Martin v. Rowlett
| Citation | 93 P.2d 1090,1939 OK 307,185 Okla. 431 |
| Decision Date | 12 September 1939 |
| Docket Number | Case Number: 28769 |
| Parties | MARTIN, Mayor v. ROWLETT, Supt. Of Motor Vehicle Inspection Bureau |
| Court | Supreme Court of Oklahoma |
¶0 1. MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS--Powers of Control Over Public Ways Only Those Delegated to Municipality by Legislature.
Control and regulation of the public ways of a municipality are reserved to the state, and such powers may be exercised by the municipality only to the extent of the authority to that end delegated by the Legislature (sec. 7, art. 18, Const.).
2. SAME--AUTOMOBILES--Ordinance Requiring Periodic Inspection of Automobiles at Stipulated Fee Held Unauthorized Assumption of Police Powers Reserved to State.
Ordinance No. 4945 of Oklahoma City, requiring the owners of motor vehicles operating on the streets of said city to submit such vehicles to periodic inspection at a stipulated fee, constitutes an unauthorized assumption of the police powers reserved to the state, and specifically withheld from municipalities by section 9, art. 7, ch. 50, S. L. 1936-1937.
Appeal from District Court, Oklahoma County; Sam Hooker, Judge.
Action in mandamus by Fred Rowlett against Frank Martin, Mayor of Oklahoma City. Judgment for plaintiff, and defendant appeals. Reversed.
Frank Martin, for plaintiff in error.
A. L. Jeffrey, Municipal Counselor, and Leon Shipp, Asst. Municipal Counselor, for defendant in error.
¶1 Plaintiff in error, as mayor of Oklahoma City, appeals from a judgment against him in a mandamus action by defendant in error arising out of plaintiff in error's refusal, on the ground of claimed Invalidity of the city ordinance, to sign a pay warrant for defendant in error for services rendered by the latter in connection with a position created by the provisions of the challenged ordinance, 4945 of said city.
¶2 Summarized, the pertinent portions of said ordinance provide that all motor vehicles owned by residents of Oklahoma City, or owned by nonresidents of said city, which are regularly operated on its streets, shall be inspected periodically and a fee therefor paid by the owner; that notice of the time and place of such required inspections be given to the vehicle owner, and that in event of failure to present for Inspection within the time allowed, the operation of the motor vehicle upon the city streets shall be a finable offensethat any motor vehicle operated on said streets without having passed inspection during the periods provided is declared to be a public nuisance dangerous to public safety and may be seized by the city police; that all motor vehicles shall be provided with certain equipment, and requiring certain conditions of the vehicles and equipment; for the installation and maintenance of places of inspection, and for wages for necessary personnel.
¶3 The police power of the city under the general powers granted to it is relied upon to sustain the validity of the ordinance. In the determination of this appeal It is necessary to consider only whether or not the city had the power to enact the ordinance.
¶4 It is elementary that control over the streets and highways within the corporate limits of a municipality is reserved in the state, and that the municipality can exercise only such control as has been delegated to it by the state. City of Tulsa v. Southwestern Bell Telephone Co. (C. C. A. 1935) 75 Fed.2d 345; Ex parte Duncan, 179 Okla. 355, 65 P.2d 1015.
¶5 Cities have been clothed with power to control and regulate the streets and alleys therein and may exercise their police power to the attainment of that end. Sections 2. 3, and 7, art. 18, Okla. Const., and sections 6380, 6397, 6410, O. S. 1931, 11 Okla. St. Ann. §§ 642, 660, 672. But a limitation of this power to all cities, towns, and villages is expressed by the provisions of section 9, art. 7, ch. 50. p. 354, S. L. 1936-1937, 47 Okla. St. Ann, § 19h; Ex parte Duncan, supra; City of Muskogee v. Wilkins, 73 Okla. 192, 175 P. 497, 498.
¶6 The above section 9 is identical with that of the repealed section 10290, O. S. 1931, discussed in the Duncan Case, supra, except for the omission in the 1937 enactment of the second paragraph (immaterial here) of said section 10290.
¶7 Said section 9 provides in substance that cities shall have Do power to pass any ordinance (1) requiring any tax, fee, license, or permit from any owner to whom the article is applicable for the free use of the public highways, or (2) excluding any motor vehicle from the free use of the public highways, provided that the powers given to cities to enact...
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