Martin v. Town of Westport, CIV. 3:02CV1395(MRK).
| Decision Date | 04 August 2004 |
| Docket Number | No. CIV. 3:02CV1395(MRK).,CIV. 3:02CV1395(MRK). |
| Citation | 329 F.Supp.2d 318 |
| Parties | Robert E. MARTIN, Jr., Plaintiff, v. TOWN OF WESTPORT and Stephen Edwards, Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Connecticut |
Ikechukwu Umeugo, Umeugo & Assoc., West Haven, CT, for Plaintiff.
Alexandria L. Voccio, Martha Anne Shaw, Melinda A. Powell, Michael J. Rose, Howd & Ludorf, Hartford, CT, for Defendants.
Plaintiff Robert E. Martin, Jr. filed this action on August 12, 2002 against the Town of Westport and Stephen Edwards (collectively "the Defendants") alleging claims arising under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981 and 1983, the Americans with Disabilities Act ("ADA"), 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq., as well as state statutory and common law. Pending before the Court is Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment [doc. # 18]. For the reasons set forth below, the Motion for Summary Judgment [doc. # 18] is GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART.
The relevant facts are drawn from Defendants' Local Rule 9(c)1 Statement [doc. # 19] ("Defs.' 9(c)1 Statement"),1 and other pleadings and documents submitted by the parties,2 and unless otherwise indicated, are undisputed. Mr. Martin is an African-American male currently employed by the Town of Westport (the "Town") in its Equipment Maintenance Division. Id. ¶ 1. That division falls under the aegis of the Town's Public Works Department, of which Mr. Edwards is the Director. Id. ¶ 2. Mr. Martin is, and at all relevant times was, the Master Mechanic, which is the lead mechanic in the Equipment Maintenance Division, and is responsible for, among other things, leading, instructing, and assisting all Equipment Mechanics in all phases of the work, assigning work, writing up job tickets, maintaining records, maintaining work schedules, and assisting in the requisitioning of parts and supplies. Id. ¶ 4; Master Mechanic Description [doc. # 20], Ex. B.
On or about December 20, 1999, Mr. Martin injured his right shoulder and wrist while working for the Town. Id. ¶ 10; Martin Affidavit ¶ 18. He underwent surgery on his elbow and wrist on February 14, 2000, and spent time out of work recuperating until about August 2000. Id. ¶¶ 11, 12. In August 2000, Mr. Martin returned to work but his treating physician, Dr. Stewart C. Gross, limited Mr. Martin to light duty, not to exceed four hours a day, with no lifting. Id. ¶ 13. As a consequence, Mr. Edwards assigned Mr. Martin exclusively to light duty work, including completing paperwork that had accumulated during Mr. Martin's medical absence, and ordering parts and attending to inventory. Id. ¶ 14.
On December 14, 2000, Mr. Martin re-injured his right arm while at home clearing snow from his vehicle, and he remained out of work until February 20, 2001. Id. ¶ 16. On February 20, 2001, Mr. Martin again returned to light duty for four hours a day, but increased to eight-hour days of light duty beginning February 22, 2001. Id. ¶ 17. Mr. Martin's light duty assignment restricted any required lifting to less than ten pounds. Id. ¶ 18. On April 13, 2001, after meeting with Mr. Martin and his union representatives, Mr. Edwards advised Mr. Martin by letter that: "as of the end of April we will only have work for you if your doctor authorizes your return to your regular position as Master Mechanic, full time without restrictions, and you do, in fact, return to work." Id. ¶ 19; see also April 13, 2001 Edwards Letter [doc. # 20], Ex. F.
As of May 1, 2001, Mr. Martin had failed to provide the Town with a note from his doctor permitting him to return to full-time work without restrictions as required by the April 13 letter. Id. ¶ 20. When Mr. Martin reported to work on May 1, he was forbidden from working and was ordered to turn in his keys. Id. ¶ 22; May 1, 2001 Edwards Letter [doc. # 30], Ex. 5. However, Mr. Martin continued to receive health benefits and all other benefits in accordance with the contract between the union and the Town. Id. ¶ 23. He eventually returned to work and was restored to the payroll on or about October 15, 2001, after an independent medical examiner declared him fit to resume his job. Martin Depo. at 82-83, 85.
Mr. Martin filed a grievance charging wrongful termination and discrimination against the Town and Mr. Edwards under the terms of the Collective Bargaining Agreement ("CBA"). Id. ¶ 43. The grievance was filed directly with the First Selectman, who rejected Mr. Martin's contention that he had been terminated by Mr. Edwards since Mr Edwards lacked the authority to fire Mr. Martin. Id. ¶ 45; Martin Depo. at 100. The Connecticut State Board of Mediation and Arbitration later affirmed the First Selectman's decision and ruled in the Town's favor, finding that Mr. Martin's employment had not been terminated. Id. ¶ 46. On or about May 1, 2001, Mr. Martin filed a complaint with the CHRO alleging that he had been terminated and harassed on the basis of his race and physical disability. See CHRO Application, attached to Complaint [doc. # 1]. He received a release of jurisdiction on May 20, 2002, see CHRO Letter, attached to Complaint [doc. # 1], and filed this lawsuit on August 12, 2002.
Summary judgment is appropriate only when "the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). A genuine issue of fact exists when "a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party," and facts are material to the outcome if the substantive law renders them so. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). The moving party bears the burden of demonstrating that no genuine issue exists as to any material fact. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323-25, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). If the moving party carries its burden, the party opposing summary judgment "may not rest upon mere allegations or denials," rather, the opposing party must "set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e). The Court must draw all ambiguities and inferences in favor of the plaintiffs. See Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255, 106 S.Ct. 2505. However, to defeat a motion for summary judgment, the nonmoving party "must do more than simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts." Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986). "If the evidence is merely colorable, or is not significantly probative, summary judgment may be granted." Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249-50, 106 S.Ct. 2505.
Courts must be Schwapp v. Town of Avon, 118 F.3d 106, 110 (2d Cir.1997) (citations omitted) (quoting Gallo v. Prudential Residential Servs., 22 F.3d 1219, 1224 (2d Cir.1994)). However, "[s]ummary judgment is appropriate even in discrimination cases," Weinstock v. Columbia Univ., 224 F.3d 33, 41 (2d Cir.2000), where a plaintiff's argument is "based on conclusory allegations of discrimination and the employer provides a legitimate rationale for its conduct." Tojzan v. N.Y. Presbyterian Hosp., No. 00 Civ. 6105, 2003 WL 1738993, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. March 31, 2003).
There are two issues that the Court should address at the outset of its consideration of Mr. Martin's Title VII claims. First, Mr. Edwards asserts that he is not subject to suit under Title VII, since that law applies to employers and not to individuals, such as Mr. Edwards. Mem. in Supp. of Summ. J. at 8. The Court agrees.
Title VII provides, among other things, that "[i]t shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer ... to discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of conditions, or privileges of employment, because of the individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin." 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1). An "employer" is defined as "a person engaged in an industry affecting commerce who has fifteen or more employees for each working day in each of twenty or more calendar weeks in the current or preceding calendar year, and any agent of such a person." 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b). The Second Circuit has held that "under Title VII individual supervisors are not subject to liability." Mandell v. County of Suffolk, 316 F.3d 368, 377 (2d Cir.2003) (citing Wrighten v. Glowski, 232 F.3d 119, 120 (2d Cir.2000)) (per curiam).
Mr. Martin does not address this issue in his opposition brief, and the Court construes Mr. Martin's failure to respond to Mr. Edwards' argument as a concession that Mr. Edwards is not subject to liability under Title VII. The Court therefore grants Mr. Edwards summary judgment on all of Mr. Martin's Title VII claims, and in the remainder of this opinion, the Court will address Mr. Martin's Title VII claims only with respect to the Town.
Second, Defendants argue that Mr. Martin has not asserted a viable Title VII claim for gender discrimination. Mem. in Supp. of Mot. for Summ. J. at 21. Once again, the Court agrees with Defendants.
Mr. Martin alleges in his Complaint that "[t]he defendants through its agents and employees discriminated against the plaintiff because of plaintiff's race, color, and gender." Compl. ¶ 37. As Defendants observe, Mr. Martin has submitted not a scintilla of evidence in support of his gender...
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