Martin v. United States
| Decision Date | 23 June 2022 |
| Docket Number | Civil Action 21-cv-02107-NYW |
| Parties | DAVID J. MARTIN, Plaintiff, v. UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Colorado |
ORDER ON MOTION TO DISMISS
This matter is before the court on Defendant's Motion to Dismiss Pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6) (the “Motion” or “Motion to Dismiss”) [Doc. 24]. This court considers the Motion pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c) and the Order Referring Case to Magistrate Judge dated November 5, 2021. [Doc 18].[1] Upon review of the Motion, the related briefing, and the applicable case law, the Motion to Dismiss is respectfully DENIED.
The court draws the following facts from the Prisoner Complaint (the “Complaint”). [Doc. 1]. Plaintiff David J Martin (“Plaintiff” or “Mr. Martin”) is in the custody of the Federal Bureau of Prisons (“BOP”) and is currently housed at the Federal Correctional Institution in Terre Haute Indiana. [Id. at 2].[2] At all times relevant to this matter, Mr. Martin was housed at the United States Penitentiary in Florence, Colorado (“USP Florence”). [Id. at ¶ 5]. Mr. Martin alleges that on June 2, 2018, he entered the recreation yard at USP Florence to wait for his cousin, [id. at 11; id. at ¶ 9], whom Mr. Martin states he had testified against in a hearing “during a trial involving Murder.” [Id. at ¶ 10]. While Mr. Martin sat on the bleachers and waited for his cousin to arrive, his cousin snuck up on him and began pushing and kicking him. [Id. at ¶¶ 12, 16]. This prompted Mr. Martin to kick at his cousin's hand in an attempt to defend himself. [Id. at ¶ 18]. The cousin then began to stab Mr. Martin with a six- or seven-inch metal blade. [Id. at ¶¶ 17-18]. Mr. Martin's cousin stabbed Mr. Martin over 19 times creating “a total of 9 [puncture] wounds to multiple parts of [Plaintiff's] body.” [Id. at ¶¶ 18-19].
According to Plaintiff, the attack occurred in an area that “staff in the Guard Tower” and “the Lieutenants Office,” “[w]here the Defendant[s'] Offices are,” could observe. [Id. at ¶ 16]. Moreover, Plaintiff alleges that before entering the recreation yard, inmates must pass through several security check points, including “metal scanners”. [Id. at 4, 11]. Mr. Martin states that even staples can set off the metal scanners, [id. at 11], and asserts that the metal in the blade “would have set off the metal detector, and would have alerted the observant Officer [whose] duty [it] was to observe the metal detector.” [Id. at ¶ 14]. Mr. Martin states that this unnamed correctional officer was either not present at the metal detector or was present and permitted the blade to enter the yard. [Id.].
Mr. Martin asserts that a number of USP Florence officials were negligent in the events leading up to the stabbing. Specifically, he asserts that the USP Florence Complex Warden, John Oliver (“Warden Oliver”) was negligent in training correctional officers, knowingly permitted his staff “to refuse to do their job assignments,” and “allowed and permitted inmates knowingly to freely carry [weapons], in and about the institution.” [Id. at ¶ 7a]. He asserts the same or similar general allegations against Stephen Julian, the Complex Warden Associate (“Associate Warden Julian”), the Special Investigations Services Officer, Debra Payne (“Officer Payne”), and Operations Lieutenant Daniel Armendarez (“Lieutenant Armendarez”). [Id. at ¶¶ 7b, 7e, 7f].[3] Mr. Martin asserts that the “Federal Officers, Specifically the Special Investigation Lieutenant . . ., as well as the Complex Warden, and the Associate Warden of Security and the complex Captain,” were aware that Mr. Martin had testified at a hearing against his cousin. [Id. at ¶ 10]. He states that he and his cousin “were known in [the Central Inmate Monitoring (“CIM”) system] and other Court documents not to be on [the] ‘same' yard together.” [Id. at 4]. In addition, Plaintiff asserts that USP Florence staff knew or should have known of the danger presented to Mr. Martin by his cousin and consciously or recklessly disregarded that risk, but he does not specifically explain how they did so. [Id. at ¶ 11].
Proceeding pro se, Plaintiff initiated this civil action on August 3, 2021. See generally [id.]. Mr. Martin raises a single negligence claim under the Federal Tort Claims Act (“FTCA”), which appears to be based on three distinct categories of allegations: (1) the government's alleged failure to separate Plaintiff and his cousin at USP Florence; (2) the government's alleged failure to prevent Plaintiff's cousin from bringing a blade into the recreation yard; and (3) the government's alleged failure to intervene in the recreation yard attack. See [id. at 4]. In the caption of the Complaint, Mr. Martin names only the United States as a Defendant, see [id. at 1], and lists “NONE” on the portion of the form Complaint asking for additional named defendants. See [id. at 3]. However, Plaintiff then purports to name individual defendants in this matter, as well. See [id. at 9-11, 15]. Upon an initial review of the case, the Honorable Gordon P. Gallagher determined that the case was not appropriate for summary dismissal. See [Doc. 7]. The case was originally re-assigned to the Honorable William J. Martinez and referred to the Honorable Kathleen M. Tafoya, but was then referred to Judge Tafoya for all purposes upon the Parties' consent to the jurisdiction of a Magistrate Judge. [Doc. 8; Doc. 18]. Upon Judge Tafoya's retirement, the case was re-assigned to the undersigned Magistrate Judge. [Doc. 27].
On January 13, 2022, the United States filed the instant Motion to Dismiss, arguing that Plaintiff's FTCA claim should be dismissed pursuant to Rules 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. [Doc. 24]. Plaintiff responded in opposition to the Motion on March 21, 2022, [Doc. 30], and the United States replied on April 11, 2022. [Doc. 42]. On April 29, 2022, this court entered a Minute Order advising the Parties that the court was considering converting the portion of the Motion to Dismiss that raises an argument under Rule 12(b)(1) to a motion for summary judgment under Rule 56. See [Doc. 48 at 2]. Accordingly, the court advised Plaintiff that should he intend to submit any additional evidence in support of his claim-in particular, evidence demonstrating whether there was an order mandating the separation of Plaintiff and his cousin while housed at USP Florence prior to June 2, 2018-he was required to do so no later than May 27, 2022. [Id.]. In addition, the court informed the Parties that it intended to consider Plaintiff's “[Sworn] Declaration of David J. Martin, The Plaintiff” (the “First Declaration”), which was filed after Plaintiff filed his Response, see [Doc. 39], and permitted Defendant to file a supplemental reply addressing the assertions in that First Declaration. [Doc. 48 at 2]. Plaintiff submitted a “Supplemental [Sworn] Declaration and Reply of David J. Martin to This Courts [sic] Order April 29, 2022” (the “Second Declaration”) on May 26, 2022. [Doc. 51]. That same day, the United States filed a Surreply to its Motion to Dismiss. [Doc. 50]. The briefing is thus complete, and I consider the Parties' submissions below.
Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction. Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 511 U.S. 375, 377 (1994). As such, courts “are duty bound to examine facts and law in every lawsuit before them to ensure that they possess subject matter jurisdiction.” Wilderness Soc. v. Kane Cty., 632 F.3d 1162, 1179 n.3 (10th Cir. 2011) (Gorsuch, J., concurring). The party invoking federal jurisdiction has the burden of establishing said jurisdiction. Merida Delgado v. Gonzales, 428 F.3d 916, 919 (10th Cir. 2005).
United States v. Rodriquez Aguirre, 264 F.3d 1195, 1203 (10th Cir. 2001) (quotation omitted)). However, when “the jurisdictional question is intertwined with the merits of the case, the [motion to dismiss] should be construed as a motion for summary judgment, not a Rule 12(b)(1) motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.” Garcia v. U.S. Air Force, 533 F.3d 1170, 1176 (10th Cir. 2008).
Under Rule 12(b)(6), a court may dismiss a complaint for “failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6). In deciding a motion under Rule 12(b)(6), the court must “accept as true all well-pleaded factual allegations . . . and view these allegations in the light most favorable to the plaintiff.” Casanova v. Ulibarri, 595 F.3d 1120, 1124 (10th Cir. 2010) (quoting Smith v. United States, 561 F.3d 1090, 1098 (10th Cir. 2009)). Nevertheless, a plaintiff may not rely on mere labels or conclusions, “and a formulaic recitation of the elements...
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