Martin v. Rivard
| Decision Date | 31 October 2013 |
| Docket Number | Civil No. 2:11-CV-12976 |
| Parties | SIRVAN R. MARTIN, Petitioner, v. STEVEN RIVARD, Respondent. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Michigan |
HONORABLE NANCY G. EDMUNDS
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
Sirvan R. Martin, ("Petitioner"), presently confined at the Saginaw Correctional Facility in Freeland, Michigan, has filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus through counsel Craig A. Daly pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254, in which he challenges his conviction for possession with intent to deliver 450 or more but less than 1,000 grams of cocaine, M.C.L. 333.7401(2)(a)(ii), possession with intent to deliver less than five kilograms of marijuana, M.C.L. 333.7401(2)(d)(iii), and possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony, M.C.L. 750.227b. For the reasons that follow, the petition for writ of habeas corpus is DENIED.
Petitioner was convicted of the above offenses following a jury trial in the Wayne County Circuit Court. This Court recites verbatim the relevant facts relied upon by the Michigan Court of Appeals, which are presumed correct on habeas review pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1). See Wagner v. Smith, 581 F.3d 410, 413 (6th Cir. 2009):
Defendant's convictions arise from a November 1, 2006, drug raid of a home located at 11385 Penrod in Detroit. Police officers had previously conducted surveillance of the home and made controlled purchases of cocaine at the residence using an informant. Defendant was the target of their investigation and was observed conducting suspected narcotics transactions. When the police arrived in a raid van, defendant ran inside the home and jumped out a window, breaking the windowpane. Police officers recovered $880 in cash from defendant as well as photographs of defendant, a medical prescription containing his name, seven baggies of marijuana, and $1,300 in cash from inside his vehicle. Officers also recovered from the basement of the home a large bag of crack cocaine, an AK-47 assault rifle, drug paraphernalia, and several bags of marijuana along with a safe containing $20,440 in cash, a small amount of marijuana, and a large amount of cocaine.
People v. Martin, No. 279338 * 1 (Mich.Ct.App. December 15, 2009).
Petitioner's conviction was affirmed on appeal. Id; Iv. den. 487 Mich. 853, 784 N.W. 2d 211 (2010).
Petitioner seeks a writ of habeas corpus on the following grounds:
28 U.S.C. § 2254(d), as amended by The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA), imposes the following standard of review for habeas cases:
A decision of a state court is "contrary to" clearly established federal law if the state court arrives at a conclusion opposite to that reached by the Supreme Court on a question of law or if the state court decides a case differently than the Supreme Court has on a set of materially indistinguishable facts. Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 405-06 (2000). An "unreasonable application" occurs when "a state court decision unreasonably applies the law of [the Supreme Court] to the facts of a prisoner's case." Id. at 409. A federal habeas court may not "issue the writ simply because that court concludes in its independentjudgment that the relevant state-court decision applied clearly established federal law erroneously or incorrectly." Id. at 410-11.
The Supreme Court has explained that "[A] federal court's collateral review of a state-court decision must be consistent with the respect due state courts in our federal system." Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 340 (2003). The "AEDPA thus imposes a 'highly deferential standard for evaluating state-court rulings,'and 'demands that state-court decisions be given the benefit of the doubt.'" Renico v. Lett, 130 S. Ct. 1855, 1862 (2010)(quoting Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320, 333, n. 7 (1997); Woodford v. Viscotti, 537 U.S. 19, 24 (2002) (per curiam)). "[A] state court's determination that a claim lacks merit precludes federal habeas relief so long as 'fairminded jurists could disagree' on the correctness of the state court's decision." Harrington v. Richter, 131 S. Ct. 770, 786 (2011)(citing Yarborough v. Alvarado, 541 U.S. 652, 664 (2004)). The Supreme Court has emphasized "that even a strong case for relief does not mean the state court's contrary conclusion was unreasonable." Id. ( citing Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 75 (2003)). Furthermore, pursuant to § 2254(d), "a habeas court must determine what arguments or theories supported or...could have supported, the state court's decision; and then it must ask whether it is possible fairminded jurists could disagree that those arguments or theories are inconsistent with the holding in a prior decision" of the Supreme Court. Id.
"[I]f this standard is difficult to meet, that is because it was meant to be." Harrington, 131 S. Ct. at 786. Although 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d), as amended by the AEDPA, does not completely bar federal courts from relitigating claims that have previously been rejected in the state courts, it preserves the authority for a federal court to grant habeas relief only"in cases where there is no possibility fairminded jurists could disagree that the state court's decision conflicts with" the Supreme Court's precedents. Id. Indeed, "Section 2254(d) reflects the view that habeas corpus is a 'guard against extreme malfunctions in the state criminal justice systems,' not a substitute for ordinary error correction through appeal." Id. (citing Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 332, n. 5 (1979)(Stevens, J., concurring in judgment)). Thus, a "readiness to attribute error [to a state court] is inconsistent with the presumption that state courts know and follow the law." Woodford, 537 U.S. at 24. Therefore, in order to obtain habeas relief in federal court, a state prisoner is required to show that the state court's rejection of his claim "was so lacking in justification that there was an error well understood and comprehended in existing law beyond any possibility for fairminded disagreement." Harrington, 131 S. Ct. at 786-87. Finally, in reviewing petitioner's claims, this Court must remember that under the federal constitution, petitioner was "entitled to a fair trial but not a perfect one." Lutwak v. United States, 344 U.S. 604, 619 (1953).
A. Claims # 1, # 2, and # 4. The Ineffective Assistance of Counsel/Prosecutorial misconduct claims.
The Court will consolidate petitioner's first, second, and fourth claims for judicial clarity.
In his first claim, petitioner contends that he is entitled to an evidentiary hearing on his ineffective assistance of counsel claim. In his second claim, petitioner alleges that he was denied of his right to the effective assistance of counsel when counsel 1) failed to seek suppression of evidence, 2) failed to object to evidence of other criminal activity, 3)and failed to object to prosecutorial misconduct. The Court will consider Claims 1 and 2 together, since they are interrelated. For purposes of judicial economy, this Court will also address Petitioner's prosecutorial misconduct claim (Claim # IV) along with the part of his ineffective assistance of counsel claim pertaining to prosecutorial misconduct. See Millender v. Adams, 187 F. Supp. 2d 852, 874 (E.D. Mich. 2002).
In regards to petitioner's first claim, the Court does not have the power to grant habeas relief on petitioner's claim that the Michigan courts denied him an evidentiary hearing on his ineffective assistance of counsel claims. There is no federal constitutional right to appeal a state court conviction. Cleaver v. Bordenkircher, 634 F. 2d 1010, 1011 (6th Cir. 1980). Where a habeas petitioner alleges a denial of his or her right to appeal a state criminal conviction, he or she is not entitled to federal habeas relief. Tate v....
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