Martin v. State, 011419 INSC, 29A04-1712-CR-02992

Docket Nº:29A04-1712-CR-02992
Opinion Judge:Loretta H. Rush Chief Justice of Indiana.
Party Name:Timothy D. Martin, Appellant(s), v. State Of Indiana, Appellee(s).
Judge Panel:David, J., Massa, J., and Slaughter, J., vote to deny transfer. Rush, Chief Justice, dissenting. Goff, J., joins.
Case Date:January 14, 2019
Court:Supreme Court of Indiana

Timothy D. Martin, Appellant(s),


State Of Indiana, Appellee(s).

No. 29A04-1712-CR-02992

Supreme Court of Indiana

January 14, 2019

Trial Court Case No. 29C01-0102-CF-5


Loretta H. Rush Chief Justice of Indiana.

This matter has come before the Indiana Supreme Court on a petition to transfer jurisdiction, filed pursuant to Indiana Appellate Rules 56(B) and 57, following the issuance of a decision by the Court of Appeals. The Court has reviewed the decision of the Court of Appeals, and the submitted record on appeal, all briefs filed in the Court of Appeals, and all materials filed in connection with the request to transfer jurisdiction have been made available to the Court for review. Each participating member has had the opportunity to voice that Justice's views on the case in conference with the other Justices, and each participating member of the Court has voted on the petition.

Being duly advised, the Court DENIES the petition to transfer.

David, J., Massa, J., and Slaughter, J., vote to deny transfer.

Rush, Chief Justice, dissenting.

Are additional procedural safeguards necessary to ensure that indigent Hoosiers aren't incarcerated for probation violations that result simply from their poverty? Yes-and it's imperative that this Court explicitly establish those protections. Today, however, this Court declines to do so, and I thus respectfully dissent from the denial of transfer.

"[T]o prevent indigent defendants from being imprisoned because of their inability to pay," Garrett v. State, 680 N.E.2d 1, 2 (Ind.Ct.App. 1997), the Indiana General Assembly enacted a statute mandating that "[p]robation may not be revoked for failure to comply with conditions of a sentence that imposes financial obligations on the person unless the person recklessly, knowingly, or intentionally fails to pay," Ind. Code § 35-38-2-3(g) (2018); see Pub. L. No. 311, § 3(e), 1983 Ind. Acts 1861, 1877. But this statutory requirement is not the only limit on probation revocation for a person who is unable to pay. See Runyon v. State, 939 N.E.2d 613, 616 (Ind. 2010) (recognizing that "more may be required beyond satisfaction of [Indiana's] statut[e]").

The due process and equal potection guarantees of the Federal Constitution impose their own procedural and substantive limits. See Black v. Romano, 471 U.S. 606, 610 (1983). The Supreme Court of the United States held in Bearden v. Georgia that courts may not revoke a defendant's probation for failure to pay a fine or restitution without first making an inquiry into the reason for that failure: If the probationer could not pay despite sufficient bona fide efforts to acquire the resources to do so, the court must consider alternative measures of punishment other than imprisonment. Only if alternative measures are not adequate to meet the State's interests in punishment and deterrence may the court imprison a probationer who has made...

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