Martin v. State

• Decision Date: 26 February 1985
• Docket Number: No. 4-1183A398,4-1183A398
• Citation: 475 N.E.2d 37
• Parties: Deetra J. (Shelby) MARTIN, Appellant (Petitioner Below), v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee (Respondent Below).
• Court: Indiana Appellate Court

Page 37

475 N.E.2d 37

Deetra J. (Shelby) MARTIN, Appellant (Petitioner Below), v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee (Respondent Below).

No. 4-1183A398.

Court of Appeals of Indiana,

Fourth District.

Feb. 26, 1985.

Rehearing Denied Mar. 27, 1985.

Susan K. Carpenter, Public Defender, William L. Touchette, Melanie C. Conour, Deputy Public Defender, Indianapolis, for appellant.

Linley E. Pearson, Atty. Gen., Michael Gene Worden, Deputy Atty. Gen., Indianapolis, for appellee.

YOUNG, Judge.

ON PETITION FOR REHEARING

Deetra J. (Shelby) Martin brought this appeal from the trial court's denial of her petition for post-conviction relief. In our original decision, Martin v. State (1984), Ind.App., 471 N.E.2d 1190, we affirmed, holding that the entire record of the guilty plea at issue showed Martin pled guilty knowingly, voluntarily, and understandingly. Martin has challenged this holding in a timely-filed petition for rehearing. After examining our supreme court's most recent decisions, we agree with Martin that we applied an incorrect standard of review in our original decision. We accordingly grant rehearing and substitute the following for our previous decision in this case.

The facts are undisputed. At Martin's guilty plea hearing, the trial court did not advise Martin that by pleading guilty she waived her right to have the state prove her guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, as required by IND.CODE 35-4.1-1-3 (now codified at IC 35-35-1-2 (Supp.1984)). The court, however, had before it a form, signed by Martin, saying she was aware of her constitutional rights, including the right to a jury trial in which the state would bear the burden of proving her guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. The only issue on appeal is whether the court hearing Martin's petition was entitled to consider Martin's written plea agreement in determining whether her guilty plea was entered voluntarily and intelligently.

Our supreme court, faced with similar facts in German v. State (1981), Ind., 428 N.E.2d 234, held that the trial court may not rely on such written agreements, but must strictly comply with the requirements of IC 35-4.1-1-3 by personally advising the one pleading guilty of the rights he is waiving thereby. In several later decisions, the supreme court applied German retroactively to guilty pleas entered after IC 35-4.1-1-3 was enacted but before German was handed down. In these decisions the court repeatedly held that, where the trial court failed to personally advise the defendant of his rights, the resulting guilty plea must be vacated, even though the record as a whole showed the defendant understood his rights. E.g., Anderson v. State (1984), Ind., 465 N.E.2d 1101; Davis v. State (1983), Ind., 446 N.E.2d 1317; Early v. State (1982), Ind., 442 N.E.2d 1071.

Notwithstanding these decisions, however, in October 1984, the supreme court held that in reviewing guilty pleas entered before German we must "look to the entire record to determine if [the] petitioner was fully advised of and understood his constitutional rights." Williams v. State (1984), Ind., 468 N.E.2d 1036, 1037. In light of this holding, we concluded in our original opinion that the supreme court had overruled all of its earlier decisions, cited above, applying the "strict compliance" standard of German retroactively. This led to our holding that, as Martin had pled guilty before German was decided, the post-conviction court was entitled to consider Martin's written statement as evidence that she knowingly waived...