Martin v. Thor Motor Coach Inc.

• Decision Date: 23 July 2020
• Docket Number: CAUSE NO. 3:20-CV-13 DRL-MGG
• Citation: 474 F.Supp.3d 978
• Parties: Clarence MARTIN et al., Plaintiffs, v. THOR MOTOR COACH INC., Defendant.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Northern District of Indiana

474 F.Supp.3d 978

Clarence MARTIN et al., Plaintiffs,

v.THOR MOTOR COACH INC., Defendant.

CAUSE NO. 3:20-CV-13 DRL-MGG

United States District Court, N.D. Indiana, South Bend Division.

Signed July 23, 2020

Amorette Rinkleib, Russell S. Thompson, IV, Thompson Consumer Law Group, PLLC, Mesa, AZ, for Plaintiffs.

Trevor Q. Gasper, Thor Industries Inc., Elkhart, IN, Vicki M. Smith, Bodyfelt Mount, LLP, Portland, OR, for Defendant.

OPINION & ORDER

Damon R. Leichty, Judge

Clarence and Terri Martin purchased a recreational vehicle manufactured by Thor Motor Coach, Inc., which they claim is a dud. After months of attempts to fix various defects, the Martins filed this action alleging Thor breached its express and implied warranties. Thor believes the Martins waited too long to file this action and asks the court to dismiss the case. The court agrees with Thor only in part and thus partially grants and denies the company's motion.

BACKGROUND

These facts emerge from the complaint's well-pleaded allegations. On March 24, 2018, the Martins purchased a 2018 Thor Hurricane M29 motorhome from a dealer. Thor manufactured the recreational vehicle and provided a written limited warranty (ECF 20-2, 25-1). The warranty explicitly limited the period in which a buyer could bring a warranty action to 15 months after the breach (ECF 20-2 at 2).

Shortly after receiving their vehicle, the Martins say they noticed several alleged defects that diminished the vehicle's value and impaired their use. The Martins tendered the RV for repairs on or about May 3, 2018, when it was in service for 43 days, and July 26, 2018, when it remained in service for approximately 180 days. Despite the attempted repairs, the Martins allege the RV remains defective and that Thor breached its limited warranty by failing to fix the defects.

On September 23, 2019, the Martins sued, alleging Thor breached its express and implied warranties under the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2301 et seq. Thor now requests the court to dismiss these claims as untimely.

STANDARD

Though both parties argued the instant motion as one under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), the court reviews the motion under Rule 12(c) because the pleadings have closed; however, the court uses the same standard. See Adams v. City of Indianapolis , 742 F.3d 720, 727-28 (7th Cir. 2014) ( Rule 12(c) is governed by the same standards as a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) ); see also Lanigan v. Village of E. Hazel Crest , 110 F.3d 467, 470 n.2 (7th Cir. 1997) (treating a motion to dismiss under 12(b)(6) as a 12(c) motion because they can be reviewed using the same standard).

In reviewing the motion to dismiss, the court accepts all well-pleaded factual allegations as true and draws all reasonable inferences in the plaintiff's favor.

Reynolds v. CB Sports Bar, Inc. , 623 F.3d 1143, 1146 (7th Cir. 2010). A complaint must contain a "short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief." Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). The statement must contain enough factual matter, accepted as true, to state a plausible claim, not a speculative one. Ashcroft v. Iqbal , 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009) ; Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly , 550 U.S. 544, 570, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007). A claim must be plausible, not probable. Indep. Trust Corp. v. Stewart Info. Servs. Corp. , 665 F.3d 930, 935 (7th Cir. 2012). Whether a claim is sufficiently plausible to survive a motion to dismiss is "a context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and common sense." McCauley v. City of Chicago , 671 F.3d 611, 616 (7th Cir. 2011) (quoting Iqbal , 556 U.S. at 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937 ).

A statute of limitations defense is an affirmative defense; a complaint need not anticipate or plead against it. See Xechem, Inc. v. Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. , 372 F.3d 899, 901 (7th Cir. 2004). Though a limitations defense isn't normally a part of a motion to dismiss, "when the allegations of the complaint reveal that relief is barred by the applicable statute of limitations, the complaint is subject to dismissal for failure to state a claim." Logan v. Wilkins , 644 F.3d 577, 582 (7th Cir. 2011) ; Small v. Chao , 398 F.3d 894, 898 (7th Cir. 2005) (courts may dismiss a claim under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) if the claim is "indisputably time barred").

Generally, if a party attaches evidence outside the pleadings in a motion to dismiss, "the court must either convert [the motion] into a motion for summary judgment under Rule 56 ... or exclude the documents attached to the motion to dismiss and continue under Rule 12." 188 LLC v. Trinity Indus., Inc. , 300 F.3d 730, 735 (7th Cir. 2002) (quoting Levenstein v. Salafsky , 164 F.3d 345, 347 (7th Cir. 1998) ). There is a narrow exception: a dismissal motion can rest on critical documents, central to the claim and referred to in the complaint. Geinosky v. City of Chicago , 675 F.3d 743, 745 n.1 (7th Cir. 2012) ; 188 LLC , 300 F.3d at 735. This allowance applies particularly in cases of contractual interpretation. Levenstein , 164 F.3d at 347. Accordingly, the court considers the written warranty that both parties have attached to their briefing but excludes Celina Tyler's affidavit.¹

DISCUSSION

The argument at this stage revolves around whether the Martins timely filed their claims. Thor says the Martins were required to bring any claims for breach of the written or implied warranties within 15 months after the RV's delivery. The Martins view the 15-month limitation ineffective for a number of reasons.

The MMWA lacks its own statute of limitations, so the court must borrow a limitations period from an analogous state cause of action. N. Star Steel Co. v. Thomas , 515 U.S. 29, 33-35, 115 S.Ct. 1927, 132 L.Ed.2d 27 (1995). The parties agree that Indiana's statute of limitations applies. The court also applies "any rules that are an integral part of the statute of limitations, such as tolling and equitable estoppel." Indep. Trust Corp. v. Stewart Info. Servs. Corp. , 665 F.3d 930, 935 (7th Cir. 2012) (quoting Parish v. City of Elkhart , 614 F.3d 677, 679 (7th Cir. 2010) ).

Under Indiana law, the statute of limitations for breach of any contract for sale is normally four years after the cause of action accrues; a claim accrues at the time of breach when the warranty doesn't extend to future performance. Ind. Code § 26-1-2-725. The parties may reduce that period by contract to not less than one year. Ind. Code § 26-1-2-725(1). Thor argues that its warranty did just that—it reduced the limitations period to 15 months.

The Martins argue that the reduced period of limitations is a modification of the implied warranty that must be conspicuous and presented at the time of purchase. Under Indiana law, a modification or exclusion of an implied warranty can be ineffective if it wasn't a basis of the bargain or if it wasn't conspicuous. See Ind. Code § 26-1-2-316(2) ; Hahn v. Ford Motor Co. , 434 N.E.2d 943, 947-48 (Ind. Ct. App. 1982). The MMWA invalidates modifications of an implied warranty, save those limiting its duration, when a written warranty is supplied. 15 U.S.C. § 2308.

That said, the Martins cite no authority that reducing the limitations period is a modification of an implied warranty. Neither the UCC nor the MMWA define modification, but courts have held that modifications are changes that eliminate the quality commitment in a warranty. Hahn , 434 N.E.2d at 952 (citing Gladden v. Cadillac Motor Car Division , 83 N.J. 320, 416 A.2d 394, 399 (1980) ); see also Iron Dynamics v. Alstom Power, Inc. , 2007 WL 3046430, 4, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 77164, 13 (N.D. Ind. Oct. 15, 2007) (Cosbey, J.). Generally, they limit "the circumstances in which the seller or manufacturer may be deemed to be in breach of warranty." Hahn , 434 N.E.2d at 952.

Reducing the statute of limitations doesn't fit this definition. "A statute of limitations neither excludes nor modifies warranties, but only limits the period of time in which an action may be brought." Jandreau v. Sheesley Plumbing & Heating Co. , 324 N.W.2d 266, 273 (S.D. 1982). Unlike an exclusion or modification, the statute of limitations doesn't bear on when a warranty has been breached; in fact, it only begins to run at the moment a breach occurs. See Ind. Code § 26-1-2-725.

The Martins’ arguments unravel because the 15-month period remains enforceable. They say the 15-month limitations period is void because Thor cannot show they received the written warranty at the time of purchase. This is an odd assertion given they pleaded that their "purchase of the RV was accompanied by the written warranty offered by Thor and extending to Plaintiffs." This well-pleaded fact undermines their argument now.

The Martins say the 15-month limitations period is unenforceable because this warranty provision wasn't conspicuous. The court need not decide whether the language here was conspicuous because it wasn't an exclusion or modification. A manufacturer should not obfuscate or hide such pertinent language, but that wasn't done here, no matter the frequency and variance of emphasis and conspicuousness used within this warranty. The Martins’ claims must meet the 15-month window.

Now the court must determine when that window opened and shut. For their written warranty claim, the Martins argue that the period began to run after Thor's failed attempts to repair the RV. The Martins contend that this comports with the MMWA's requirement that they afford the company a reasonable opportunity to cure. Though MMWA claimants must show that they gave the warrantor a reasonable opportunity to cure its failure to comply with the warranty, see 15 U.S.C. § 2310(e) ; Anderson v. Gulf Stream Coach, Inc. , 662 F.3d 775, 781 (7th Cir. 2011), this federal law merely establishes the conditions to a federal suit rather than create an independent form of liability, see 15 U.S.C. § 2310(e) ; Schimmer v. Jaguar...