Martin v. State
Decision Date | 03 October 2011 |
Docket Number | No. C11-2036-LRR,C11-2036-LRR |
Parties | EDWARD MARTIN, III, Plaintiff, v. STATE OF IOWA, BRAD WALZ, J. BRANDT, J. SULLIVAN, J. PRITCHARD, WATERLOO WORK RELEASE, ELLEN POLLAND, MARGRET SHIPLEY, ROXANE PHILLIPS, JAMES COIL, FORT DODGE CORRECTIONAL STAFF, ROCKWELL CORRECTIONAL STAFF, CLARINDA CORRECTIONAL STAFF, Defendants. |
Court | U.S. District Court — Northern District of Iowa |
INITIAL REVIEW ORDER
This matter is before the court on the plaintiff's application to proceed in forma pauperis (docket no. 1). The plaintiff filed such application on July 8, 2011. Along with his application to proceed in forma pauperis, the plaintiff submitted a complaint under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Additionally, the plaintiff supplemented either his application to proceed in forma pauperis or his complaint under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 on August 4, 2011 and September 12, 2011 (docket nos. 2, 3 & 4).
I. IN FORMA PAUPERIS UNDER 28 U.S.C. § 1915
Based on the plaintiff's application to proceed in forma pauperis, the court concludes that the plaintiff does not have sufficient funds to pay the required filing fee. 28 U.S.C. § 1914(a) (requiring $350.00 filing fee). Thus, in forma pauperis status shall be granted to the plaintiff. See generally 28 U.S.C. § 1915. The clerk's office shall file the complaint without the prepayment of the filing fee. Although the court deemed it appropriate to grant the plaintiff in forma pauperis status, the plaintiff is required to paythe full $350.00 filing fee by making payments on an installment basis. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1); see also In re Tyler, 110 F.3d 528, 529-30 (8th Cir. 1997) (). The full filing fee will be collected even if the court dismisses the case because it is frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted, or seeks money damages against a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2).
Here, the plaintiff must pay an initial partial filing fee in the amount of 20 percent of the greater of his average monthly account balance or average monthly deposits for the six months preceding the filing of the complaint. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1). Based on his average monthly deposits, the court finds that the initial partial filing fee is $9.07. Id. The plaintiff shall submit $9.07 by no later than October 18, 2011. Id. If necessary, the plaintiff may request in a written motion an extension of time to pay the initial partial filing fee.
28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(2). Therefore, after the plaintiff pays in full the initial partial filing fee, the remaining installments shall be collected by the institution having custody of theplaintiff. Id. The clerk's office shall send a copy of this order and the notice of collection of filing fee to the appropriate official at the place where the plaintiff is an inmate.
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
A pro se complaint must be liberally construed. See Hughes v. Rowe, 449 U.S. 5, 9, 101 S. Ct. 173, 66 L. Ed. 2d 163 (1980); Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520, 92 S. Ct. 594, 30 L. Ed. 2d 652 (1972) (per curiam); Smith v. St. Bernards Reg'l Med. Ctr., 19 F.3d 1254, 1255 (8th Cir. 1994). In addition, unless the facts alleged are clearly baseless, they must be weighed in favor of the plaintiff. Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 32-33, 112 S. Ct. 1728, 118 L. Ed. 2d 340 (1992). A court, however, can dismiss at any time a complaint filed in forma pauperis if the complaint is frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2); 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1). A claim is "frivolous" if it "lacks an arguable basis in law or in fact." Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325, 109 S. Ct. 1827, 104 L. Ed. 2d 338 (1989); accord Cokeley v. Endell, 27 F.3d 331, 332 (8th Cir. 1994). An action fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted if it does not plead "enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face." Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570, 127 S. Ct. 1955, 167 L. Ed. 2d 929 (2007). Accordingly, a court may review the complaint and dismiss sua sponte those claims that fail "'to raise a right to relief above the speculative level. . . see Parkhurst v. Tabor, 569 F.3d 861, 865 (8th Cir. 2009) (quoting Bell Atl., 550 U.S. at 555), or that are premised on meritless legal theories or clearly lack any factual basis, see Neitzke, 490 U.S. at 325. See, e.g., Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. at 27 (considering frivolousness); Myers v. Vogal, 960 F.2d 750, 751 (8th Cir. 1992) ( ).
III. CLAIM ASSERTED
Currently confined at the Iowa Medical and Classification Center in Coralville, Iowa, the plaintiff, proceeding pro se, submitted a complaint to redress issues that arerelated to criminal proceedings. The plaintiff predicates jurisdiction on 28 U.S.C. § 1343. Under 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b), venue appears proper as the defendants are located in this district and the events giving rise to the instant action occurred in this district.
In his complaint, the plaintiff makes clear that he is complaining about events that occurred from 2003 to 2006 and that relate to criminal cases brought by the State of Iowa. As relief, the plaintiff states that he wants the court to: (1) order the defendants to pay his child support, fines and court costs; (2) award him $100,000 for the mental anguish that he has suffered; (3) expunge his record; and (4) notify the public as to the outcome of his case.
IV. ANALYSIS
Title 42 U.S.C. § 1983 provides, in relevant part:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory . . . subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress . . .
42 U.S.C. § 1983 was designed to provide a "broad remedy for violations of federally protected civil rights." Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 685, 98 S. Ct. 2018, 56 L. Ed. 2d 611 (1978). However, 42 U.S.C. § 1983 provides no substantive rights. Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 271, 114 S. Ct. 807, 127 L. Ed. 2d 114 (1994); Graham v. Conner, 490 U.S. 386, 393-94, 109 S. Ct. 1865, 104 L. Ed. 2d 443 (1989); Chapman v. Houston Welfare Rights Org., 441 U.S. 600, 617, 99 S. Ct. 1905, 60 L. Ed. 2d 508 (1979). "One cannot go into court and claim a 'violation of [42 U.S.C.] § 1983' — for [42 U.S.C.] § 1983 by itself does not protect anyone against anything." Chapman, 441 U.S. at 617. Rather, 42 U.S.C. § 1983 provides a remedy for violations of all"rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws [of the United States]." 42 U.S.C. § 1983; see also Albright, 510 U.S. at 271 ( ); Graham, 490 U.S. at 393-94 (same); Maine v. Thiboutot, 448 U.S. 1, 4, 100 S. Ct. 2502, 65 L. Ed. 2d 555 (1980) ( ). To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must establish: (1) the violation of a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States, and (2) the alleged deprivation of that right was committed by a person acting under color of state law. West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48, 108 S. Ct. 2250, 101 L. Ed. 2d 40 (1988).
Based on the facts alleged, it is clear that the plaintiff does not state a viable claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The applicable statute of limitations is the period governing personal injury actions. Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261, 276-80, 105 S. Ct. 1938, 85 L. Ed. 2d 254 (1985); see also City of Rancho Palos Verdes v. Abrams, 544 U.S. 113, 123 n.5, 125 S. Ct. 1453, 161 L. Ed. 2d 316 (2005) ( ); Wycoff v. Menke, 773 F.2d 983, 984-87 (8th Cir. 1985) ( ). In Iowa, the statute of limitations for personal injury actions is two years after accrual. Iowa Code § 614.1(2). Such "'statute of limitations begins to run when the injured person discovers or in the exercise of reasonable care should have discovered the allegedly wrongful act.'" Roth v. G.D. Searle & Co., 27 F.3d 1303, 1306 (8th Cir. 1994) (quoting Franzen v. Deere & Co., 377 N.W.2d 660, 662 (Iowa 1985)); see also Richmond v. Clinton County, 338 F.3d 844, 847 (8th Cir. 2003) (Roth, 27 F.3d at 1306) . The plaintiff did not file the instant complaint in a timely manner. The plaintiff alleges that he sustained...
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