Martin v. Texas Bd of Criminal Justice

Decision Date16 August 2001
Docket NumberNo. 13-00-502-CV,13-00-502-CV
Citation60 S.W.3d 226
Parties(Tex.App.-Corpus Christi 2001) TIMOTHY PAUL MARTIN , Appellant, v. THE TEXAS BOARD OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE, THE TEXAS BOARD OF PARDONS AND PAROLES, AND THE TEXAS DEPARTMENT OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE, INSTITUTIONAL DIVISION , Appellees
CourtTexas Court of Appeals

On appeal from the 156th District Court of Bee County, Texas. [Copyrighted Material Omitted]

Before Justices Dorsey, Hinojosa, and Castillo

OPINION

Opinion by Justice Castillo

Appellant Timothy Paul Martin is an inmate proceeding pro se to challenge the trial court's dismissal of his plea for declarative and injunctive relief against the Texas Board of Criminal Justice, the Texas Board of Pardons and Paroles, and the Texas Department of Criminal Justice Institutional Division. The State has not filed a response. Martin's claims were dismissed with prejudice for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, without a hearing. Martin contests the dismissal on the grounds that the trial court abused its discretion by granting the motion to dismiss when jurisdiction properly existed and he was entitled to equitable relief. We affirm the judgment to dismiss all claims with prejudice.

Factual Summary

Martin is concurrently serving one 20 year sentence for credit card abuse, one 17 year sentence for credit card abuse, one 20 year sentence for burglary of a vehicle, and one life sentence for theft, enhanced by his previous felony convictions. While serving these sentences in 1993, Martin was involved in a fight with prison guards. Martin pled guilty to aggravated assault on a peace officer, and was sentenced to an additional 12 years, to run concurrently with his other four sentences. Martin has lost his good time credit due to various disciplinary actions. He requests that we restore his good time credit because he received a letter from the Texas Board of Pardons and Paroles saying he would have been initially eligible for parole consideration in May 1998, and believes that he will be paroled if the credit is restored. 1

Issue Summary

In his sole point of error, Martin claims that the trial court abused its discretion in dismissing his claims for lack of subject matter jurisdiction when said jurisdiction existed and he was entitled to equitable relief. In his brief, Martin has resubmitted his petitions filed with the trial court, and does not specify any new or different forms of relief requested. Because we evaluate pro se pleadings liberally in order to determine the merits of the complaint, we review the same claims and grounds for jurisdiction as below. See Haines v. Kernes, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972); Johnson v. McAdams, 781 S.W.2d 451, 452 (Tex. App.- Houston [1st Dist.] 1990, no writ). Martin brings suit pursuant to the Texas Uniform Declaratory Judgment Act (codified at Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code Chapter 37), seeking a declaratory judgment that the law allowing prison officials to take away his good time credits is unconstitutional and that he has a liberty interest under Texas parole statutes. Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. §37.001-37.011 (Vernon 1997).

Martin also invokes the trial court's jurisdiction to issue writs of injunction under Texas Government Code §24.011. Tex. Gov't Code Ann. §24.011 (Vernon 1988). Martin asks that the court order the defendants to cease the alleged poor treatment they are subjecting the appellant to, to replace the food slot on his door, and to release the plaintiff from administrative segregation into the general population. Martin also requests an injunction that would restore his forfeited good conduct time and vacate a prior conviction.

Analysis

Trial courts have broad discretion in dismissing in forma pauperis suits they find to be frivolous. Martinez v. Thaler, 931 S.W.2d 45, 46 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1996, writ denied); Thomas v. Texas Dept. of Criminal Justice, Inst. Div., 848 S.W.2d 797, 798 (Tex. App.--Houston [14th Dist.] 1993, writ denied). An abuse of discretion occurs if the trial court acts arbitrarily, capriciously, and without reference to any guiding rules or principles. Thomas, 848 S.W.2d at 798. Under the controlling standards, trial courts may dismiss inmate lawsuits when those suits have no basis in law or fact. Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 14.003(a)(2), (b)(2) (Vernon Supp. 1998); Johnson v. Texas Dep't of Criminal Justice-Inst. Div., 33 S.W.3d 412, 414 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2000, pet. denied) (quoting Johnson v. Lynaugh, 796 S.W.2d 705, 706 (Tex.1990)). When the trial court dismisses a claim without conducting a fact hearing, however, the issue on appeal is whether the claim had no arguable basis in law. Birdo v. Williams, 859 S.W.2d 571, 572 (Tex. App.--Houston [1st Dist.] 1993, no writ). Therefore, because there was no fact hearing conducted in this case, we consider whether the trial court properly concluded there was no arguable basis in law for appellant's claim.

In his original petition, Martin asserts that Texas Civil Practice & Remedies Code Chapter 37 (the "Declaratory Judgments Act") confers jurisdiction upon the trial court to issue a declaratory judgment of the unconstitutionality of the law removing his good time credits and his liberty interest in parole. However, the Supreme Court of Texas has held that the Declaratory Judgment Act is "not a grant of jurisdiction, but a procedural device for deciding cases already within a court's jurisdiction." Chenault v. Phillips, 914 S.W.2d 140, 141 (Tex. 1996) (citing State v. Morales, 869 S.W.2d 941, 947 (Tex. 1994)); see Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. §37.001-37.011 (Vernon 1997).

In his two supplemental petitions, Martin asserts that Texas Government Code §24.011 confers jurisdiction upon the trial court to issue injunctive relief for his additional claims under their "writ power". Tex. Gov't Code Ann. § 24.011 (Vernon 1988). A district court may grant writs of mandamus necessary to the enforcement of the court's jurisdiction. Tex. Const. art. V, §8; Tex. Gov't Code Ann. § 24.011 (Vernon 1988). In order for his claims to be heard, Martin must establish jurisdiction in the court independent of his two cited statutes.

All of Martin's claims are barred by the doctrine of sovereign immunity. Martin is attempting to bring suit for declaratory and injunctive relief against agencies of the State of Texas. The doctrine of sovereign immunity insulates agency action from judicial review unless a statute provides for such review, the action violates constitutional procedural due process, or the constitution waives the state's immunity from suit. Southwest Airlines v. Texas High-Speed Rail Auth., 867 S.W.2d 154, 157 (Tex. App.--Austin 1993, writ denied). A suit against an agency of the State is considered to be a suit against the State. Lowe v. Texas Tech Univ., 540 S.W.2d 297, 298 (Tex. 1976). Therefore, as a state agency, TDCJ is entitled to the same sovereign immunity enjoyed by the State of Texas. See Thomas v. Brown, 927 S.W.2d 122, 127-28 (Tex App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1996, writ denied) (suit against TDCJ employee barred by sovereign immunity).

"A district court has no constitutional or statutory jurisdiction to exercise supervisory control over prison officials." Martinez, 931 S.W.2d at 46. Thus, the trial court could not order TDCJ officials to cease their alleged poor treatment, replace Martin's food door or alter their segregation decisions. Thus, the trial court did not abuse its discretion by not ordering the prison officials to alter their treatment of appellant.

There is no constitutional waiver of suit by any of the agencies involved. Therefore, Martin must assert some constitutional violation in order for any of his other claims to overcome the State's assertion of sovereign immunity. Sovereign immunity does not preclude a claim alleging that the State deprived the plaintiff of property without due process of law....

To continue reading

Request your trial
22 cases
  • Boateng v. Trailblazer Health Enterprises
    • United States
    • Texas Supreme Court
    • July 26, 2005
    ...and when a suit is barred by sovereign immunity the cause should ordinarily be dismissed with prejudice. See Martin v. Texas Bd. of Criminal Justice, 60 S.W.3d 226, 231 (Tex.App.-Corpus Christi 2001, no pet.) (holding when a lawsuit is barred by sovereign immunity, dismissal with prejudice ......
  • Harris County v. Sykes
    • United States
    • Texas Supreme Court
    • May 28, 2004
    ...is appropriate when a trial court lacks subject matter jurisdiction because of the sovereign immunity bar. See Martin v. Tex. Bd. of Criminal Justice, 60 S.W.3d 226, 231 (Tex.App.-Corpus Christi 2001, no pet.); City of Midland v. Sullivan, 33 S.W.3d 1, 6 (Tex.App.-El Paso 2000, pet. dism'd ......
  • Powell v. Texas Dept. of Criminal Justice
    • United States
    • Texas Court of Appeals
    • February 7, 2008
    ...S.W.2d 465, 467 (Tex.1995). The Act is a procedural device for deciding cases already within a court's jurisdiction. Martin v. Texas Bd. of Crim. Justice, 60 S.W.3d 226, 229 (Tex.App.—Corpus Christi 2001, no pet.). In Martin, the plaintiff argued that the declaratory judgment act conferred ......
  • Texas Dept. of Health v. Rocha
    • United States
    • Texas Court of Appeals
    • March 27, 2003
    ...review, the action violates constitutional due process, or the constitution waives the state's immunity from suit. Martin v. Texas Bd. of Criminal Justice, 60 S.W.3d 226, 229 (Tex.App.-Corpus Christi 2001, no pet.); Southwest Airlines v. Tex. High-Speed Rail Auth., 867 S.W.2d 154, 157 (Tex.......
  • Request a trial to view additional results

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT