Mr. Kiess's salary rose to $30,356
On May 5, 1992, the plaintiff was advised that the Board voted to place her on the transfer list. By letter dated June 30, 1992, she was further informed that the Board approved her assignment for the 1992-93 school year. Due to the retirement of one of the accountants in the finance department whose position would be abolished, the duties held by that person would be divided between three other accountants, including the plaintiff. Accordingly, the plaintiff's workload increased and it was necessary for her to work some overtime. The plaintiff did not receive an increase in salary to assume these additional duties.
In July of 1992, the plaintiff filed this grievance alleging certain procedural problems with notice and sufficiency of the hearing, along with the Board's "continuing practice of adding job responsibilities while reducing pay." 3 The Level II hearing was held on December 14, 1992. The plaintiff chose to bypass the Level III stage of the grievance procedure. On February 22, 1993, the Level IV hearing was held. The administrative law judge (ALJ) rendered
[195 W.Va. 304] her decision on June 30, 1993, and denied the grievance.
This Court reviews appeals from the West Virginia Educational Employees Grievance Board under W.Va.Code, 18-29-7 (1985), which provides that a court may set aside a decision of a hearing examiner for the Board if it is arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or contrary to law. Board of Education of the County of Mercer v. Wirt, 192 W.Va. 568, 453 S.E.2d 402 (1994). The scope of review under the arbitrary and capricious standard is narrow, and a court is not to substitute its judgment for that of the hearing examiner. In Randolph County Board of Education v. Scalia, 182 W.Va. 289, 292, 387 S.E.2d 524, 527 (1989), Justice Miller compared the standard of review applicable to a review of an ALJ's decision under W.Va.Code, 18-29-7, 4 to that of an administrative decision under the Administrative Procedures Act, W.Va.Code, 29A-5-4(g) (1964): "Both statutes contain virtually the same criteria for reversal of the factual findings made at the administrative level, i.e., that they are 'clearly wrong in view of the reliable, probative and substantial evidence on the record as a whole.' " In reviewing the decision of an ALJ following a Level IV grievance hearing, the circuit court should give deference to such findings. In Syllabus Point 1 of Randolph County Board of Education v. Scalia, supra, we stated:
"A final order of the hearing examiner for the West Virginia Educational Employees Grievance Board, made pursuant to W.Va.Code, 18-29-1, et seq. (1985), and based upon findings of fact, should not be reversed unless clearly wrong."
Similarly, in reviewing an ALJ's decision that was affirmed by the circuit court, this Court accords deference to the findings of fact made below. This Court reviews decisions of the circuit under the same standard as that by which the circuit reviews the decision of the ALJ. We must uphold any of the ALJ's factual findings that are supported by substantial evidence, and we owe substantial deference to inferences drawn from these facts. Further, the ALJ's credibility determinations are binding unless patently without basis in the record. Nonetheless, this Court must determine whether the ALJ's findings...
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