Martin v. State

• Decision Date: 09 November 1898
• Citation: 25 So. 255,119 Ala. 1
• Parties: MARTIN v. STATE.
• Court: Alabama Supreme Court

25 So. 255

119 Ala. 1

MARTIN v. STATE.

Supreme Court of Alabama

November 9, 1898

Appeal from city court of Gadsden; John H. Disque, Judge.

Frank Martin was convicted of murder, and he appeals. Reversed.

Coleman J., dissenting.

The appellant was indicted and tried for the murder of William Alexander, was convicted of murder in the first degree, and sentenced to the penitentiary for life. The defendant pleaded not guilty, and not guilty by reason of insanity. The evidence for the state tended to show that the defendant and the deceased had a quarrel about a monkey wrench; that the deceased was seen running with the monkey wrench in his hand and the defendant running after him, holding an ax in his hand; that, after running about 75 steps, the deceased turned to the left, and, as he did so, the defendant struck him with the ax, and the deceased fell on his knees; that, as the defendant struck the deceased a second blow, he (the deceased) struck the defendant in the head with the monkey wrench; that the defendant then struck the deceased in the head with the ax, knocking him to the ground, and then hit him four times after he had fallen, from the effects of which the deceased died where he fell. The testimony introduced in behalf of the defendant was directed to the establishment of the plea of insanity. A physician examined on behalf of the defendant testified that he was weak-minded and of weak intellect, but that, in his opinion, the defendant was capable of doing business, and knew right from wrong. There were several witnesses introduced in behalf of the defendant who testified as to his having been weak-minded. The mother father, and sister of the defendant testified that he was given to having spells once a month, at which time he was unable to distinguish between right and wrong. There was also evidence on behalf of the defendant to the effect that, when the defendant's passions were aroused, he seemed to lose his mind entirely. The state, in rebuttal, introduced evidence tending to show that the defendant was capable of distinguishing between right and wrong, and was employed at different times as other men, and acted as other men did. During the examination of John Higgins, one of the state's witnesses, and after he had testified to the circumstances of the killing, he was asked by the defendant the following question: "Didn't you, in the presence of the Woodards, at the engine, after the killing, tell A. L Martin, the father of the defendant, that Alexander struck at the defendant twice before the defendant struck at deceased?" The witness answered that he did not tell him that. Upon the redirect examination of this witness, he was asked by the state the following question: "Did you have any conversation at the place and time asked about by the defendant?" Upon the witness answering that he did, the state then asked him to tell what he did say about the number of licks. The defendant objected to this question asked the witness by the state, on the grounds that it was illegal, irrelevant, and incompetent, and because it was hearsay, and the conversation did not take place in the presence of the defendant. The court overruled the objection, and the defendant then and there duly excepted. The portions of the court's oral charge to which exceptions were reserved are sufficiently stated in the opinion.

The defendant requested the court to give to the jury, among others, the following written charges, and separately excepted to the court's refusal to give each of them as asked: (1) "The court charges the jury that, in order to sustain the defense of insanity, it is not necessary that the insanity of the accused be established by a preponderance of the evidence; but if, from all the evidence, the jury entertain a reasonable doubt as to the sanity of the accused they should find him not guilty under his plea of insanity." (2) "The court charges the jury that, while the law presumes every man to be sane and responsible for his acts until the contrary appears from the evidence, still, if there is evidence in the case tending to rebut this presumption sufficient to raise a reasonable doubt upon the issues of sanity, then the jury should give the defendant the benefit of the doubt, and find him not guilty under his plea of insanity." (3) "The court charges the jury that if they reasonably believe from all the evidence in this case that the deceased struck the first blow, and the defendant, by reason of the lick on the head and his weak intellect, was unable to control his actions at the time the fatal blow was struck, then they must find the defendant not guilty under his plea of insanity." (4) "The court charges the jury that the existence or nonexistence of sanity is a question for the jury, to be determined from all the evidence in the case; and, if the jury have a reasonable doubt as to whether the defendant was insane when he struck the fatal blow, then they should find him not guilty under his plea of insanity." (7) "The court charges the jury that if the killing was the result of a blow by the deceased, which, by reason of the weak intellect of the defendant and the violence of the blow received by the defendant, rendered him incapable of controlling his actions, they should find him not guilty under his plea of insanity." (8) "The court charges the jury that, when insanity is set up as a defense in a criminal case, the burden of proof is not on the defendant to establish his insanity by a preponderance of the evidence; but, if all the evidence raises in the minds of the jury a reasonable doubt as to whether or not the defendant was insane when he struck the fatal blow, they should find him not guilty under his plea of insanity." (9) "The court charges the jury that, when the plea of insanity is interposed in a criminal case, the burden of proof is on the state to show to the satisfaction of the jury that the defendant was sane at the time of the commission of the crime charged; and if, from the whole evidence, they have a reasonable doubt as to the sanity of the defendant at the time of the commission of the alleged crime, they must find him not guilty by reason of insanity." (10) "The court charges the jury that if they have a reasonable doubt, from all the evidence, whether the defendant had the capacity to distinguish between right and wrong as to the particular act or inability to refrain from doing the act, there is no legal responsibility; and, unless the jury are so satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt, they should find the defendant not guilty by reason of insanity." (11) "The court charges the jury that, if the evidence as to his insanity raises a reasonable doubt in the minds of the jury, they must give the defendant the benefit of that doubt, and find him not guilty under his plea of insanity." (12) "The court charges the jury that unless they are satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt, from all the evidence, that the defendant was sane at the time of the commission of the alleged offense, they must find him not guilty under his plea of insanity." (13) "The court charges the jury that, to warrant a conviction in this case, it is incumbent on the state to establish, by evidence to the satisfaction of the jury, beyond a reasonable doubt, the existence of every element necessary to constitute the offense alleged; and if the jury, after a careful and impartial examination of all the evidence in the case, entertain a reasonable doubt of the defendant's sanity, they should give him the benefit of the doubt, and find him not guilty under his plea of insanity." (14) "The court charges the jury that, if they believe from all the evidence that the defendant was moved to action by reason of the blow and insane impulse by reason of his weak intellect which controlled his will, then the jury should find him not guilty under his plea of insanity." (16) "The court charges the jury that it is the law in this state that if there be either incapacity to distinguish between right and wrong as to the particular act, or inability to refrain from doing the act, there is no legal responsibility; and the jury should, if they have a reasonable doubt as to whether the defendant had the capacity or the ability to refrain from...