Martin v. State

• Decision Date: 10 February 1978
• Docket Number: No. 877S557,877S557
• Citation: 372 N.E.2d 181,267 Ind. 583
• Parties: Phillip R. MARTIN, Appellant, v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee.
• Court: Indiana Supreme Court

Page 181

372 N.E.2d 181

267 Ind. 583

Phillip R. MARTIN, Appellant, v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee.

No. 877S557.

Supreme Court of Indiana.

Feb. 10, 1978.

Peyton & Giddings, Lebanon, for appellant.

Theodore L. Sendak, Atty. Gen., Dennis K. McKinney, Deputy Atty. Gen., Indianapolis, for appellee.

GIVAN, Chief Justice.

Appellant was convicted of murder in the second degree. He was sentenced to 15 to 25 years.

Appellant first claims the trial court erred in overruling his motion to suppress a statement made by him to police officers. Three days after appellant's five and one-half month old daughter died, two police officers went to his parents' home and asked to talk to appellant. Appellant accompanied them to the Zionsville police station. There his constitutional rights were read to him. Appellant himself read and signed the waiver form. In the questioning that followed appellant admitted striking his baby daughter. The session was not recorded and the officers therefore testified at trial as to his statements. Appellant's motion to suppress was on the ground that he was emotionally distraught and fatigued; that the police officers threatened him with being jailed and that therefore he told the police officers what they wanted to hear.

The trial court conducted a hearing pursuant to the motion and on the basis of the evidence found the statement made by appellant was freely and voluntarily given and ruled that it was admissible. This Court has held that in determining the voluntariness of a waiver of rights, the test is whether " . . . looking at all the circumstances, the confession was free and voluntary and not induced by any violence, threats, promises, or other improper influences." Nacoff v. State (1971) 256 Ind. 97, 101, 267 N.E.2d 165, 167. This question is to be decided by the trial court, and when the evidence of voluntariness is conflicting, this Court will not reverse the trial court so long as there is sufficient evidence of probative value to support the ruling. Lane v. State (1977) Ind., 364 N.E.2d 756; French v. State (1977) Ind., 362 N.E.2d 834.

Although appellant argues that he was emotionally distraught at the time, the record shows that the questioning took place three days after the death of the daughter. There is nothing in the record to show any unusual situation which would nullify appellant's statements. Furthermore, the record shows that on the same day the child died appellant was questioned by police officers. That recorded statement was played to the jury. Appellant was fully advised of his constitutional rights before consenting to the questioning and does not now argue that this statement was involuntary. We find the trial judge did not err in holding that the statements of the appellant should be submitted in evidence.

Appellant next claims the trial court erred in overruling his motion in limine, thereby permitting evidence of alleged acts of child abuse by appellant in the prior five months to be introduced to show premeditation and malice. The trial court relied on Corbin v. State (1968), 250 Ind. 147, 234 N.E.2d 261, 263. In that case, at page 151, Justice Arterburn stated:

"The defendant contends that the court erred in admitting evidence that a few months prior he had been convicted of excessively beating this same child and another child. In answer to his contention that there is no evidence of malice, these prior acts of assault go to prove such mental condition. Courts have held unanimously that prior threats and acts of beating or assault upon an individual may be considered by a jury in determining not only malice, but also premeditation."

We, therefore, hold the trial court did not...