Martin v. United States, Civil Action No. RDB-18-0103
| Decision Date | 24 July 2018 |
| Docket Number | Crim. Action No. RDB-15-0111,Civil Action No. RDB-18-0103 |
| Parties | CURTIS R. MARTIN, JR., Petitioner, v. UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Respondent. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Maryland |
On July 28, 2015, pro se Petitioner, Curtis R. Martin, Jr. ("Petitioner" or "Martin"), pleaded guilty before this Court to one count of Wire Fraud in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1343. (ECF No. 43 at 2.)1 This Court sentenced Martin to ninety-six (96) months' imprisonment and ordered that he remain on supervised release for a period of three years.2 (ECF No. 75.) Martin subsequently appealed his sentence to the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit because it was above the advisory Guidelines range of 63 to 78 months. (ECF No. 78.) On February 21, 2017, the Fourth Circuit affirmed this Court's Judgment. See United States v. Martin, 676 F. App'x 214 (4th Cir. 2017). On January 10, 2018, Martin filed the subject Motion to Vacate, Set Aside, or Correct Sentence, pursuant to 28 U.S.C § 2255. (ECF No. 90.) The parties' submissions have been reviewed, and no hearing is necessary. See,e.g., United States v. Lemaster, 403 F.3d 216, 220-23 (4th Cir. 2005) (); United States v. White, 366 F.3d 291, 302 (4th Cir. 2004); United States v. Taylor, 139 F.3d 924, 933 (D.C. Cir. 1998); see also Local Rule 105.6 (D. Md. 2016). For the reasons stated herein, Petitioner's Motion to Vacate (ECF No. 90) is DENIED.
The facts of this case are largely laid out in Martin's Plea Agreement. (Statement of Facts, ECF No. 32 at 12-16.)3 To summarize, Martin incorporated Oledix Technologies, LLC ("Oledix") during the summer of 2010 while serving the final portion of a one-hundred and sixty-two (162) month federal prison sentence at a halfway house in the District of Maryland. (Id. at 12.) Martin represented Oledix as a technology firm that designed and distributed a variety of touchscreen products. (Id.)
One of the companies from which Martin sought financing was New Century Financial ("NCF"), a Texas company in the business of accounts receivable financing. (Id. at 13.) In early April 2012, Martin provided NCF with fraudulent documents4 that presented a misleading picture of Oledix's financial position. (Id.) As a result, Martin ultimately received financing on three different invoices from Oledix, with the amount of the invoices being substantially greater than the financing he received. (Id.) Specifically, on June 13, 2012, Martin submitted a request for financing to NCF. (Id.) This request was based upon a counterfeit invoice purportedly issued by Oledix to Johns Hopkins Medical Center("Hopkins") in the amount of $174,720, for the sale of three "Oledix mobile telemedicine carts." (Id. at 15.) The next day, based upon receipt of this Hopkins invoice, NCF provided $119,986 in funding for Oledix via a wire transfer from its bank account in Texas to Oledix's PNC bank account in Maryland. (Id.; see also Count 5 of Indictment, ECF No. 1 at 8.)
On March 18, 2015, a federal Grand Jury charged Martin with various wire fraud offenses related to his involvement as President and Chief Executive Officer (CEO) of Oledix in these fraudulent schemes. (ECF No. 1.) Martin subsequently executed a Plea Agreement and pleaded guilty to Count 5 of the Indictment. (ECF Nos. 32, 43.) The Government then proceeded to dismiss Counts 1-4, and 6-14. (Id.) This Court sentenced Martin to ninety-six (96) months' imprisonment and ordered that he remain on supervised release for a period of three years subject to additional conditions. (ECF No. 75.)5 Martin appealed this Court's Judgment to the Fourth Circuit based upon his sentence being above his advisory Guidelines range. Martin, 676 F. App'x 214. The Fourth Circuit affirmed this Court's Judgment stating that "Martin's sentence [was] procedurally and substantively reasonable." Id. at 215. Currently pending is Martin's Motion to Vacate, Set Aside, or Correct Sentence, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255. (ECF No. 90.)
Since Martin proceeds pro se in this manner, this Court must construe his pleadings liberally. See Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007); see also Alky v. Yadkin County SheriffDept., 698 Fed. App'x 141 (4th Cir. Oct 5, 2017) (citing Erickson for the proposition that "[p]ro se complaints and pleadings, however inartfully pleaded, must be liberally construed and held to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers").
Under 28 U.S.C. § 2255, a prisoner in custody may seek to vacate, set aside or correct his sentence on four grounds: (1) the sentence was imposed in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States; (2) the court was without jurisdiction to impose the sentence; (3) the sentence was in excess of the maximum authorized by law; or (4) the sentence is otherwise subject to a collateral attack. Hill v. United States, 368 U.S. 424, 426-27 (1962) (citing 28 U.S.C. § 2255)). "[A]n error of law does not provide a basis for collateral attack unless the claimed error constituted 'a fundamental defect which inherently results in a complete miscarriage of justice.'" United States v. Addonizio, 442 U.S. 178, 185 (1979) (quoting Hill, 368 U.S. at 428).
The scope of a § 2255 collateral attack is far narrower than an appeal, and a "'collateral challenge may not do service for an appeal.'" Foster v. Chatman, 136 S. Ct. 1737, 1758 (2016) (quoting United States v. Frady, 456 U.S. 152, 165 (1982)). Thus, any failure to raise a claim on direct appeal constitutes a procedural default that bars presentation of the claim in a § 2255 motion unless the petitioner can demonstrate cause and prejudice, or actual innocence. United States v. Pettiford, 612 F. 3d 270, 280 (4th Cir. 2010); see Dretke v. Haley, 541 U.S. 386, 393 (2004); Reed v. Farley, 512 U.S. 339 (1994); see also United States v. Mikalajunas, 186 F.3d 490, 492-93 (4th Cir. 1999). However, any "failure to raise an ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim on direct appeal does not bar the claim from being brought in a later, appropriate proceeding under § 2255." Massaro v. United States, 538 U.S. 500, 509 (2003).
In Martin's § 2255 Motion, he claims his sentence should be vacated based upon four grounds. First, Martin claims the Government failed to provide evidence establishing that the wire transmission in Count 5 of the Indictment moved in interstate commerce, "resulting in a fatally defective indictment, centralizing undue fraud upon the court." (ECF No. 32 at 2.) As a result, Petitioner argues that as a matter of law, no violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1343 occurred and therefore he is not guilty of wire fraud. (Id.) Second, Martin requests to withdraw his guilty plea for "fair and just" reason under Rule 11(d)(2)(B) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. (Id. at 3.) Third, Martin alleges that he "experienced harm resulting from exposure to racial prejudice through a version of 'sentence entrapment'" (Id.) Fourth, Martin alleges that the "District Court committed 'plain error' when erroneously ordering restitution from BOP Inmate Financial Responsibility Program (IFRP) and impermissibly 'handing over' discretionary power to [the] probation department." (Id.)
In light of Martin proceeding pro se in this matter, this Court has construed his legal arguments to assert five claims for relief. To summarize, Martin's Motion is based on the alleged: (1) invalidity of his guilty plea; (2) insufficiency of the facts supporting his conviction; (3) sentencing errors related to restitution and post-incarceration employment; (4) prosecutorial misconduct; and (5) ineffective assistance of trial counsel. (ECF Nos. 90, 97.)
The general rule governing procedural default of claims brought under § 2255 bars consideration of any matters that "could have been but were not pursued on direct appeal,[unless] the movant . . . show[s] cause and actual prejudice resulting from the errors of which he complains," or shows "actual innocence." Pettiford, 612 F. 3d 270, 280 (4th Cir. 2010) (citing Mikalajunas, 186 at 492-93).
Under the "cause and prejudice" standard, the petitioner must show: (1) cause for not raising the claim of error on direct appeal; and (2) actual prejudice from the alleged error. Bousley v. United States, 523 U.S. 614, 622 (1998) (emphasis added); see also Dretke, 541 U.S. at 393; Massaro, 538 U.S. at 505 (2003); Reed, 512 U.S. at 354 (); Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 485, 496 (1986); United States v. Frady, 456 U.S. 152, 167-68 (1982); Mikalajunas, 186 F.3d at 492-93. In addition, any ineffective assistance of counsel claim may also be raised for the first time in a § 2255 petition. See Massaro, 538 U.S. at 508.
In order to show cause for not raising the claim of error on direct appeal, a petitioner must prove that "some objective factor external to the defense such as the novelty of the claim or a denial of effective assistance of counsel" impeded their counsel's efforts to raise the issue earlier. Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 753 (1991); see also Carrier, 477 U.S. at 492 (); Mikalajunas, 186 F.3d at 493 (). Additionally, the alleged error cannot simply create a possibility of prejudice, but must be proven to work to the petitioner's "actual and substantial disadvantage, infecting his entire trial with error of constitutional dimensions." Frady, 456U.S. at 170 (emphasis in...
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