Martin v. Standard Oil Co. of New Jersey

Decision Date19 June 1952
Docket Number10970.,No. 10969,10969
Citation91 US App. DC 84,198 F.2d 523
PartiesMARTIN v. STANDARD OIL CO. OF NEW JERSEY et al. STANDARD OIL CO. OF NEW JERSEY v. MARTIN et al.
CourtU.S. Court of Appeals — District of Columbia Circuit

Daniel Partridge, III, Washington, D. C., for Lottie May Martin, appellant in No. 10969 and appellee in No. 10970.

John J. Courtney, Washington, D. C., for Standard Oil Company of New Jersey, appellee in No. 10969 and appellant in No. 10970.

Oliver Gasch, Asst. Corporation Counsel for the District of Columbia, Washington, D. C., with whom Vernon E. West, Corporation Counsel, Chester H. Gray, Principal Asst. Corporation Counsel, Stanley DeNeale, Asst. Corporation Counsel, and John F. Doyle, Asst. Corporation Counsel, Washington, D. C. were on the brief, for appellee District of Columbia.

Warren E. Magee, Washington, D. C. with whom Burdette M. Asbill was on the brief, for appellee Gulf Oil Corporation.

Before EDGERTON, CLARK, and PRETTYMAN, Circuit Judges.

EDGERTON, Circuit Judge.

Appellant Lottie May Martin asks an injunction to require the Standard Oil Company of New Jersey (Standard) and the Gulf Oil Corporation (Gulf) to remove a pier and piles in the Anacostia River in the District of Columbia. The controversy concerns the location of the wharfing rights of riparian owners. It arises from the fact that the dry-land boundaries between the riparian lots do not run at right angles to the river. While these boundaries are straight and run east and west, the river curves and runs generally southwest or, more nearly, west of south.

Martin owns lots 6, 7, and 8 in Square E of 664, at the corner of South Capitol and S Streets. Her land is bounded on the north by S Street, which runs east to the river. Her south boundary also runs east to the river. She says these boundaries continue due east into the river, either to the "channel" or to the bulkhead line established by the Secretary of War (now the Secretary of the Army) pursuant to the Rivers and Harbors Act of 1899, 30 Stat. 1151, § 11, 33 U.S.C.A. § 404, as amended 37 Stat. 206, 33 U.S.C.A. § 405. Martin's wharf runs into the river beyond the bulkhead line. It was built or rebuilt in 1931. Martin contends that a pier and piles that Standard and Gulf erected in 1946 encroach on her riparian area.

Appellee Gulf owns lot 4 in Square S of 708 which is bounded on the south, and therefore separated from Martin's land, by S Street. Standard owns lots 1, 2, and 3 in Square S of 708, directly north of Gulf's lot. These lots, like Martin's, run down to the river. In the 1930s Gulf, with the approval of the United States Engineers and with a building permit from the District of Columbia, built a wharf and dock. At the bulkhead line, the wharf is between the intersections of that line with Gulf's lot lines. It runs into the river at right angles to the bulkhead line. The dock at the end of the wharf runs at right angles to it in the direction of S Street.

In 1944 Standard conveyed land to the District for abutments of the South Capitol Street Bridge. This made useless a wharf that Standard had built in front of its land. The District therefore agreed to, and did, permit Standard to extend the Gulf dock, between lines drawn at right angles to the bulkhead line and intersecting that line where the boundaries of S Street intersect it. Gulf authorized Standard to make this extension. The United States Engineers approved the permit. The extension was built in 1946.

The District Court dismissed Martin's complaint. It found that the Gulf-Standard structure did not encroach on her riparian area. It found that her riparian area lies "within lines drawn from points where the northerly and southerly lines of her Lots * * * extended due east intersect the present bulkhead line and running thence at right angles to the said bulkhead line between parallel lines to the channel * *." This finding conforms to the so-called Hazen plan which we discuss below.

Both Martin and Standard appeal; Martin on the theory that her riparian boundaries are projections of her lot lines from the bulkhead line to the pierhead line, Standard on the theory that though Martin's complaint was rightly dismissed, riparian boundaries should have been found by projection from the points where lot lines cross the high water mark of 1794 and not from the points where they cross the bulkhead line. On Martin's theory, but not on either the District Court's or Standard's, the Gulf-Standard dock extends into Martin's riparian area. Standard concedes that its rights are not directly affected by the District Court's judgment.

I. Projection of lot lines: the Dermott plat. When Washington was laid out in the early 1790s, Square E of 664 was part of Carrollsburg on the Anacostia River or, as it was then called, the Eastern Branch. Martin's predecessors conveyed land in Carrollsburg to trustees who in turn, by agreement, conveyed it to land commissioners for use in laying out the new city. In 1794 the grantors received in return land equal in area to the land they gave up and "in as good a situation", i. e. bordering on the river. United States v. Belt, 79 U.S.App.D.C. 87 at page 91, 142 F.2d 761 at page 765. In 1792 Major Ellicott, surveyor to the land commissioners, prepared a plan of Washington that showed wharves extending into the river at right angles to the shore line, but this plan was never approved. The land commissioners directed Dermott, who succeeded Ellicott in 1793, to resurvey and plat the Carrollsburg lands. Dermott's plat showed the boundaries of the shore lots as continuing due east into the river. Morris v. U. S., 174 U.S. 196, at 221, 19 S.Ct. 649, at page 661, 43 L.Ed. 946. President Washington approved Dermott's plat in 1797. 174 U.S. at 256, 268, 19 S.Ct. at pages 673, 677, 43 L.Ed. 946. 79 U.S.App. D.C. 91, 142 F.2d 765. Martin contends that the riparian area, thus defined, of her lots became vested in her predecessors, and that its boundaries could not be changed except to meet needs of navigation.

Though the record shows no express grant of a specific riparian area to Martin's predecessors, the conveyances to them by the land commissioners carried rights to wharf out into the river. United States v. Martin, 85 U.S.App.D.C. 382, 177 F.2d 733, certiorari denied, 339 U.S. 957, 70 S.Ct. 979, 94 L.Ed. 1368. But the commissioners not only did not, but could not, permanently fix the boundaries of these rights: "the only power given to the commissioners was to grant licenses, from time to time, and until congress should assume and exercise its jurisdiction within the territory * * *. The licenses contemplated therefore were temporary, and liable to be withdrawn by congress on assuming jurisdiction." Morris v. United States, 174 U.S. 196, 282, 19 S.Ct. 649, 683, 43 L.Ed. 946. And the conveyances from the land commissioners were made before 1797, when President Washington approved the Dermott plat. We agree with the District Court that Martin's riparian boundaries did not become fixed in accordance with this plat.

Potomac Steam-Boat Co. v. Upper Potomac Steam-Boat Co., 109 U.S. 672, 3 S.Ct. 445, 27 L.Ed. 1070, and Morris v. United States, 174 U.S. 196, 19 S.Ct. 649, 43 L.Ed. 946, review the early development of Washington. A regulation adopted by commissioners in 1795 permitted owners of river lots to build wharves in the Potomac and the Eastern Branch "`as they think convenient and proper, not injuring or interrupting navigation, leaving a space, wherever the general plan of the streets in the city requires it, of equal breadth with those streets * * *.'" 109 U.S. at page 675, 3 S.Ct. at page 446, 27 L.Ed. 1070. In 1795 the commissioners submitted this regulation to President Washington with a statement implying that riparian boundaries ran at right angles to the river: "`no wharves, except by the public, can be erected * * * on the streets at right angles with the water * * *.'" 109 U. S. at pages 676, 688, 3 S.Ct. at page 455. Later official correspondence implies that approval of the Dermott plat in 1797 was not meant to change or fix riparian boundaries. Nicholas King, surveyor of the city, wrote to President Jefferson in 1803: "`In laying off the city, * * * they stopped * * * on the bank of the river, sold the lots on the high ground with a water privilege, without defining either what the privilege is, or the extent or direction in which the purchasers were to wharf and improve.'" 109 U.S. at 691, 3 S.Ct. at page 457. In 1806 King wrote the President regarding the regulation of 1795 and various plans of the city: "`The principle adopted in the engraved plan the Ellicott plan; 174 U.S. at 269, 19 S.Ct. at page 678, 43 L.Ed. 946 if carried into effect and finally established in the plan now laid out upon the ground, * * will define the extent and privileges of water lots, and enable the owners to improve without fear of infringing on the rights of others.'" 174 U.S. at 258, 19 S. Ct. at page 674, 43 L.Ed. 946 II. "Normal" or right-angle projection: the Hazen plat. Gulf and the District, impleaded as a third party defendant by Gulf, contend that (1) Congress authorized the Commissioners of the District of Columbia to establish riparian boundaries and (2) the Commissioners did so by adopting the so-called Hazen plat. We agree with the first contention but not the second.

(1) We said in 1944 that the commonlaw right of riparian owners in the Carrollsburg area is as was "declared in Baltimore & O....

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