Martin v. Wilson

• Decision Date: 28 February 2006
• Docket Number: No. 5:00 CV 2502.,5:00 CV 2502.
• Citation: Martin v. Wilson, 419 F.Supp.2d 976 (N.D. Ohio 2006)
• Parties: Ralphonzo MARTIN, Petitioner, v. Julius WILSON, Warden, Respondent.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Northern District of Ohio

Page 976

419 F.Supp.2d 976

Ralphonzo MARTIN, Petitioner, v.Julius WILSON, Warden, Respondent.

No. 5:00 CV 2502.

United States District Court, N.D. Ohio, Eastern Division.

February 28, 2006.

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

Ralphonzo Martin, Leavittsburg, OH, Pro se.

Stuart A. Cole, Office of the Attorney General, Columbus, OH, for Respondent.

MEMORANDUM OF OPINION AND ORDER

POLSTER, District Judge.

I.BACKGROUND

This matter comes before the Court on remand from the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals.ECF Nos. 31, 34.This is the third pro se petition for writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 that PetitionerRalphonzo Martin("Petitioner" or "Martin") has filed with this Court.The first petition(Case No. 3:91 CV 7483, ECF No. 1) was dismissed for failure to exhaust available state court remedies.Case No. 3:91 CV 7483, ECF No. 3;Case No. 5:00 CV 2502, ECF No. 17, Exh. U, District Court's Opinion and Order of Sept. 30, 1991, at 475.Apparently suspecting that permission was required before another petition could be filed, Martin requested leave from the Sixth Circuit.The Sixth Circuit held that leave was not required as the first petition was dismissed without prejudice for lack of exhaustion.¹Case No. 3:91 CV 7483, ECF No. 29.

Martin then filed his second petition(Case No. 5:00 CV 1750, ECF No. 1) which was again dismissed for lack of exhaustion.Case No. 5:00 CV 1750, ECF No. 6.Upon exhaustion of his state court remedies, Martin filed a motion for reconsideration.Case No. 5:00 CV 1750, ECF Nos. 10.This Court denied the motion and instructed Martin to file a new habeas petition if exhaustion was complete.Case No. 5:00 CV 1750, ECF No. 11.Nine days later, Martin filed the instant habeas petition.ECF No. 1("Petition").This Court initially denied the petition as untimely.ECF No. 23.The Sixth Circuit vacated this Court's judgment in light of its decision in Abela v. Martin,348 F.3d 164(6th Cir.2003)(en bane), cert. denied,541 U.S. 1070, 124 S.Ct. 2388, 158 L.Ed.2d 976(2004), and remanded the case for further proceedings.²ECF No. 31, Martin v. Wilson,110 Fed.Appx. 488, 491, 2004 WL 1801342, *2(6th Cir.2004)(unpublished opinion).Upon remand from the Sixth Circuit, this matter was referred to Magistrate Judge William H. Baughman, Jr., for a report and recommendation.ECF No. 33.

In a thorough opinion, the Magistrate Judge examined Martin's claims and recommended that the petition be denied on the merits.ECF No. 35, Report and Recommendation("R & R"), at 35.Martin filed objections to the Magistrate Judge's Report and Recommendation.ECF No. 37("Objections").

II.STANDARD OF REVIEW

Under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA), a federal habeas court may grant an application for a writ of habeas corpus on behalf of a state prisoner only where a claim adjudicated on the merits in state court:

(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or (2) resulted in a decision that was based upon an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.

Maples v. Stegall,427 F.3d 1020, 1025(6th Cir.2005)(quoting28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1996)).A state court decision is contrary to clearly established Supreme Court precedent if the state court applies a rule that contradicts the governing law set forth in Supreme Courtcases"or if the state court decided a case differently than did the Supreme Court on a set of materially indistinguishable facts."Lopez v. Wilson,426 F.3d 339, 342(6th Cir.2005);Hutchison v. Bell,303 F.3d 720, 728(6th Cir.2002);Gimotty v. Elo,40 Fed.Appx. 29, 31(6th Cir.2002)(unpublished opinion).A state court decision involves an unreasonable application of clearly established Federal law if "the state court identifies the correct governing legal rules from the [Supreme] Court's cases but unreasonably applies it to the facts of the particular prisoner's case' or if the state court extends a Court precedent to a context where it should not apply, or fails to extend it to a context where it should apply."Miskel v. Karnes,397 F.3d 446, 451(6th Cir.2005)(citingWilliams v. Taylor,529 U.S. 362, 406-09, 120 S.Ct. 1495, 146 L.Ed.2d 389(2000)).In deciding whether a state court decision is "contrary to" or an "unreasonable application of clearly established Supreme Court law, this Court may only look to the "holdings, as opposed to the dicta, of th[e]Court's decisions as of the time of the relevant state-court decision" and may not look to lower federal court decisions.Doan v. Brigano,237 F.3d 722, 729(6th Cir.2001)(quotingTaylor,529 U.S. at 412, 120 S.Ct. 1495;Herbert v. Billy,160 F.3d 1131, 1135(6th Cir.1998)), abrogated on other grounds byWiggins v. Smith,539 U.S. 510, 123 S.Ct. 2527, 156 L.Ed.2d 471(2003).

Federal courts"will not review questions of federal law decided by a state court if the decision of that court rests upon a state law ground that is independent of the federal question and adequate to support the judgment."Coleman v. Thompson,501 U.S. 722, 729, 111 S.Ct. 2546, 115 L.Ed.2d 640(1991).Applied to the habeas context, the doctrine of procedural default acts to bar federal review of federal claims that a state court has declined to address because of the petitioner's noncompliance with a state procedural requirement.SeeWainwright v. Sykes,433 U.S. 72, 87, 97 S.Ct. 2497, 53 L.Ed.2d 594(1977)."In these cases, the state judgment rests on independent and adequate state procedural grounds."Coleman,501 U.S. at 730, 111 S.Ct. 2546.

If the district court concludes that the State prisoner has procedurally defaulted his federal claims in state court, federal review is barred unless the prisoner can demonstrate "cause for the default and actual prejudice as a result of the alleged violation of federal law, or demonstrate that failure to consider the claims will result in a fundamental miscarriage of justice."Coleman,501 U.S. at 749, 111 S.Ct. 2546;Bousley v. United States,523 U.S. 614, 118 S.Ct. 1604, 140 L.Ed.2d 828(1998).

Demonstrating "cause" requires showing that an objective factor external to the defense impeded counsel's efforts to comply with the state procedural rule.Murray v. Carrier,477 U.S. 478, 488, 106 S.Ct. 2639, 91 L.Ed.2d 397(1986).Demonstrating "prejudice" requires showing a wrong "infecting" the trial with constitutional error.United States v. Frady,456 U.S. 152, 168, 102 S.Ct. 1584, 71 L.Ed.2d 816(1982).

In the absence of cause and prejudice, federal courts are prohibited from reviewing issues that are procedurally defaulted unless the petitioner shows that his conviction is the result of a fundamental miscarriage of justice.A fundamental miscarriage of justice is a conviction of one who is "actually innocent."SeeColeman,501 U.S. at 750, 111 S.Ct. 2546;Murray,477 U.S. at 496, 106 S.Ct. 2639.The Supreme Court requires the petitioner to demonstrate not merely a reasonable doubt in light of new evidence, but rather that "it is more likely than not that no reasonable juror would have convicted [the petitioner] in light of the new evidence."Schlup v. Delo,513 U.S. 298, 327, 115 S.Ct. 851, 130 L.Ed.2d 808(1995).The petitioner fails to meet his burden if "at least one juror, acting reasonably and properly instructed would have found" him guilty.Fairchild v. Norris,51 F.3d 129, 130-31(8th Cir.), cert. denied,515 U.S. 1182, 116 S.Ct. 28, 132 L.Ed.2d 911(1995);Schlup,513 U.S. at 329, 115 S.Ct. 851.

The Sixth Circuit has established a four-step analysis to determine whether a claim has in fact been procedurally defaulted.SeeMaupin v. Smith,785 F.2d 135(6th Cir.1986).The Court must determine (1) whether the petitioner failed to comply with an applicable state procedural rule; (2) whether the state courts actually enforced the state procedural sanction; (3) whether the state procedural bar is an "adequate and independent" state ground on which the State can foreclose federal review; and if the above are met, (4) whether the petitioner has demonstrated cause and prejudice, or a fundamental miscarriage of justice.Id.In determining whether a state court rested its holding on procedural default so as to bar federal habeas review, the Court must look to "the last explained state-court judgment."Combs v. Coyle,205 F.3d 269, 275(6th Cir.2000);Couch v. Jabe,951 F.2d 94, 96(6th Cir.1991)(quotingYlst v. Nunnemaker,501 U.S. 797, 805, 111 S.Ct. 2590, 115 L.Ed.2d 706(1991)).

III.ANALYSIS

The Court will address only those claims that were not adequately addressed by the Magistrate Judge and those objections that warrant further attention.

As a result of the death of Oliver Gracy and the shooting of Cleophus Fincher on May 21, 1988, Petitioner was indicted for two counts of aggravated murder, with a firearm specification on each count; one count of felonious assault, with a firearm specification and a prior aggravated felony specification; and two counts of aggravated robbery with a firearm specification and a prior aggravated felony specification on each count.Petitioner was also charged with having a weapon while under disability, with a firearm specification and a prior crime of violence specification.The underlying disability charged in this final count was a prior conviction of armed robbery.ECF No. 16, Exh.A, Indictment;State v. Martin,No. 13954, 1989 WL 117279, at *1(Ohio App.Oct. 4, 1989).The indictment was joined with a 1977 indictment charging Martin with the unauthorized use of a motor vehicle and two counts of grand theft.Martin,at *1.The jury acquitted Martin of one of the aggravated murder charges, but found him guilty of the lesser included offense of murder, acquitted him of the charges in the 1977 indictment, and found him guilty on all...