Martin v. State
Decision Date | 04 May 2018 |
Docket Number | Case No. 2D16–4468 |
Citation | 313 So.3d 658 |
Parties | Tymothy Ray MARTIN, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee. |
Court | Florida District Court of Appeals |
Howard L. Dimmig, II, Public Defender and Kevin Briggs, Assistant Public Defender, Bartow, for Appellant.
Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Tallahassee and Jonathan A. Hurley, Assistant Attorney General, Tampa, for Appellee.
Tymothy Martin appeals his judgment and sentence for one count of felony battery. Mr. Martin raises several issues on appeal. Because we hold that section 776.032, Florida Statutes (2016), applies retroactively to his case, we reverse and remand for the circuit court to convene a new "Stand Your Ground" hearing under the statute as amended. Mr. Martin's remaining issues are without merit.
One evening in February of 2016, Mr. Martin and his girlfriend, Kathryn Lawson, went out for a night on the town that ended in an altercation in a McDonald's parking lot over who should drive to their next destination. According to Ms. Lawson, Mr. Martin punched her twice in the face after she refused to get into the vehicle. According to Mr. Martin, it was he who refused to get in the car, which prompted Ms. Lawson to threaten him with a firearm; he attempted to disarm her, and in the ensuing scuffle, elbowed her in the face (and, at some point, somehow got himself shot in the arm).
The State charged Mr. Martin with one count of felony battery causing great bodily harm, permanent disability, or permanent disfigurement under section 784.041(1), Florida Statutes (2016). Mr. Martin filed a motion to establish immunity under section 776.032. The trial court held a hearing on the motion and ultimately denied it, ruling that "[a]fter hearing the testimony of the witnesses, the review of the evidence that has been offered as exhibits, the court finds that the defense has not met their burden and I'll deny the motion." (Emphasis added.) Mr. Martin's case proceeded to a jury trial, and he was convicted as charged.
Mr. Martin filed the present appeal, but while this appeal was pending, the Florida Legislature amended section 776.032 to modify which party bears the burden of proof in a self-defense immunity hearing. See ch. 2017–72, § 1, at 898–99, Laws of Fla. (2017).1 The Florida Legislature's amendment to section 776.032 added the following provision:
(4) In a criminal prosecution, once a prima facie claim of self-defense immunity from criminal prosecution has been raised by the defendant at a pretrial immunity hearing, the burden of proof by clear and convincing evidence is on the party seeking to overcome the immunity from criminal prosecution provided in subsection (1).
Thus, as it now stands, the State bears the burden of disproving, by clear and convincing evidence, a facially sufficient claim of self-defense immunity in a criminal prosecution. On appeal, Mr. Martin argues that this amendment is retroactive in its application, that it applies to his case, and that he is entitled to a new immunity hearing. We agree.
We begin with some basic postulates about the application of statutory amendments. Statutory amendments may take one of three forms: substantive, which are usually applied prospectively, or procedural or remedial, either of which may apply retroactively to pending proceedings. See Orlando v. Desjardins, 493 So.2d 1027, 1028 (Fla. 1986). Whether a statutory amendment is characterized as substantive versus procedural in nature becomes a critical determination for purposes of an amendment's temporal application.2 See R.A.M. of S. Fla., Inc. v. WCI Cmtys., Inc., 869 So.2d 1210, 1216 (Fla. 2d DCA 2004) ( ); Merrill Lynch Tr. Co. v. Alzheimer's Lifeliners Ass'n, 832 So.2d 948, 952 (Fla. 2d DCA 2002) (); Webb v. Webb, 765 So.2d 220, 221 (Fla. 2d DCA 2000) ; Basel v. McFarland & Sons, Inc., 815 So.2d 687, 692 (Fla. 5th DCA 2002) . Broadly speaking, substantive law is that which "prescribes duties and rights," while "procedural law concerns the means and methods to apply and enforce those duties and rights." Alamo Rent–A–Car, Inc. v. Mancusi, 632 So.2d 1352, 1358 (Fla. 1994). Amendments are procedural in nature if they "do not create new or take away vested rights, but only operate in furtherance of the remedy or confirmation of rights already existing." Smiley v. State, 966 So.2d 330, 334 (Fla. 2007) (quoting City of Lakeland v. Catinella, 129 So.2d 133, 136 (Fla. 1961) ). In the context of criminal cases specifically, "substantive law is that which declares what acts are crimes and prescribes the punishment therefor, while procedural law is that which provides or regulates the steps by which one who violates a criminal statute is punished." State v. Garcia, 229 So.2d 236, 238 (Fla. 1969). Discerning the precise contours between these distinctions can occasionally pose a challenge. Cf. Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 471, 85 S.Ct. 1136, 14 L.Ed.2d 8 (1965) (). But this amendment does not appear to be one of those occasions.
In Florida, statutory changes to the burden of proof—the change at issue here—are invariably deemed procedural in nature for purposes of retroactive application.3 See, e.g., Shaps v. Provident Life & Acc. Ins. Co., 826 So.2d 250, 254 (Fla. 2002) (); Walker & LaBerge, Inc. v. Halligan, 344 So.2d 239, 243 (Fla. 1977) ( ; Kenz v. Miami–Dade County, 116 So.3d 461, 464 (Fla. 3d DCA 2013) (); see also Ziccardi v. Strother, 570 So.2d 1319, 1321 (Fla. 2d DCA 1990) ( ).4 In light of Florida's precedents on this point, we need not belabor the analysis. Subsection (4) now ascribes to the State what had, under common law precedent, been the defendant's burden of proof. That is not a substantive change. Neither the substantive rights of a successful claim of immunity nor the necessary elements of proof to establish a claim of immunity were altered by the June 9, 2017, amendment. Cf. Metro. Dade County v. Chase Fed. Hous. Corp., 737 So.2d 494, 499 (Fla. 1999) ) ) . As such, under Florida law, it is a procedural amendment that the legislature wrought, one which can be applied retrospectively.5
We must next determine whether Mr. Martin's case was "pending" at the time of the June 9, 2017, amendment. Our court has observed that "procedural or remedial changes [to statutes] may be immediately applied to pending cases, including in some instances cases pending on direct appeal." Heilmann v. State, 310 So.2d 376, 377 (Fla. 2d DCA 1975) (footnote omitted); see also Rothermel v. Fla. Parole & Prob. Comm'n, 441 So.2d 663, 665 (Fla. 1st DCA 1983) (); Turner v. United States, 410 F.2d 837, 842 (5th Cir. 1969) (); Bowles v. Strickland, 151 F.2d 419, 420 (5th Cir. 1945) (). So, too, we conclude that Mr. Martin's case was still pending when the legislature amended section 776.032 by virtue of his appeal pending before this court.
Adhering to stare decisis, we must hold that the June 9, 2017, amendment to section 776.032 changing the burden of proof was procedural in nature. Because his appeal remained pending before us at the time the amendment took effect, the amendment should be applied to Mr. Martin's case. How to now apply it is the only issue left to decide. We address the scope of remand below.
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