Martin v. State

• Citation: 620 S.W.3d 749
• Decision Date: 14 April 2021
• Docket Number: NO. PD-0563-19,PD-0563-19
• Court: Court of Appeals of Texas. Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas
• Parties: Casey Allen MARTIN, Appellant v. The STATE of Texas

620 S.W.3d 749

Casey Allen MARTIN, Appellant

v.The STATE of Texas

NO. PD-0563-19

Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas.

Delivered: April 14, 2021

Lukas Garcia, Michael Mowla, Duncanville, Greggory Gallian, for Appellant.

Victoria Ford Oblon, for State.

OPINION

Slaughter, J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court.

When a firefighter, in the line of duty, asks law enforcement for a safety check after seeing drug paraphernalia, guns, and flammable liquids in an apartment, is the officer's entry into the apartment reasonable under the Fourth Amendment, and can that officer's discovery of drug paraphernalia in plain view provide probable cause for a search warrant? The short answer to this question under the specific facts of this case is yes. We therefore uphold the court of appeals’ judgment which affirmed the trial court's denial of Appellant's motion to suppress the drug evidence found pursuant to a search warrant.

I. Background

One evening shortly before 11 p.m., an automatic sprinkler alarm was triggered at an apartment complex, and the Bedford Fire Department responded to a suspected fire in one of the units. Firefighter Darren Cook arrived to find smoke and water flowing from the front door of Appellant's apartment. Appellant, who was sitting outside in the grass, informed Cook that no one else was inside. Firefighters entered Appellant's home and extinguished a small stovetop fire. They then began efforts to remove smoke from the apartment one room at a time by opening windows and running fans to increase airflow. This work was conducted in the dark with the only light source being the firefighters’ headlamps because power to the apartment had been cut off to avoid the risk of electrical hazards.

During the firefighters’ ventilation efforts, Cook observed what he believed to be evidence of drugs or drug paraphernalia in plain view, including: (1) a torch, (2) little plastic baggies, (3) an unmarked jar of pills, (4) a glass object with some residue inside it, and (5) numerous lighters and/or butane lighter fluid.¹ He also encountered multiple firearms inside the apartment. In fact, Cook testified at the hearing on Appellant's motion to suppress that while attempting to ventilate the back bedroom in the dark, he knelt on a futon in an effort to open a window and his knee came into contact with a rifle hidden under some blankets.² Cook stated that at this point, the firefighters decided to "really slow things down" and call the police for assistance. He testified that the combination of possible narcotics, multiple unsecured firearms throughout the apartment, and flammable liquids put the firefighters on "high alert" and caused him to be concerned for his safety and the safety of the other firefighters.³ He further testified that the presence of these potential safety hazards, especially in a dark and smoky environment, hindered the firefighters’ ventilation efforts. He noted that some drugs, specifically Fentanyl, can "catch on fire" and become airborne, posing serious health risks to firefighters. Having decided that these safety concerns required assistance from the police because of their expertise in handling drugs and firearms,⁴ Cook called the Bedford Police Department.

Officer Hunter Hart arrived shortly after 11:30 p.m. and testified that he was dispatched "to assist the fire department on the structure fire" but "wasn't given any other specific details." Hart initially made contact with the fire battalion chief outside the apartment.⁵ The battalion chief told Hart that firefighters had been unable to finish ventilating because of safety concerns and first needed police to perform a safety check of the apartment.⁶

Before entering the apartment, Hart checked to make sure Appellant was unharmed. He did not, however, ask Appellant for consent to enter his apartment.⁷ But Hart testified that at the time he entered the apartment, he believed firefighters were still trying to ventilate and needed him to go "inside and [make] sure everything was safe."

Once inside the apartment, Hart conducted what he described as a "protective sweep" to check for threats.⁸ During his initial entry, Hart inspected each room, ending with the back bedroom. There, he observed the same items that Firefighter Cook had observed in plain view, including glass pipes or bongs containing residue, a bottle of pills, a plastic baggie containing a white, crystal-like substance, and smaller plastic baggies commonly associated with drug activity.⁹ After finishing his "protective sweep," Hart walked outside without seizing anything. He testified that based upon his plain-view discovery of possible drugs and/or paraphernalia, he believed he had the authority to "freeze" the scene.¹⁰

Outside, Hart spoke with another officer about what he had just observed. He then re-entered the apartment with the other officer, and they were soon joined by at least two more officers.¹¹ During the re-entry, Hart opened a box containing ammunition and a sunglasses case. Neither of these actions led to the discovery of the methamphetamine for which Appellant was eventually prosecuted, and no evidence was seized during the re-entry.¹² About twelve minutes after his second entry, Hart left the apartment.

Around midnight, narcotics officers were called to the scene to observe the plain-view evidence to determine whether to seek a search warrant. Around this same time, Appellant, who was still outside, was arrested for possession of drug paraphernalia.¹³ Officer Versocki, a narcotics investigator, then prepared a probable-cause affidavit and sought a warrant to search Appellant's apartment for methamphetamine. In the affidavit, he included his own observations of the plain-view evidence, as well as the observations of Firefighter Cook and Officer Hart.¹⁴ At 3:12 a.m., officers secured a warrant to search Appellant's apartment. Upon execution of the search warrant, officers discovered methamphetamine that had not been in plain view. Appellant was charged with possession of methamphetamine between 1 and 4 grams.¹⁵

Appellant filed a motion to suppress the drug evidence, arguing that the officers’ entry into his apartment was a warrantless search that did not fall within any lawful exception to the warrant requirement. He contended that the fire had been fully extinguished and the apartment ventilated before the officers’ arrival, such that any exigency had dissipated. Thus, he asserted, the officers had no lawful basis for entering his apartment and their observations could not properly establish probable cause to support issuance of the search warrant.

The State countered that Hart's entry was justified based on the information he received from the fire battalion chief asking him to secure the scene for the firefighters’ safety. Once Hart saw the drug paraphernalia in plain view, the State contended that he then had the authority to freeze the scene and call other officers to assist in the investigation. Alternatively, the State relied on the Supreme Court's decision in Michigan v. Tyler to argue that the firefighters’ lawful authority to be inside the apartment extended to the police officers. See 436 U.S. 499, 509, 98 S.Ct. 1942, 56 L.Ed.2d 486 (1978). Thus, the State's position was that because firefighters were lawfully present in the apartment pursuant to the exigency of the fire, they were permitted to seize any evidence of criminal activity that was in plain view. Extending that principle, the State argued that police officers should be permitted to "step into the shoes" of firefighters and seize or observe that same evidence.

Following the suppression hearing, the trial court denied Appellant's motion to suppress. In its findings of fact, the trial court found the testimony of Cook and Hart reliable and credible. The trial court also made findings that the presence of safety concerns "hindered [the fire department's] ability to do their job;" that Cook called the police department as a result of "his safety concerns and the drug paraphernalia in plain view;" and that Hart "entered the apartment to secure it for the safety of" the firefighters. The trial court concluded, "Firefighter Cook's entry was lawful due to the ongoing exigency of the fire; Officer Hart's entry was also lawful in that he was ‘stepping into the shoes’ of the firefighter." Following the trial court's ruling, Appellant pleaded guilty to the drug possession charge but retained his right to appeal the denial of his motion to suppress.

On direct appeal, the court of appeals upheld the trial court's ruling. It reasoned that if evidence of criminal activity is discovered by firefighters during the course of a lawful entry under exigent circumstances, firefighters may seize that evidence under the plain-view doctrine. Martin v. State , 576 S.W.3d 818, 823-24 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2019) (citing Michigan v. Clifford , 464 U.S. 287, 294, 104 S.Ct. 641, 78 L.Ed.2d 477 (1984) ). It then extended this reasoning to further conclude that police officers " ‘may enter premises to seize contraband that was found in plain view by firefighters or other emergency personnel, at least if the exigency is continuing and the emergency personnel are still lawfully present.’ " Id. at 824 (quoting State v. Bower , 135 Idaho 554, 21 P.3d 491, 496 (Idaho Ct. App. 2001) ). The court reasoned that here, the exigency continued "for a reasonable time to allow firefighters to complete their duties, and it was within this window that Officer Hart conducted his investigation." Id. at 825-26. It further determined that Hart did not exceed the scope of the firefighters’ legitimate entry. Id. at 826. The court of appeals concluded that Officer Hart was permitted to "step into Cook's shoes and make the same plain-view observation that Cook was entitled to make." Id. Having held that Officer Hart's entry into the apartment was reasonable under the Fourth Amendment, the court of appeals overruled Appellant's sole issue. Id.

We grante...