Martin v. State, 252

Decision Date01 September 1996
Docket NumberNo. 252,252
Citation686 A.2d 1130,113 Md.App. 190
Parties, 65 USLW 2503 Thomas M. MARTIN v. STATE of Maryland. ,
CourtCourt of Special Appeals of Maryland

Timothy J. McCrone and Richard O'Connor, Ellicott City, for appellant.

David C. Larson, Assistant Attorney General, Baltimore (J. Joseph Curran, Jr., Attorney General, Baltimore, and Marna McLendon, State's Attorney for Howard County, Ellicott City, on the brief), for appellee.

Argued before WILNER, * C.J., MOYLAN, J., and THEODORE G. BLOOM, Judge of the Court of Appeals (retired), Specially Assigned.

MOYLAN, Judge.

On December 4, 1995, Thomas A. Martin, the appellant, was tried before Judge James B. Dudley, sitting without a jury, in the Circuit Court for Howard County. The appellant was found guilty of committing a second-degree sexual offense, a third-degree sexual offense, and a fourth-degree sexual offense, as well as committing an assault and battery. The trial court sentenced the appellant to three separate four-year terms of incarceration for the second-degree offense, third-degree sexual offense, and the battery charges, and to a one-year sentence for the fourth-degree sexual offense. The trial court ordered that all the sentences be served concurrently.

On appeal, the appellant raises the following issues:

1. Did the trial court commit error in allowing the State to introduce statements made by the appellant during the course of an interrogation?

2. Did the trial court err in ruling that appellant had no standing to contest the search of his police vehicle?

3. Did the trial court err in finding the evidence sufficient to sustain the appellant's conviction for committing a second-degree sexual offense?

4. Did the trial court err by convicting the appellant based on jurisdiction conferred by Article 27, Section 590?

5. Did the trial court err by improperly drawing an adverse inference from the appellant's decision not to testify at trial?

Factual Background

On August 2, 1995, M.N. attended an Allman Brothers Concert at the Meriweather Post Pavilion in Columbia. During the evening, M.N. consumed large quantities of alcohol and inhaled nitrous oxide, an intoxicating substance, that was being sold at the concert in balloons. Near the conclusion of the concert, M.N. and her male companion went to separate rest rooms. After vomiting for a significant length of time, M.N. left the rest room only to find that her friend was gone. After resting in a nearby wooded area, M.N. began walking away from the concert, unsure of precisely where she was headed. In the process of stumbling through a wooded area, M.N. somehow lost both of her shoes. Eventually, she made her way onto the median strip of Little Patuxent Parkway and began walking in the general direction of her residence in Montgomery County.

Thomas M. Martin, the appellant, who was then serving as a sergeant in the Howard County Police Department, was on duty that night. At approximately 2:30 A.M., the appellant observed M.N. on Little Patuxent Parkway, made a U-turn, and pulled along side of her. The appellant noticed that she appeared disheveled, that she was staggering and barefoot, and that she had the general appearance of being intoxicated. M.N., after seeing the patrol car turn around, believed that she might be in trouble because she was "drunk." The appellant, however, simply asked her where she was going and asked if he could give her a ride. M.N. gladly accepted the ride and sat down in the front passenger seat of the police car. At that point, M.N. felt relieved because she thought she would be taken home. The appellant did not threaten to arrest her or force her into the police car; he did not display a weapon or refer to it in any way. According to M.N., the appellant was polite and friendly.

From that point on, M.N.'s and the appellant's versions of events differ greatly. M.N. testified that after she had entered the patrol car, she engaged the appellant in friendly conversation. Shortly thereafter, she leaned her head back and fell asleep. She later awoke when the police car came to a stop and she found herself in an unfamiliar "dark area." M.N. could see trees and a small building, and she observed that there were no people in the area. 1 The appellant, to M.N.'s shock, suddenly began to touch her leg, while commenting that she had nice legs. She remained completely silent and motionless in an effort to convince the appellant that she was still asleep. M.N.'s hope was that the appellant would stop of his own accord.

The appellant, however, did not stop. He moved his hands underneath her shorts and began fondling her vagina. The appellant then repeatedly placed his fingers inside M.N.'s vagina, occasionally stopping to ask her if she wanted to go home. M.N. did not physically resist or tell him to stop because she believed that the appellant would hurt her, or even kill her, to prevent her from reporting what was taking place. The appellant was not only physically "bigger" than M.N., but she believed that he, by virtue of being a police officer, was armed with a handgun. The appellant then took out a mini-flashlight, moved M.N.'s shorts out of the way, and shined the flashlight in between her legs. Eventually, the appellant inserted the mini-flashlight into her vagina, moved the flashlight back and forth, and then placed the flashlight in his own mouth. M.N. was gripped with fear and continued to feign sleep. She did, however, keep her eyes partially open in order to see what the appellant was doing.

After a period of time, the appellant got out of the patrol vehicle and walked around to the passenger's side. The appellant reclined M.N.'s seat and took her left leg and placed it on the dashboard so that her legs were spread apart. After positioning M.N., he again placed the flashlight inside her vagina. The appellant also fondled other parts of her body, including her breasts. Throughout the process, the appellant continued to make sexually explicit comments to M.N. concerning her state of arousal.

At one point, the appellant walked away from the patrol vehicle. When asked why she did not attempt to run at that point, M.N. responded, "Well, I remember specifically imagining myself running from the car and I imagined getting shot in the back because I knew he had a gun." The appellant then returned to the patrol vehicle and drove off. M.N. continued to feign sleep and she noticed that they eventually stopped at another dark location. M.N. was still in a reclining position when the appellant proceeded to fondle her vagina again.

The appellant, after finally stopping his sexual conduct, began shaking M.N. and yelling her name. M.N. pretended to wake up because she "didn't want anything worse to happen than had already happened." She looked at the digital clock in the vehicle and observed that it was 4:48 A.M., which was over two hours after she had first been picked up by the appellant. M.N. commented to the appellant that it was late and that she had better get home. The appellant responded by telling her that she had passed out and that he merely let her sleep while he answered a couple of police calls. The appellant even stated, "I thought about taking you back to my apartment and letting you sleep there but I thought you might be a little scared when you woke up." The appellant, after noting that they were near the Howard County and Montgomery County line, finally proceeded to drive her home. After arriving at her home at approximately 5:20 A.M., M.N. asked the appellant his name so that she would know who had sexually assaulted her, and he gave her his business card. M.N. entered the house, went to the bathroom, and then immediately dialed 9-1-1 in an effort to report the incident. M.N. told her mother that she had been molested by a police officer, and then began to take notes for the purpose of capturing all of the details while they were still fresh in her memory. Throughout the entire ordeal, M.N. conceded that the appellant never brandished his weapon, struck her, physically held her down, or made any other forceful moves. M.N. noted, however, that she had construed his touching her as a threat.

The appellant did not testify at his trial. He gave a very conflicting version of that evening's events, however, while being interrogated by a member of the Howard County Police Department. The appellant there stated that when he picked up M.N., she appeared intoxicated. He informed M.N. that he could give her a ride to the Montgomery County line and that arrangements could then be made for someone from that county to come and get her and take her home. The appellant stated that, while driving toward the Montgomery County line, he learned from M.N. where she lived.

The appellant claimed that at some point between the Little Patuxent Parkway and the Montgomery County line, M.N. passed out. After arriving at the Burtonsville Shopping Center, the appellant reported to the police department that he had "dropped off the female passenger." The appellant conceded that that was not true. During the interrogation, he admitted to having had M.N. in his vehicle for approximately forty-five minutes beyond the time he had reported dropping her off. He claimed that he did so simply to let her sleep. The appellant further stated that, while parked, he was in the middle of the parking lot and that even though no businesses were open, the parking lot was lighted. The appellant acknowledged that he never called the Montgomery County Police or anyone else to meet him and that no other individuals were on the parking lot at that time.

The appellant firmly maintained, however, that there had been no physical contact between him and M.N. except for his periodic shaking of her in order to wake her up. He further stated that after the approximately 45-minute period when he let her sleep, he proceeded to drive her immediately to her residence. He claimed to have...

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