Martin v. State
Decision Date | 05 May 1997 |
Docket Number | No. CR,CR |
Citation | 328 Ark. 420,944 S.W.2d 512 |
Parties | Lawrence Edward MARTIN, Appellant, v. STATE of Arkansas, Appellee. 95-1314. |
Court | Arkansas Supreme Court |
J. Blake Hendrix, Little Rock, for Appellant.
Winston Bryant, Attorney General, Kent G. Holt, Assistant Attorney General, Little Rock, for Appellee.
The appellant, Lawrence Edward Martin, was sentenced to life imprisonment without parole for the capital murder of his mother, Thelma Artis. On appeal, Martin raises several challenges to his conviction. Finding no reversible error, we affirm.
On April 22, 1994, around 5:00 in the evening, Gloria Carter visited Thelma Artis in her apartment in Little Rock, Arkansas. Ms. Artis was a sixty-three-year-old woman who lived alone and used a wheelchair. Around 10:00 p.m. that same evening, a neighbor and the assistant apartment manager observed a black male with very short hair angrily knocking on the front door of Ms. Artis's apartment. The man was wearing a t-shirt and shorts. According to the witnesses, the visitor exclaimed, "Open up, it's your son!" as he pounded on the door. Around 12:30 a.m., another witness spotted a black male with very short hair wearing a t-shirt and shorts run from the apartment complex.
The next morning around 9:00, Gloria Carter and the apartment manager discovered Thelma Artis's slain body on the floor of her living room next to her toppled wheelchair. Ms. Artis was in her nightgown and a pillow was placed over her face. Carter and the manager also observed that the door was unlocked and the chain was not fastened.
The police arrived and determined that Ms. Artis died as a result of multiple stab wounds to her neck and face. In addition, Ms. Artis's hands contained defensive wounds and scratches. There were no signs of a forced entry into the apartment, and the only items that appeared to be missing were four rings that Ms. Artis customarily wore. Finally, the police noticed that the kitchen trash can contained only a coke can and a cellophane sandwich bag. Both items were dusted for fingerprints.
On April 23, the day after the murder, the police began questioning Ms. Artis's sons. The police located Lawrence Martin around 10:00 p.m., and he agreed to accompany them to the police station to answer some questions. While at the station, Martin gave a taped statement regarding his whereabouts on the night of the murder. Martin told the police that on April 22 he picked-up his pay check, drove to Pine Bluff, and spent the night driving, drinking, and smoking marijuana. Martin claimed that he threw away his work clothes and bought a new set of clothing at a flea market. Martin, however, could not tell the police where he obtained gas or ate, and he was unable to name anyone who could confirm his story. Martin also told the police that he had previously sought drug rehabilitation for his marijuana and crack cocaine habits.
After his statement, the police told Martin that he was not under arrest, but that he was a suspect in the murder. The police then read Martin his Miranda rights, and he executed a waiver form. At this point, Martin refused to give a second statement and the interview was terminated. Martin was transported back to his home.
A few days later, the assistant apartment manager quickly identified Martin's photograph in a photographic line-up and stated that he "looked very similar" to the man he observed knocking on Ms. Artis's door. In addition, the forensic department identified Martin's fingerprint on the soda can discovered in Ms. Artis's trash. Based on this additional evidence, the police arrested Martin and charged him with capital felony murder.
During the trial, several witnesses testified that Ms. Artis would always respond to a visitor's knock on her door by asking who it was and then opening the door with the chain still latched to confirm the visitor's identity. Ms. Artis's daughter, Debra Dillard, testified that Ms. Artis wore four rings, that "she never pulled them off," that she "wore them every day," and that she would even wear her rings to bed. The State then displayed to the jury photographs of indention and tan marks on Ms. Artis's hands where the four rings were likely to have been worn.
Martin's brother, Donald Ray Lewis, and his sister, Debra Dillard, testified that two days after the murder they met Martin at their mother's apartment. Martin told his siblings that he spent the night of the murder driving in Pine Bluff while drinking and using marijuana and crack cocaine. Although Martin initially claimed that he was driving with a friend, he later told his family that he was alone. Martin explained that he threw away his clothing because they had a foul odor, and that he purchased a new set of clothing from a flea market. Martin, however, could not remember where the flea market was located.
Martin's wife, Wanda, testified on cross-examination that she suspected that her husband was smoking crack cocaine on the night of the murder, and that they had previously experienced marital difficulties due to his use of the substance. The State then introduced evidence that a crack cocaine habit could cost as much as $350 to $500 a day, and that dealers would accept jewelry and other property in exchange for illegal drugs.
After deliberations, the jury found Martin guilty of capital murder during the course of an aggravated robbery. Because the State did not seek the death penalty, the court imposed the sentence of life imprisonment without parole. From his judgment and commitment order, Martin filed a timely notice of appeal.
For his first argument on appeal, Martin challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to support his conviction of capital felony murder. As we have previously explained, in making this determination we view the evidence in the light most favorable to the State and will affirm where there is substantial evidence to support the verdict. Hicks v. State, 327 Ark. 652, 941 S.W.2d 387 (1997); Allen v. State, 327 Ark. 350, 939 S.W.2d 270 (1997). This review necessarily includes evidence both properly and improperly admitted, and we are required to consider only the testimony that supports the verdict. Hicks, supra. Finally, the evidence, whether direct or circumstantial, is considered sufficient if it is of enough force to compel a conclusion one way or the other and goes beyond mere suspicion or conjecture. Hicks, supra; Johnson v. State, 326 Ark. 3, 929 S.W.2d 707 (1996).
On appeal, Martin concedes that there was sufficient evidence for the jury to conclude that he killed Ms. Artis; hence, the sole inquiry is whether there was sufficient evidence to support the underlying crime of aggravated robbery. See Clay v. State, 324 Ark. 9, 919 S.W.2d 190 (1996). Martin argues that the circumstantial evidence that Ms. Artis's rings were missing was not substantial proof that they were taken in the course of a robbery.
We disagree with this argument for several reasons. First, direct evidence that a robbery occurred is not required to support an underlying charge of aggravated robbery. To the contrary, in Harris v. State, 308 Ark. 150, 823 S.W.2d 860 (1992), we said that circumstantial evidence is "entirely sufficient to deny a motion for directed verdict and submit the issue to the jury." Likewise, in McClendon v. State, 295 Ark. 303, 748 S.W.2d 641 (1988), we found that a witness's testimony that four or five hundred dollars were missing from the victim's pants was sufficient circumstantial evidence to support the underlying charge of robbery in a capital murder case.
During Martin's trial, several witnesses testified that Ms. Artis always wore rings, and her daughter claimed that she did not remove them even when she went to bed. The jury was also shown photographs of indention and tan marks on Ms. Artis's fingers where she likely wore her rings. We find that this evidence, albeit circumstantial, was sufficient to support the jury's conclusion that Ms. Artis's rings were removed and taken by the person who killed her. Therefore, we find no merit to Martin's first argument on appeal.
Next, Martin claims that the trial court committed reversible error when it refused to suppress the taped statement he gave to the police on April 23. Martin argues that the statement should have been suppressed because it was taken in violation of Ark. R.Crim. P. 2.3 and his right to receive Miranda warnings.
Before addressing the merits of these two arguments, it should be noted that the State asserts that Martin failed to properly raise these issues before the trial court. We strongly disagree with the State's contention.
In December, Martin filed a pro se motion regarding a violation of Ark. R.Crim. P. 2.3, and his attorney filed a motion to suppress the statement based on the alleged Miranda violation. During a pretrial hearing, Martin's counsel addressed the alleged Rule 2.3 violation, and the judge delayed his ruling so that both sides could submit posthearing briefs on the issue. Although Martin submitted a brief, it does not appear from the record that the State complied with the trial judge's request. Finally, the trial court rendered a ruling on both issues. Therefore, we find that contrary to the State's assertion both issues have been properly preserved for appeal.
Martin claims that Ark. R.Crim. P. 2.3 was violated when the police appeared at his house on April 23 without a warrant, asked him to come to the station for questioning, and failed to notify him that he did not have to comply with this request. We agree with Martin's argument, and accordingly we find that the statement should have been suppressed.
In United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 100 S.Ct. 1870, 64 L.Ed.2d 497 (1980), the United States Supreme Court first defined the type of police conduct that amounted to a ...
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