Martin v. Shea

• Decision Date: 06 June 1984
• Docket Number: No. 684S214,684S214
• Parties: David L. MARTIN and Donna J. Martin, Appellants (Plaintiffs Below), v. Richard SHEA, Appellee (Defendant Below).
• Court: Indiana Supreme Court

Page 1092

463 N.E.2d 1092

David L. MARTIN and Donna J. Martin, Appellants (Plaintiffs Below), v. Richard SHEA, Appellee (Defendant Below).

No. 684S214.

Supreme Court of Indiana.

June 6, 1984.

Michael G. Naville, New Albany, for appellants.

Richard L. Mattox, Richard T. Mullineaux, Orbison, O'Connor MacGregor & Mattox, New Albany, for appellee.

ON CIVIL PETITION TO TRANSFER

PRENTICE, Justice.

This cause is before us upon the petition of the Defendant, Shea (Appellee), to transfer it from the Court of Appeals, First District, which reversed the judgment of the trial court sustaining the Defendant's motion to dismiss the complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. Ind.R.P.T.R. 12(B)(6). The decision and opinion of the Court of Appeals appears at 432 N.E.2d 46 and is now ordered vacated, and the Petition to Transfer is granted inasmuch as said decision of the Court of Appeals erroneously decided a new question of law, i.e., that one in control of real property has a duty to control the conduct of social guests, whom he has permitted to enter upon it, for the protection of other such guests.

On June 23, 1979, the Plaintiffs (Appellants) David Martin and Donna Martin, his wife, attended a swimming pool party hosted by the Defendant (Appellee) Richard Shea. During the course of the evening several of the guests participated in acts of "horseplay" around the pool. David Martin did not participate in these acts of horseplay. However, as he stood near the corner of the pool he was struck from behind by one of the guests and consequently fell into the pool, striking his head on the bottom. As a result, he was rendered quadriplegic and was totally and permanently disabled.

Plaintiffs argue that the trial court erred as a matter of law in dismissing their amended complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. They allege that the Defendant, as host of the pool party and being present at the time in question, had a duty to control the conduct of those using the premises, such that one guest while engaging in acts of horseplay would not cause serious injury to another guest who was not participating in such acts. The trial court dismissed the complaint on a T.R. 12(B)(6) motion for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. We held in State v. Rankin, (1973) 260 Ind. 228, 294 N.E.2d 604 that a complaint is not subject to dismissal under Trial Rule 12(B)(6) unless it appears to a certainty that plaintiff would not be entitled to relief under any set of facts and that this rule is based on so-called "notice pleadings" in which a plaintiff essentially need only plead the operative facts involved in the litigation.

When no evidence has been heard or no affidavits have been submitted, a 12(B)(6) motion should be granted only where it is clear from the face of the complaint that under no circumstances could relief be granted.

In the case at bar, no evidence was heard and no affidavits were submitted pertaining to the question raised by the motion to dismiss. Consequently, the crucial question to be answered is whether there exist any circumstances under which relief may be granted. Research reveals that this is a case of first impression in this state. We thus turn to an examination of similar Indiana cases and cases from other jurisdictions based upon similar facts.

Our Court of Appeals, First District, following the lead of other jurisdictions extended the law of business hosts and, with Judge Neal dissenting, held that the Defendant had a duty to control the conduct of his guests for their reciprocal safety. We have determined that the majority is in error and that this action is governed by the general principles of premises liability, as set forth in the dissenting opinion of Judge Neal, which we approve and adopt as our own, as follows:

"It is undisputed that David Martin was a social guest of Richard Shea. Under Indiana law Mr. Martin was, therefore, a licensee, and Mr. Shea's duties toward him were limited. Swanson v. Shroat, (1976) 169 Ind.App. 80, 345 N.E.2d 872; Fort Wayne National Bank v. Doctor, (1971) 149 Ind.App. 365, 272 N.E.2d 876. It is presumed that the adult licensee will 'take the premises as they are, with all the uses to which the owner may subject them while there, and that he will look after his own safety and welfare, and that he has discretion and judgment to do so.' (Emphasis added.) Cleveland, Cincinnati, Chicago and St. Louis Railway Company v. Means, (1914) 59 Ind.App. 383, 405-06, 104 N.E. 785 (overruled by Fort Wayne National Bank, supra, to the extent it distinguished between active and passive negligence); quoted in Swanson, supra 169 Ind.App. at 89, 345 N.E.2d 872. Although the extent of the owner-occupier's duty toward the licensee has been variously described, the kinds of conduct for which he is liable have been categorized as positive wrongful acts, willful or wanton misconduct, and entrapment. Fort Wayne National Bank, supra. Negligence toward a licensee is not sufficient to impose liability."

The Martins alleged only negligence by Shea and contend that inasmuch as Mr. Martin's injuries were the result of activities taking place on the Shea premises, rather than a defect in their condition, premises liability principles are inapplicable. However, we agree with Judge Neal that there are two reasons why this distinction is inappropriate.

"First, the theory of liability in this case is not significantly different from that of a 'typical' premises liability case; in both the duties imposed on the owner or occupier are based on the defendant's right to control the premises. Any duty to control the conduct of another must be grounded in the right to control him. See Sports, Inc. v. Gilbert, Ind.App. 431 N.E.2d 534 (1982). Any right on the part of Mr. Shea to control his guests is derived from his right to control the property. It is anomalous to hold premises liability law inapplicable to a theory of liability intrinsically related to the control of land.

"In Sports, Inc., supra, this court cited the Restatement (Second) of Torts Sec. 315 (1965) for its statement of the general rule regarding liability for the actions of a third person.

'There is no duty so to control the conduct of a third person as to prevent him from causing physical harm to another unless

(a) a special relation exists between the actor and the third person which imposes a duty upon the actor to control the third person's conduct, or

(b) a special relation exists between the actor and the other which gives to the other a right to protection.'

In the case at bar, the crucial relationship is that between a social guest and an owner or occupier of land. In Indiana the relationship of host and guest gives no right to protection from obvious dangers, whether due to broken stairways, climbing trees, or unruly guests. It is well established that even young children are presumed to understand and appreciate the dangers of bodies of water. Harness v. Churchmembers Life Insurance Company, (1961) 241 Ind. 672, 175 N.E.2d 132; Plotzki v. Standard Oil Company of Indiana, (1950) 228 Ind. 518, 92 N.E.2d 632. Barbre v. Indianapolis Water Company, (1980) Ind.App., 400 N.E.2d 1142.

"Secondly, this case is typical of premises liability cases in that the plaintiff's injury was allegedly caused by an act or omission of the defendant relating to a condition on his premises. The relative importance of the defendant's conduct and the condition of his premises in causing the plaintiff's injuries varies from case to case. In this case the horseplay which gave rise to the injury took place because there was a swimming pool on the premises; it was the swimming pool which made those activities so dangerous and so attractive to the guests. If Mr. Shea was negligent, it was the potential dangerousness of the swimming pool which made his conduct unreasonable. It makes no sense to separate Mr. Shea's activities from the condition and use of his land.

"In Prosser's Law of Torts (4th ed. 1971) an owner or...