Martin v. Stine

• Decision Date: 21 November 1995
• Docket Number: Docket No. 165857
• Citation: 542 N.W.2d 884,214 Mich.App. 403
• Parties: Holston MARTIN, III, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Wayne W. STINE, Michael J. Crowley, Bob Siedell, and Jim Nelson, Defendants-Appellees.
• Court: Court of Appeal of Michigan — District of US

Page 884

542 N.W.2d 884

214 Mich.App. 403

Holston MARTIN, III, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Wayne W. STINE, Michael J. Crowley, Bob Siedell, and Jim Nelson, Defendants-Appellees.

Docket No. 165857.

Court of Appeals of Michigan.

Submitted April 13, 1995, at Grand Rapids.

Decided Nov. 21, 1995, at 9:35 a.m.

Released for Publication Feb. 7, 1996.

Holston Martin, III, Carson City, in propria persona.

Frank J. Kelley, Attorney General, Thomas L. Casey, Solicitor General, and Allan J. Soros, Assistant Attorney General, for defendants.

Before GRIBBS, P.J., and MARKMAN and SHELTON, ^* JJ.

MARKMAN, Judge.

Plaintiff appeals the trial court's order granting defendants' motion for summary disposition. We affirm.

Plaintiff, a prisoner in the custody of the Department of Corrections, commenced this action on January 19, 1993. Plaintiff alleged in his complaint that on December 7, 1992, his cell was searched and his property was confiscated because he possessed merchandise in excess of the amount he was allowed to accumulate pursuant to the department's policy directive regarding prisoner personal property control, PD-BCF-53.01. Plaintiff further alleged that on December 12, 1992, an administrative hearing was held and he was subsequently found guilty of a "minor rule infraction." Plaintiff claimed that, consequently, the merchandise was sent to his home at his expense and he received a five-day loss of privileges. Plaintiff further asserted that he appealed the decision to Assistant Deputy Warden Michael Crowley, who denied the appeal after finding that the elements of the charge against plaintiff had been established and that there had been no violation of plaintiff's right to due process.

Plaintiff then brought this action against four of the prison's employees: Warden Wayne Stine, Assistant Deputy Warden Michael Crowley, storekeeper Bob Siedell, and corrections officer/hearing officer Jim Nelson. Plaintiff's first cause of action alleged that defendant Siedell violated departmental policy by selling merchandise to plaintiff in excess of the amount that he was allowed to accumulate. Plaintiff's second cause of action, dealing with the confiscation of the merchandise, alleged that he should not be punished because the storekeeper allowed him to make the purchase. His third cause of action alleged violation of his constitutional rights as a result of defendant Crowley's denial of plaintiff's appeal. Plaintiff's fourth cause of action alleged that defendant Stine was responsible for the above actions and that plaintiff was further deprived of his personal property in violation of his constitutional rights to due process and just compensation. Defendant Nelson presumably is included within catch-all provisions of plaintiff's complaint.

On March 17, 1993, plaintiff filed a motion for leave to amend the complaint to include, among other things, allegations of jurisdiction based on M.C.L. §§ 600.605 and 600.611; M.S.A. §§ 27A.605 and 27A.611; MCR 2.605; and 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and that plaintiff had exhausted his administrative remedies. This motion was denied by order dated April 5, 1993.

Defendants filed a motion for summary disposition, alleging that subject-matter jurisdiction was lacking, the claim was barred because of public employee immunity from liability, and plaintiff failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. ¹ The trial court entered an order dated June 17, 1993, finding that defendants' positions were correct and granting their motion for summary disposition.

Plaintiff argues that the circuit court had jurisdiction to review his minor misconduct report. Litigants seeking judicial review of decisions by administrative agencies are guaranteed some opportunity for judicial review pursuant to Const. 1963, art. 6, § 28. There are three means of effectuating this right: (1) review pursuant to a procedure specified in a statute applicable to the particular agency, see generally M.C.L. §§ 24.301 and 24.302; M.S.A. §§ 3.560(201) and 3.560(202); (2) the method of review for contested cases, M.C.L. § 24.271 et seq.; M.S.A. § 3.560(171) et seq., in §§ 103-105 of the Administrative Procedures Act of 1969 (APA), M.C.L. §§ 24.303-24.305; M.S.A. §§ 3.560(203)-3.560(205); and (3) M.C.L. § 600.631; M.S.A. § 27A.631, in conjunction with which MCR 7.104(A) should be consulted. Living Alternatives for the Developmentally Disabled, Inc. v. Dep't of Mental Health, 207 Mich.App. 482, 525 N.W.2d 466 (1994).

First, we review a statute applicable to the Department of Corrections. M.C.L. § 791.251; M.S.A. § 28.2320(51) provides for the creation of a hearings division within the department. That section further specifies those hearings for which the hearings division is responsible, namely, those that may result in the loss by a prisoner of a "right." The statute expressly stated at the time of plaintiff's action, however, that the hearings division "shall not be responsible for a prisoner hearing that is conducted as a result of a minor misconduct charge that would not cause a loss of good time or disciplinary credits, or placement in punitive segregation." M.C.L. § 791.251(3); M.S.A. § 28.2320(51)(3). ²

Judicial review of a final decision or order of a hearing officer is provided for under M.C.L. § 791.255; M.S.A. § 28.2320(55). Taken in context with M.C.L. § 791.251; M.S.A. § 28.2320(51), the judicial review afforded under this section applies to those decisions regarding hearings covered by M.C.L. § 791.251; M.S.A. § 28.2320(51), namely, matters that may result in the loss by a prisoner of a "right." Thus, because minor misconduct charges that would not result in a loss of good time or disciplinary credits, or placement in punitive segregation, are specifically excluded from those matters in which a prisoner is entitled to a hearing, judicial review is similarly not required under M.C.L. § 791.255; M.S.A. § 28.2320(55). Accordingly, plaintiff has no right to judicial review under M.C.L. § 791.255; M.S.A. § 28.2320(55). ³

Second, we turn to the terms of judicial review provided by the APA. The APA provides for judicial review of an agency's final decision or order in a "contested case." M.C.L. § 24.301; M.S.A. § 3.560(201). The APA defines "contested case" as follows:

"Contested case" means a proceeding, including rate-making, price-fixing, and licensing, in which a determination of the legal rights, duties, or privileges of a named party is required by law to be made by an agency after an opportunity for an evidentiary hearing. [M.C.L. § 24.203(3); M.S.A. § 3.560(103)(3).]

See also MCR 7.105(A)(2).

Under 1987 AACS, R 791.5501(6), a prisoner charged with minor misconduct has a right to a fact-finding hearing under 1989 AACS, R 791.3310 and may be subject to sanctions provided in 1987 AACS, R 791.5505(4) (i.e., a loss of privileges). The fact-finding hearing is not a formal evidentiary hearing, but, rather, gives the prisoner the right to be present, speak on his own behalf, and generally to receive a copy of any department document relevant to the issue before the hearing officer. 1989 AACS, R 791.3310(2). The hearing officer must also make a summary report of the hearing and decision or recommendation. 1989 AACS, R 791.3310(3). The prisoner may appeal to the officials designated in department policies and procedures upon giving notice of intent to appeal at the hearing and providing the written basis of the appeal within twenty-four hours of the receipt of the written decision. 1987 AACS, R 791.3320.

Accordingly, given the lack of a formal evidentiary hearing requirement, the present case does not involve a "contested case" and thus is not reviewable under the APA. See, 13 Southfield Associates v. Dep't of Public Health, 82 Mich.App. 678, 267 N.W.2d 483 (1978). It appears that plaintiff is further arguing invocation of jurisdiction based on the APA, even if the minor misconduct hearing is not a "contested case." However, we find no basis for, and no merit in, this argument.

We thus look to the third basis for judicial review, provided under M.C.L. § 600.631; M.S.A. § 27A.631:

An appeal shall lie from any order, decision, or opinion of any state board, commission, or agency, authorized under the laws of this state to promulgate rules from which an appeal or other judicial review has not otherwise been provided for by law, to the circuit court of the county of which the appellant is a resident or to the circuit court of Ingham county, which court shall have and exercise jurisdiction with respect thereto as in nonjury cases. Such appeals shall be made in accordance with the rules of the supreme court.

While the Department of Corrections may be considered an "agency ... authorized ... to promulgate rules," we believe that the Legislature has addressed the issue of a prisoner's right to a hearing and judicial review and has determined that, under the circumstances in this case, a prisoner is not entitled to judicial review.

Certainly, the phrase "from which an appeal or other judicial review has not otherwise been provided for by law" does not impair the Legislature's ability to preclude judicial review where constitutional rights are not implicated. To interpret this language as plaintiff suggests--to require judicial review even where the Legislature has affirmatively precluded judicial review whether expressly or, as in this case, by implication--is to interpret this provision in a nonsensical manner. Such an interpretation would forever bind subsequent Legislatures by the language of the Legislature that enacted M.C.L. § 600.631; M.S.A. § 27A.631 no matter how explicit the subsequent Legislatures were in limiting the application of judicial review. Malcolm v. East Detroit, 437 Mich. 132, 139, 468 N.W.2d 479 (1991). Further, such an interpretation would be contrary to the general rule of statutory interpretation that a more specific subsequent enactment of the Legislature is controlling to the...