Martin v. Review Bd. of Indiana Employment Sec. Division

• Decision Date: 08 June 1981
• Docket Number: No. 2-880A292,2-880A292
• Citation: 421 N.E.2d 653
• Parties: Shirley M. MARTIN, Appellant (Defendant Below), v. REVIEW BOARD OF the INDIANA EMPLOYMENT SECURITY DIVISION, Appellee (Plaintiff Below).
• Court: Indiana Appellate Court

Page 653

421 N.E.2d 653

Shirley M. MARTIN, Appellant (Defendant Below), v. REVIEW BOARD OF the INDIANA EMPLOYMENT SECURITY DIVISION Appellee (Plaintiff Below).

No. 2-880A292.

Court of Appeals of Indiana, Fourth District.

June 8, 1981.

Legal Services Program of Northern Ind., Inc., Jay Lauer, South Bend, for appellant.

Theodore L. Sendak, Atty. Gen., Gordon R. Medlicott, Deputy Atty. Gen., Indianapolis, for appellee.

MILLER, Judge.

Shirley M. Martin is appealing from a decision by the Review Board of the Indiana Employment Security Division (Review Board), holding her ineligible to receive unemployment compensation benefits based on a finding that she refused to accept suitable work without good cause. Since we find the Board's decision is contrary to law, we reverse.

FACTS

In an earlier consideration of this case, this Court examined an appeal from a Review Board determination that Martin had refused to accept suitable work as required by Ind.Code 22-4-15-2 which provides in relevant part: "an individual shall be ineligible for waiting period or benefit rights: If the director or the division finds that being totally, partially, or part-totally unemployed, he fails without good cause, ... to accept suitable work when found for and offered to him ... by an employing unit, ...." Martin appealed the decision alleging her unrefuted testimony on transportation and babysitting problems established good cause, within the meaning of the statute, for refusing the employment in question. The Review Board's decision which affirmed a referee's earlier decision by adopting his findings of fact and conclusion, was as follows "FINDINGS OF FACT: The evidence established that the claimant previously worked for this employer during her base period for a period of approximately three (3) weeks during September and October of 1978 monitoring alarm systems. Her rate of pay at the time of separation was $2.90 per hour. On or about October 6, 1979 the claimant was told by the Division that the subject employer had a position available for her. The claimant contacted the employer and was told that a position was open under basically the same terms and conditions which she had been previously employed. The claimant indicated that she could not accept the position because of transportation problems and baby sitting problems.

The employer stated that the claimant did, in fact, contact them and they offered her basically the same job that she had previously held. The claimant was also told that there was part time work available and there would by a possibility of a day job if, in fact, one opened. The employer stated that the claimant merely called and said that she would not accept the position.

CONCLUSION. From the foregoing findings it must be concluded that the claimant refused an offer of suitable work from a base period employer under basically the same terms and conditions under which she had previously been employed and, therefore, her refusal must be held to have been without good cause." (Emphasis added.)

Martin then perfected an appeal to this Court challenging the Review Board's decision as contrary to law and arguing it was her right, without loss of benefits, to place reasonable work-shift restrictions on her acceptance of employment to accommodate transportation and child care problems. However, we were unable to reach the merits of her contentions at that time, since the Review Board did not indicate either: 1) whether they found these problems existed or 2) whether such problems were the reasons for Martin's refusal to accept the proffered employment. We remanded 415 N.E.2d 168 (N.E.) and ordered the Review Board to certify specific findings of fact on these issues. Pursuant to that order, the Review Board has certified the following findings, enabling us to reach the merits of Martin's appeal:

"(1) The Review Board finds that during W/E (the week ending) October 6, 1979, the claimant was referred to available work with this base period employer and if available to please report to said employer.

(2) It further finds that the potential employment was the same as the claimant's previous employment, monitoring alarm systems, for an hourly rate of $2.90 and working the hours of 4:00 P.M. to 12:00 Midnight.

(3) It further finds that the claimant called the employer after receiving the referral and advised she would not accept the employment.

(4) It further finds that the claimant did not file an application with this potential employer indicating hours of availability for work.

(5) It further finds that the claimant refused the available employment because she would have to employ a 'baby sitter' for her school age children for the hours of work offered, and she would not be able to see her children.

(6) It further finds that the claimant would have transportation problems if she worked the 4:00 P.M. to Midnight shift.

(7) It further finds that transportation is the responsibility of the claimant.

(8) It further finds that the restrictions placed on accepting available employment by the claimant removes her from the labor market.

(9) It further finds that the claimant refused an offer of suitable work during W/E October 6, 1979, with this base period employer for personal reasons and not good cause within the meaning of Chapter 15-2 of the Act." (Emphasis added.)

Martin continues to maintain the Board's decision is contrary to law. ¹

ISSUE

Did the restrictions Martin placed on her acceptance of employment to accommodate child care and transportation problems constitute "good cause" for refusing employment under IC 22-4-15-2?

DECISION

Under Ind.Code 22-4-17-12, "(a)n assignment of errors that the decision of the review board is contrary to law, (sic) shall be sufficient to present both the sufficiency of the facts found to sustain the decision, and the sufficiency of the evidence to sustain the findings of fact." As a general rule, we are not at liberty to weigh the evidence but must accept the facts as found by the Review Board. IC 22-4-17-12. However, there are important exceptions to this general rule which, if proven by the party appealing the decision, warrant reversal. Three of these exceptions appear to form the basis for Martin's arguments: 1) the judgment or finding is unreasonable or arbitrary; 2) reasonable persons would be bound to reach the opposite conclusion from the evidence in the record; and 3) there was no substantial evidence supporting the conclusion. Artim Transportation System, Inc. v. Review Bd. of the Ind. Employment Sec. Div., (1971) 149 Ind.App. 137, 271 N.E.2d 494; International Steel Co. v. Review Bd. of the Ind. Employment Sec. Div., (1969) 146 Ind.App. 137, 252 N.E.2d 848; Williamson Co. v. Review Bd. of the Ind. Employment Sec. Div., (1969) 145 Ind.App. 266, 250 N.E.2d 612. ² With regard to this last exception, we note "substantial evidence" means "such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as sufficient to support a conclusion." Williamson Co. v. Review Bd. of the Ind. Employment Sec. Div., supra, at 274, 250 N.E.2d at 617, quoting, Vonville v. Dexter, (1948) 118 Ind.App. 187, 208, 77 N.E.2d 759, 760.

With these exceptions and definitions in mind, we find the Review Board erred in several respects. First, it erred in dismissing Martin's transportation defense by concluding transportation is the claimant's responsibility. (Finding No. 7) Secondly, there was no evidence to support the Board's conclusion (Finding No. 8) that Martin's refusal to work a 4 p. m. to midnight shift removed her from the labor market, particularly since the uncontradicted evidence indicated there were no restrictions, due either to transportation or babysitting problems, on her employment from 7 a. m. to 9 p. m. And, finally, the Board erred in concluding Martin's transportation and babysitting problems were not "good cause" for refusing employment within the meaning of IC 22-4-15-2.

Generally, the Review Board's errors seem to arise from confusion of the definitions of "good cause" for refusal of employment under IC 22-4-15-2 and "good cause in connection with the work" for voluntarily leaving employment under 22-4-15-1. ³ The Review Board appears to incorrectly treat these two provisions as establishing identical standards even though Indiana case law expressly requires a distinction. The latter "good cause in connection with the work" requirement means the reasons for termination of employment must be job-related and thus objective in character, excluding reasons which are purely personal and subjective. E. g., Thomas v. Review Bd. of the Ind. Employment Sec. Div., (1979) Ind., 391 N.E.2d 1127, rev'd on other grounds, (1981) --- U.S. ----, 101 S.Ct. 1425, 67 L.Ed.2d 624. ⁴ Conversely, the same personal reasons which would not constitute good cause in connection with work may constitute good cause for refusing employment if the claimant's restrictions do not effectively remove her from the labor market. Gray v. Dobbs House, Inc., (1976) 171 Ind.App. 444, 357 N.E.2d 900; Thomas v. Review Bd. of the Ind. Employment Sec. Div., supra. Thus, although neither the statute nor our case law completely defines "good cause" for every occasion, the statute anticipates a less strict standard for the refusal of new employment than does the statute containing the "good cause in connection with the work" standard for voluntarily leaving employment.

The rationale supporting these different standards was explained in Thomas v. Review Bd. of the Ind. Employment Sec. Div., supra, as follows:

"A stricter standard being applied to those who voluntarily quit work as compared to those who refuse available work seems to be in keeping with the intent of the legislature and the announced purpose of the Unemployment Compensation Act to avoid the menace of unemployment by encouraging people to maintain present jobs rather than to quit them. It allows employees to restrict or place necessary...