Martin v. State

• Decision Date: 25 January 2019
• Docket Number: Court of Appeals Case No. 29A04-1712-CR-2992
• Parties: Timothy D. MARTIN, Appellant, v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee.
• Court: Indiana Supreme Court

115 N.E.3d 1272 (Mem)

Timothy D. MARTIN, Appellant,

v.STATE of Indiana, Appellee.

Court of Appeals Case No. 29A04-1712-CR-2992

Supreme Court of Indiana.

Filed January 25, 2019

Order

Loretta H. Rush, Chief Justice of Indiana

This matter has come before the Indiana Supreme Court on a petition to transfer jurisdiction, filed pursuant to Indiana Appellate Rules 56(B) and 57, following the issuance of a decision by the Court of Appeals. The Court has reviewed the decision of the Court of Appeals, and the submitted record on appeal, all briefs filed in the Court of Appeals, and all materials filed in connection with the request to transfer jurisdiction have been made available to the Court for review. Each participating member has had the opportunity to voice that Justice's views on the case in conference with the other Justices, and each participating member of the Court has voted on the petition.

Being duly advised, the Court DENIES the petition to transfer.

David, J., Massa, J., and Slaughter, J., vote to deny transfer.

Rush, C.J., dissents from the denial of transfer with separate opinion in which Goff, J., joins.

Rush, Chief Justice, dissenting.

Are additional procedural safeguards necessary to ensure that indigent Hoosiers aren't incarcerated for probation violations that result simply from their poverty? Yes—and it's imperative that this Court explicitly establish those protections. Today, however, this Court declines to do so, and I thus respectfully dissent from the denial of transfer.

"[T]o prevent indigent defendants from being imprisoned because of their inability to pay," Garrett v. State , 680 N.E.2d 1, 2 (Ind. Ct. App. 1997), the Indiana General Assembly enacted a statute mandating that "[p]robation may not be revoked for failure to comply with conditions of a sentence that imposes financial obligations on the person unless the person recklessly, knowingly, or intentionally fails to pay," Ind. Code § 35-38-2-3(g) (2018) ; see Pub. L. No. 311, § 3(e), 1983 Ind. Acts 1861, 1877. But this statutory requirement is not the only limit on probation revocation for a person who is unable to pay. See Runyon v. State , 939 N.E.2d 613, 616 (Ind. 2010) (recognizing that "more may be required beyond satisfaction of [Indiana's] statut[e]").

The due process and equal protection guarantees of the Federal Constitution impose their own procedural and substantive limits. See Black v. Romano , 471 U.S. 606, 610, 105 S.Ct. 2254, 85 L.Ed.2d 636 (1985). The Supreme Court of the United States held in Bearden v. Georgia that courts may not revoke a defendant's probation for failure to pay a fine or restitution without first making an inquiry into the reason for that failure:

If the probationer could not pay despite sufficient bona fide efforts to acquire the resources to do so, the court must consider alternative measures of punishment other than imprisonment. Only if alternative measures are not adequate to meet the State's interests in punishment and deterrence may the court imprison a probationer who has made sufficient bona fide efforts to pay.

461 U.S. 660, 672, 103 S.Ct. 2064, 76 L.Ed.2d 221 (1983). The Bearden Court reasoned that "[t]o do otherwise would deprive the probationer of his conditional freedom simply because, through no fault of his own, he cannot pay the fine." 461 U.S. at 672–73, 103 S.Ct. 2064.

Although Bearden specifically addressed only fines and restitution, its reasoning applies equally to other "conditions of a sentence that imposes financial obligations on the person," I.C. § 35-38-2-3(g). This is because, whether the condition is a fine, restitution, or some other financial obligation, to imprison the probationer simply because he cannot pay "would be contrary to the fundamental fairness required by the Fourteenth Amendment." Bearden , 461 U.S. at 673, 103 S.Ct. 2064 ; see United States v. Parks , 89 F.3d 570, 572–73 (9th Cir. 1996) ; People v. Souffrance , 94 A.D.3d 1024, 942 N.Y.S.2d 180 (N.Y. App. Div. 2012) ; State v. Miller , 180 Wash.App. 413, 325 P.3d 230, 236–37 (2014) ; cf. Whedon v. State , 765 N.E.2d 1276, 1279 (Ind. 2002) ; Henderson v. State , 44 N.E.3d 811, 815 (Ind. Ct. App. 2015).

Thus, when a defendant is too poor to meet a probation condition that imposes a financial obligation, Section 35-38-2-3(g) and Bearden offer protection from revocation. In other words, incarceration is reserved for those who can pay, but won't—not for those who merely can't pay.

But how do we ensure this is faithfully executed in Indiana courts? By implementing simple procedural safeguards. Specifically, before a trial court revokes probation and imposes incarceration for failure to meet a financial obligation, it should be required to enter findings about

(1) the financial resources the court relied on to conclude that nonpayment was willful; or

(2) if the defendant was not at fault for nonpayment, why alternatives to incarceration are inadequate, in the particular case, to meet the State's interests in punishment and deterrence.

These findings align not only with the statutory and constitutional demands described above, but also with a recommendation from a 2017 bench card for judges, produced by The National Task Force on Fines, Fees and Bail Practices. National Center for State Courts, Lawful Collection of Legal Financial Obligations: A Bench Card for Judges (2017), https://www.ncsc.org/~/media/Images/Topics/Fines% 20Fees/BenchCard_FINAL_Feb2_2017.ashx (last visited Jan. 14, 2019). Moreover, as Judge Robb aptly observed, these findings would "protect constitutional principles of fundamental fairness, and significantly aid [appellate] review of such cases." Martin v. State , No. 29A04-1712-CR-2992, 2018 WL 4275412, at *9 n.4 (Ind. Ct. App. Aug. 27, 2018) (unpublished decision) (Robb, J., dissenting). These compelling reasons to implement simple procedural safeguards are further underscored by the facts of this case.

Here, Timothy Martin pleaded guilty to and was convicted of three counts of child molestation. Martin then served nearly fourteen years in the Department of Correction before being released to probation, which included special conditions related to his status as an adult sex offender. Approximately nine months after his release, the State alleged that Martin had failed to provide written verification demonstrating his completion of required evaluations and programs. Martin admitted to the violations, and he was ordered to serve two years of his previously suspended sentence, on work release with Hamilton County Community Corrections.

During his time on Community Corrections, Martin worked at a Wendy's in Noblesville, Indiana. After the successful completion of his two-year executed sentence on work release, Martin was released and placed back on probation. At the time of his release, Martin owed over $ 3,500 in court fees, had no driver's license,¹ and no longer had a consistent place to sleep each night. He was homeless.

Martin continued his employment with the Wendy's in Noblesville. But without a place to live, in June he moved to Anderson, Indiana, to stay with his sister and her family. Because of the distance and an inability to pay for and secure transportation, he lost his job.

Martin testified he was also therefore unable to pay for and attend four required sex offender counseling sessions that summer. The State then filed a notice of probation violation against Martin. The information alleged, in part, a violation of a condition that required Martin to "attend, actively participate in and successfully complete a court-approved sex offender treatment program." That same condition stated that "[p]rompt payment...