Martin v. Seabolt

• Jurisdiction: United States,Federal
• Parties: KA'LAH (KALAH) MARTIN, Plaintiff, v. GREGORY SEABOLT, et al., Defendants.
• Citation: Martin v. Seabolt, 1:21cv906 (M.D. N.C. Mar 25, 2024)
• Decision Date: 25 March 2024
• Court: U.S. District Court — Middle District of North Carolina
• Docket Number: 1:21cv906

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KA'LAH (KALAH) MARTIN, Plaintiff, v. GREGORY SEABOLT, et al., Defendants.

No. 1:21cv906

United States District Court, M.D. North Carolina

March 25, 2024

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

L Patrick Auld United States Magistrate Judge

This case comes before the Court on “Plai[nt]iff's Motion Under Rule 60 Rel[ie]f From Order Motion to Amend and Correct Judgment[]” (Docket Entry 39 (the “Motion”) at 1 (emphasis and allcap font omitted)).^[1] For the reasons that follow, the Court will deny the Motion.^[2]

BACKGROUND

Alleging state and federal claims related to an incident on February 28, 2019, Ka'lah (Kalah) Martin (the “Plaintiff”) sued various employees of the Randolph County Sheriff's Office. (See, e.g. Docket Entry 1 (the “Complaint”), ¶¶ 2-4, 32.) Filed November 23, 2021, the Complaint includes “Defendant John Doe A,” identified as a “deputy with the Randolph County Sheriff's [Office]” who “goes by the last name[] ‘Williams'” (id., ¶ 16), and “Defendant John Doe B,” another “deputy with the Randolph County Sheriff's [Office]” who “goes by the last name[] ‘Shawver Jr.'” (id., ¶ 17). On November 30, 2021, Plaintiff obtained summonses for “Sheriff Gregory Seabolt,” “Steven Myers,” “Edward Slafky,” “Travis Short,” “Kyle Gabby,” “Travis Cox,” “Jeremiah Harrelson,” “Eric Weaver,” and “Steve Shawver Sr” (collectively, the “Named Defendants”), but not John Doe A and John Doe B, Deputies Williams and Shawver, Jr. (collectively, the “John Doe Defendants”). (Docket Entry 3 at 1-9 (all-cap font omitted).) On December 22, 2021, counsel appeared “on behalf of all Defendants” (Docket Entry 5 at 1) and accepted service of the summonses and Complaint on behalf of Named Defendants (Docket Entry 6 at 1).

On February 28, 2022, Plaintiff and Named Defendants submitted a Joint Report under Rule 26(f) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (the “Rules”). (See Docket Entry 13 (the “Rule 26(f) Report”) at 1.) The Rule 26(f) Report proposed a deadline of March 25, 2022, for “request[ing] leave to join additional parties or to amend pleadings” (id. at 2) and a deadline of August 26, 2022, for completion of all discovery (id. at 3). The Rule 26(f) Report further specified that “[t]he ‘commencement date' of discovery will begin immediately upon the submission of th[e Rule 26(f) R]eport” (id. at 2). The Court adopted the Rule 26(f) Report the following day, establishing the requested amendment and discovery deadlines.

(Text Order dated Mar. 1, 2022 (the “Scheduling Order”).) On May 5, 2022, Plaintiff served “her first set of written discovery in this discovery period,” consisting of 142 individually numbered Requests for Admission. (Docket Entry 16 at 2; see generally Docket Entry 17 (contesting extension request without disputing description of discovery).) Thereafter, Plaintiff moved to amend her Complaint, solely to remove redactions relating to defense counsel's contact information on Exhibit 1 to the Complaint. (See Docket Entry 23 at 3-7.) On July 26, 2022, Plaintiff deposed Sheriff Seabolt. (See, e.g., Docket Entry 41-5 at 1-2.) The next day, Plaintiff moved to dismiss without prejudice her individualcapacity claims against defendant Eric Weaver (see Docket Entry 24), an unopposed motion (see Docket Entry 25), which the Court promptly granted (see Text Order dated July 28, 2022). On August 10, 2022, the parties moved for a brief extension of the mediation and dispositive motions deadlines (see Docket Entry 26 at 1-2), which the Court granted (see Text Order dated Aug. 12, 2022).

On October 11, 2022, various Defendants “move[d] for summary judgment on all claims asserted in Plaintiff['s operative] Complaint.” (Docket Entry 30 (the “Summary Judgment Motion”) at 1 (emphasis added).) Plaintiff opposed the Summary Judgment Motion, but did not file her own motion for summary judgment. (See Docket Entries dated Aug. 12, 2022, to Apr. 25, 2023.) On April 25, 2023, the Court granted in part the Summary Judgment Motion, allowing only Plaintiff's state law assault and battery and Section 1983 excessive force claims against defendants Gabby, Harrelson, and Short (the “Remaining Defendants”) in their individual capacities to proceed. (See, e.g., Docket Entry 35 (the “Opinion”) at 67; see also id. at 68 (explaining that, “as to all other claims and all other Defendants, the Court will enter summary judgment against Plaintiff”).) On May 24, 2023, Remaining Defendants filed a notice of appeal from the Opinion's denial of summary judgment as to the surviving individual-capacity claims. (See Docket Entry 36 at 1.) Remaining Defendants base this interlocutory appeal upon their alleged entitlement to qualified and public official immunity as to those claims. See, e.g., Martin v. Short, No. 23-1588, Docket Entry 15 at 8-40 (4th Cir. Sept. 6, 2023). On July 22, 2023, Plaintiff filed the Motion, seeking, pursuant to Rule 60, to undo the Opinion's dismissal of John Doe Defendants and all official-capacity claims, including specifically certain claims against Gabby, as well as the Opinion's alleged sealing. (See Docket Entry 39 at 1-2.) Various Defendants filed a response in opposition to the Motion (Docket Entry 42) (the “Opposition”), to which Plaintiff failed to reply (see Docket Entries dated Aug. 7, 2023, to present).

DISCUSSION

I. Preliminary Matters

“Generally, the filing of a notice of appeal, including an interlocutory appeal, confers jurisdiction on the court of appeals and divests the district court of control over those aspects of the case involved in the appeal.” Cornelius v. City of Columbia, No. CA 3:08-2508, 2010 WL 1258012, at *2 (D.S.C. Feb. 24, 2010) internal quotation marks omitted), recommendation adopted in pertinent part, 2010 WL 1258009 (D.S.C. Mar. 26, 2010), aff'd, 428 Fed.Appx. 252 (4th Cir. 2011). Given that the Motion involves matters analytically distinct from the appropriateness of qualified and public official immunity for Remaining Defendants on Plaintiff's Section 1983 excessive force and assault and battery claims, the interlocutory appeal does not divest the Court of jurisdiction over Plaintiff's Motion. See Crutchfield v. United States Army Corps of Eng'rs, 230 F.Supp.2d 673, 680 (E.D. Va. 2002) (concluding that district court retained jurisdiction over motion seeking injunctive relief where, “in considering the request for injunctive relief[,] th[e c]ourt will consider issues different, in procedure and substance, from those on appeal to the [United States Court of Appeals for the] Fourth Circuit”).

In any event, a “district court retains jurisdiction over matters in aid of the appeal,” including considering a motion under Rule 60(b). Fobian v. Storage Tech. Corp., 164 F.3d 887, 890 (4^th Cir. 1999) (internal quotation marks omitted). Plaintiff purports to bring the Motion primarily under Rule 60(b) (see generally Docket Entries 39, 41), which provides that, “[o]n motion and just terms, the [C]ourt may relieve a party or its legal representative from a final judgment, order, or proceeding for [certain specified] reasons,” Fed.R.Civ.P. 60(b) (emphasis added). Notably, though, the Opinion constitutes an interlocutory order rather than a final judgment. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 54(b) (providing that “any order . . . that adjudicates fewer than all the claims . . . does not end the action as to any of the claims or parties” unless issuing court expressly directs entry of final judgment). Accordingly, Plaintiff's Motion “[can]not be treated under Rule[] 60 . . ., as th[at R]ule[] appl[ies] only to final judgments.” Fayetteville Invs. v. Commercial Builders, Inc., 936 F.2d 1462, 1472 (4th Cir. 1991).

“Under Rule 54(b), a district court retains the power to reconsider and modify its interlocutory judgments at any time prior to final judgment when such is warranted.” U.S. Tobacco Coop. Inc. v. Big S. Wholesale of Va., LLC, 899 F.3d 236, 256 (4th Cir. 2018) (ellipsis and internal quotation marks omitted). Although a district court possesses more flexibility to reconsider an interlocutory order than a final judgment, “the discretion afforded by Rule 54(b) is not limitless, and [the Fourth Circuit] ha[s] cabined revision pursuant to Rule 54(b) by treating interlocutory rulings as law of the case.” Id. at 256-57 (internal quotation marks omitted). “This is because, while Rule 54(b) gives a district court discretion to revisit earlier rulings in the same case, such discretion is subject to the caveat that where litigants have once battled for the court's decision, they should neither be required, nor without good reason permitted, to battle for it again.” Id. at 257 (internal quotation marks omitted).

Thus “a [district] court should only reconsider and revise an earlier ruling in three narrow circumstances: (1) if the trial produces substantially different evidence; (2) if there is a change in applicable law; or (3) when the [district] court has committed a clear error resulting in a manifest injustice.” Bethany Boardwalk Grp. LLC v. Everest Sec. Ins. Co., No. 20-2319, 2022 WL 12324609, at *6 (4th Cir. Oct. 21, 2022); accord U.S. Tobacco Coop., 899 F.3d at 257. “Of importance, a motion to reconsider is not an opportunity for a losing party to present evidence that it could have presented before the adverse ruling. And it is not sufficient for a party to show that legal precedent could support an alternative resolution.” Bethany Boardwalk, 2022 WL 12324609, at *6 (citation omitted). In this regard, “[a] prior decision does not qualify for th[e] third exception by being just maybe or probably wrong; it must strike [the reviewing court] as wrong with the force of a five-week-old, unrefrigerated dead fish. It must be dead wrong.” TFWS, Inc. v. Franchot, 572 F.3d 186, 194 (4th Cir. 2009) (citation, ellipsis, and internal quotation marks...