Martin v. Rent Control Bd. of Cambridge

• Decision Date: 30 April 1985
• Citation: 19 Mass.App.Ct. 745,477 N.E.2d 426
• Parties: Felipe S. MARTIN v. RENT CONTROL BOARD OF CAMBRIDGE.
• Court: Appeals Court of Massachusetts

Page 426

477 N.E.2d 426

19 Mass.App.Ct. 745

Felipe S. MARTIN v. RENT CONTROL BOARD OF CAMBRIDGE.

Appeals Court of Massachusetts Middlesex.

Argued March 11, 1985.

Decided April 30, 1985.

Patricia A. Cantor (Seth Brian Haber, Medford, with her), for defendant.

Before GREANEY, C.J., and CUTTER and KAPLAN, JJ.

GREANEY, Chief Justice.

This is an appeal by the rent control board of Cambridge from a judgment of the Superior Court which determined that property owned by Felipe S. Martin at 109-111 Henry Street is an owner-occupied three-family house exempt from St.1976, c. 36, the Cambridge Rent Control Act (Act).

The facts are not in dispute. In 1976, Martin purchased the property at 109-111 Henry Street. The property is an apartment building consisting of four units, two on each side of the building. At the time of purchase, Martin, his wife, and two children moved into unit two at 111 Henry Street which occupies the second and third floors at the 111 side. The other three units in the building were rented to tenants. In July, 1979, after the tenant in the first floor unit at 111 Henry Street moved out, the Martin family expanded into that unit as well. The family has occupied both units since then while continuing to rent the two units at 109 Henry Street to tenants. No structural changes have been made in the two units at 111 Henry Street occupied by the Martins. Both units still have separate kitchen and bath facilities and a room or rooms which could be used as a bedroom or bedrooms. ¹ Access can be gained to and from the first and second floors by means of an interior door which does not have a lock.

In November, 1979, Martin requested of the board that the status of the property be changed from a four-unit building subject to rent control to an exempt three-family house. In support of the request Martin relied upon § 3(b )(6) of the Act which exempts from rent control a "unit or units in an owner-occupied two-family or three-family house." After a hearing, one of the board's hearing examiners recommended that Martin's request for exemption be denied. The examiner's recommendation was adopted by the board. Thereafter, Martin, in accordance with § 10 of the Act sought judicial review of the board's decision in a District Court. The District Court upheld the board's decision. Martin appealed the District Court decision to the Superior Court pursuant to G.L. c. 231, § 97, as amended by St.1977, c. 655, § 2. A judge of the Superior Court concluded that Martin's property was entitled to the benefit of the exemption.

The controlling legal issue requires interpretation of the term "two-family or three-family" house as used in the Act. Section 3 of the Act broadly delineates the scope of the statute's coverage by making all "rental units" ² subject to rent control but excepts therefrom "the rental unit or units in an owner-occupied two-family or three-family house." What constitutes a "two-family" or "three-family" house, however, is not defined in the Act. Nor has the term been the subject of discussion in the limited number of decisions which have examined the Act and similar rent control statutes. The board argues that the word "family" has essentially the same meaning as "unit", and that the Act exempts from rent control only owner-occupied houses in which there are two or three actual dwelling units irrespective of how many families may be living in the property. Martin, on the other hand, contends that the word "family" should be interpreted literally and that if only two or three families live in the property, the property is a two-family or three-family house for purposes of the exemption.

We start with the statement of two general principles which apply to the problem. First, in ascertaining the meaning of statutory language, we usually look to the words themselves, defining them in keeping with their common usage and ordinary meaning, and construing them wherever possible to promote the object to be accomplished by the statute. See Nantucket Conservation Foundation, Inc. v. Russell Management, Inc., 380 Mass. 212, 214, 402 N.E.2d 501 (1980); Worcester Vocational Teachers Assn. v. Worcester, 13 Mass.App. 1, 7-8, 429 N.E.2d 718 (1982). Second, an exception from the coverage of a statute is ordinarily to be construed narrowly so as to prevent the purposes of the statute from being rendered ineffective. See Opinion of the Justices, 254 Mass. 617, 620, 151 N.E. 680 (1926); Loyal Protective Life Ins. Co. v. Massachusetts Indem. & Life Ins. Co., 362 Mass. 484, 493, 287 N.E.2d 412 (1972); Department of Environmental Quality Engr. v. Hingham, 15 Mass.App. 409, 411, 446 N.E.2d 406 (1983).

Applying these principles, we conclude that the board's construction is correct. The term "two-family or three-family" house, as used in the Act, denotes a certain type of structure which is designed to be lived in by two or three families. So viewed, the term refers to the physical characteristics of the structure, not to the relationships of the persons who may occupy it. Supporting this interpretation is the common usage and ordinary meaning of the term "two-family." A "two-family" house is defined in Webster's Third New Intl. Dictionary (1971), at 2474, as "a house divided either vertically and designed for two families living side by side but separated by a party wall or horizontally and designed for two families occupying separate apartments one above the other" (emphasis supplied). The State Building Code uses a similar definition. ³

Massachusetts case law provides some support for the general definition. In Van Arsdale v. Provincetown, 344 Mass. 146, 181 N.E.2d 597 (1962), the Supreme Judicial Court suggested that the purpose for which a structure is built, rather than the actual occupancy of the structure, is the determinative fact in deciding the structure's classification under a zoning by-law. The court there stated (at 147) that " 'two family dwellings' are separate structures or buildings to be occupied by two families. A building to be occupied by four families would be a four family dwelling" (emphasis supplied). Somewhat similar applications of the term can be found in Ivarson v. Mulvey, 179 Mass. 141, 142-143, 60 N.E. 477 (1901) (restriction in a deed), and Maynard v. Tomyl, 347 Mass. 397, 399, 198 N.E.2d 291 (1964) (zoning by-law).

The interpretation we adopt also promotes the objectives of rent control. An act such as this seeks to redress severe housing shortages in a congested municipality by "providing shelter at reasonable cost for members of the public." See Marshal House, Inc. v. Rent Review & Grievance Bd. of Brookline, 357 Mass. 709, 718, 260 N.E.2d 200 (1970). See St.1976, c. 36; Mayo v. Boston Rent Control Admn., 365 Mass. 575, 579-580, 314 N.E.2d 118 (1974); Flynn v. Cambridge, 383 Mass. 152, 156-158, 418 N.E.2d 335 (1981). An interpretation of the exception in § 3(b )(6) of the Act which looks to the building's occupancy rather than its structural design might subvert these statutory purposes. For example, the board would be placed in the highly impractical position of controlling "families" rather than units. Of necessity, it would constantly have to monitor who was living in a given building and ascertain their relationships before it could determine whether the building was subject to rent control. As a result of that supervision the board would likely become embroiled in the complex and controversial issue of what constitutes a "family." See, e.g., Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1, 94 S.Ct. 1536, 39 L.Ed.2d 797 (1974); Moore v. East Cleveland, Ohio, 431 U.S. 494, 97 S.Ct. 1932, 52 L.Ed.2d 531 (1977); Planning & Zoning Commn. of Westport v. Synanon Foundation, Inc., 153 Conn. 305, 216 A.2d 442 (1966); Feely v. Birenbaum, 554 S.W.2d 432 (Mo.App.1977); Region 10 Client Management, Inc. v. Hampstead, 120 N.H. 885, 424 A.2d 207 (1980). See also Annot., 71 A.L.R.3d 693 (1976). Finally, the board might be confronted...