Martin v. Town of Rosedale
| Decision Date | 18 December 1891 |
| Docket Number | 15,336 |
| Parties | Martin v. The Town of Rosedale |
| Court | Indiana Supreme Court |
From the Parke Circuit Court.
Judgment reversed, with directions to the circuit court to grant a new trial, and for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.
D. H Maxwell and H. Maxwell, for appellant.
E Hunt, for appellee.
Section 826, Elliott's Supplement, confers upon incorporated towns in this State the power to license, regulate or restrain the business of travelling peddlers. Under the power thus conferred the town of Rosedale, in Parke county, duly passed an ordinance making it unlawful for any travelling peddler to ply his avocation within the corporate limits of the town, without first procuring a license so to do, and fixing a penalty for its violation.
In the month of February, 1889, the appellant, who is a resident of the State of Illinois, without having first procured a license, was found selling goods, by sample, in the town of Rosedale, and travelling from house to house for that purpose. He was the agent of Loverin & Co., of the city of Chicago, and the samples exhibited by him belonged to that company. The goods sold by the appellant were to be delivered by the company, the appellant acting as their agent in soliciting and taking orders.
He was prosecuted for violating this ordinance, and was convicted from which conviction he appeals to this court, calling in question the validity of both the ordinance and the statute under which it was passed.
It is contended that the ordinance in question discriminates in favor of citizens of the town of Rosedale and against those who do not reside in the town, and is for that reason void. The contention is based upon the assumption that one who resides in the town and peddles goods therein from house to house is not a travelling peddler, and in this respect may enjoy a privilege under this ordinance not enjoyed by one who does not reside in the town.
This involves the construction of the ordinance before us. The object to be attained in construing a statute or ordinance is to ascertain, if possible, the intention of those who enacted it. For that purpose the court should first ascertain, if it can do so, the evil intended to be remedied or prevented, and should so construe the statute or ordinance, if it is susceptible of such construction, as to render it effectual for the purpose intended.
In the case of Graffty v. City of Rushville, 107 Ind. 502, 8 N.E. 609, it was said by this court that one of the objects sought to be attained by statutes and ordinances of the kind now under consideration was to prevent the indiscriminate invasion of the houses and places of business of citizens, and shield them from the practices of itinerant traders of unknown repute, who are frequently patronized by persons in order to be rid of their importunities and presence.
It is impossible to conceive of a "peddler," in the ordinary acceptation of that term, disconnected from the idea of "travelling" from house to house for the purpose of vending some article of merchandise. "The leading primary idea of a hawker and peddler is, that of an itinerant or travelling trader, who carries goods about, in order to sell them, and who actually sells them to purchasers, in contradistinction to a trader who has goods for sale and sells them in a fixed place of business."
"A peddler, petty chapman, or other trading person going from town to town or to other men's houses, and travelling either on foot, or with horse or horses, or otherwise carrying to sell, or...
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