Martin v. Workers Compensation Div.

• Decision Date: 30 November 2001
• Docket Number: No. 28516.,28516.
• Citation: 210 W.Va. 270,557 S.E.2d 324
• Court: West Virginia Supreme Court
• Parties: Juanita MARTIN, Widow of Dana Martin, Deceased, Appellant, v. WORKERS' COMPENSATION DIVISION AND W-P COAL COMPANY, Appellees.

557 S.E.2d 324

210 W.Va. 270

Juanita MARTIN, Widow of Dana Martin, Deceased, Appellant, v. WORKERS' COMPENSATION DIVISION AND W-P COAL COMPANY, Appellees.

No. 28516.

Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia.

Submitted October 3, 2001.

Decided November 30, 2001.

Dissenting Opinion of Justice Maynard December 11, 2001.

S.F. Raymond Smith, Esq., Rundle & Rundle, Pineville, for Appellant.

Sandra L. Evans, Esq., Charleston, for Appellee Workers' Compensation Division.

Harold S. Albertson, Esq., Albertson & Jones, Charleston, for Appellee W-P Coal Company. McGRAW, Chief Justice.

Mrs. Juanita Martin appeals a decision of the Workers' Compensation Appeal Board that affirmed a denial of her late husband's claim for a permanent total disability award. She was substituted as a party to this action upon the death of her husband Dana Martin. Because we find that Mr. Martin's death does not affect the outcome of his appeal, and because we conclude that the Office of Judges and the Workers' Compensation Appeal Board erred in not awarding permanent total disability benefits, we reverse.

I.

BACKGROUND

Mr. Dana Martin worked for approximately twenty years as a coal miner for W-P Coal Company in Southern West Virginia. As is often the case, Mr. Martin contracted occupational pneumoconiosis while working in the mines, for which he submitted a workers' compensation claim in 1987. That 1987 filing resulted in a finding by the Workers' Compensation Division that Mr. Martin suffered from a 50 percent permanent partial disability due to occupational pneumoconiosis. Mr. Martin sought an increase in his award by filing another claim application in 1994, which the Division numbered 94-37387.

Because Mr. Martin's injury was occupational pneumoconiosis, the Occupational Pneumoconiosis Board had to make a determination if he merited an additional award. On March 13, 1995, the Occupational Pneumoconiosis Board ruled that Mr. Martin was not entitled to any additional permanent partial disability award beyond the 50 percent award he had already received. Mr. Martin appealed this decision to the Office of Judges, which also ruled against him, issuing a decision on October 28, 1998.

Undeterred, Mr. Martin took this decision of the Office of Judges to the next step in the lengthy process, an appeal to the Workers' Compensation Appeal Board (the "Appeal Board"). After several months, the Appeal Board also ruled against Mr. Martin, issuing on March 31, 1999, an order affirming the prior decision of the Office of Judges. Mr. Martin proceeded to the final step in the process, a petition for appeal to this Court, which he filed by counsel on April 9, 1999.

Before this Court could act on the petition, Mr. Martin died on November 13, 1999. This Court granted his petition for appeal on November 16, 1999, and granted his wife's request to be substituted as appellant in this case on December 20, 2000.

II.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

If considering a question of fact, "[i]n most cases we show substantial deference to the factual findings of the Workers' Compensation Appeal Board." Plummer v. Workers' Compensation Division, 209 W.Va. 710, 712, 551 S.E.2d 46, 48 (2001). Indeed, we have repeatedly held that: "This Court will not reverse a finding of fact made by the Workmen's Compensation Appeal Board unless it appears from the proof upon which the appeal board acted that the finding is plainly wrong." Syllabus, Dunlap v. State Workmen's Compensation Commissioner, 152 W.Va. 359, 163 S.E.2d 605 (1968); Accord, Rushman v. Lewis, 173 W.Va. 149, 313 S.E.2d 426 (1984); Conley v. Workers' Compensation Div., 199 W.Va. 196, 483 S.E.2d 542 (1997).

However, when considering a question of law, we have a different standard: "[w]hile the findings of fact of the appeal board are conclusive unless they are manifestly against the weight of the evidence, the legal conclusions of the appeal board, based upon such findings, are subject to review by the courts." Barnett v. State Workmen's Compensation Com'r., 153 W.Va. 796, 812, 172 S.E.2d 698, 707 (1970) (quoting Emmel v. State Compensation Director, 150 W.Va. 277, 145 S.E.2d 29 (1965)).

Also, we note that: "When the Workers' Compensation Appeal Board reviews a ruling from the Workers' Compensation Office of Judges it must do so under the standard of review set out in W. Va.Code § 23-5-12(b) (1995), and failure to do so will be reversible error." Syl. pt. 6, Conley v. Workers' Compensation Div., 199 W.Va. 196, 483 S.E.2d 542 (1997). That code section provides, in pertinent part:

[The WCAB] shall reverse, vacate or modify the order or decision of the administrative law judge if the substantial rights of the petitioner or petitioners have been prejudiced because the administrative law judge's findings are:

(1) In violation of statutory provisions; or

(2) In excess of the statutory authority or jurisdiction of the administrative law judge; or

(3) Made upon unlawful procedures; or

(4) Affected by other error of law; or

(5) Clearly wrong in view of the reliable, probative and substantial evidence on the whole record; or

(6) Arbitrary or capricious or characterized by abuse of discretion or clearly unwarranted exercise of discretion.

W. Va.Code § 23-5-12(b) (1995). Bearing these various standards in mind, we turn to the case before us.

III.

DISCUSSION

A. The Effect of Mr. Martin's Death

The initial petition for appeal in this case concerned only whether or not Mr. Martin was entitled to an increase in his permanent partial disability award. We will discuss that issue in this opinion, but before doing so, we must address another issue raised by Mr. Martin's demise. Because Mr. Martin died before his claim could reach a final resolution, we must examine how his death may have affected the outcome of his claim.

Before proceeding, we reiterate the principles that guide us when considering a workers' compensation issue. "`The Workmen's Compensation Law is remedial in its nature, and must be given a liberal construction to accomplish the purpose intended.' Syl. pt. 3, McVey v. Chesapeake & Potomac Telephone Co., 103 W.Va. 519, 138 S.E. 97 (1927) (citation omitted)." Syl. pt. 1, Plummer v. Workers' Compensation Division, 209 W.Va. 710, 551 S.E.2d 46 (2001).

Although the rules and regulations governing the workers' compensation system in this state are necessarily detailed and complex, we must be careful to prevent those deserving of compensation from being thwarted by technicalities or procedural niceties:

"[The Workers' Compensation Act] requir[es] the state compensation commissioner in administering the workmen's compensation fund, to ascertain the substantial rights of the claimants in such manner as will "carry out justly and liberally the spirit of the act" unrestricted by technical and formal rules of procedure...." Syllabus, in part, Culurides v. Ott, 78 W.Va. 696, 90 S.E. 270 (1916) (citation omitted).

Syl. pt. 2, Plummer v. Workers' Compensation Division, 209 W.Va. 710, 551 S.E.2d 46 (2001). Finally, we note that the instant matter, as is the case with many workers' compensation claims, has taken many years to reach this Court. We have often held that such delay runs counter to the avowed purpose of the system. "Long delay in processing claims for workmen's compensation is not consistent with the declared policy of the Legislature to determine the rights of claimants as speedily and expeditiously as possible. W. Va.Code, 23-5-3a." Syl. pt. 1, Workman v. Workmen's Compensation Comm'r, 160 W.Va. 656, 236 S.E.2d 236 (1977).

Appellee points out that W. Va.Code § 23-4-6(g) bears on the outcome of this case. That section of the statute reads in pertinent part:

(g) Should a claimant to whom has been made a permanent partial award die from sickness or noncompensable injury, the unpaid balance of such award shall be paid to claimant's dependents as defined in this chapter, if any; such payment to be made in the same installments that would have been paid to claimant if living: Provided, That no payment shall be made to any surviving spouse of such claimant after his or her remarriage, and that this liability shall not accrue to the estate of such claimant and shall not be subject to any debts of, or charges against, such estate.

W. Va.Code § 23-4-6(g) (1999). The point made by appellee is that Mr. Martin did not receive any favorable rulings along the way as his claim advanced toward this Court, and that, at least on the basis of the 1994 claim (94-37387), Mr. Martin cannot be said to be a claimant "to whom has been made a permanent partial award." Thus, goes the appellee's argument, because Mr. Martin died before receiving any favorable decisions in the 1994 claim, his claim has been extinguished.

We note that a long line of authority stands between Mrs. Martin and any potential recovery of the benefits sought by her late husband. First in that line is a case with facts very similar to the instant case. In Hughes v. State Compensation Comm'r, 145 W.Va. 629, 116 S.E.2d 153 (1960), Mr. Hughes was a workers' compensation claimant who had received a 50 percent permanent partial disability award, but sought to reopen that claim so that he might receive an additional award. At the first level of the process, the Division ruled he was not entitled to any additional award. However, the Appeal Board¹ ruled on December 10, 1959, that Mr. Hughes was entitled to an additional 10 percent disability award. Unfortunately for all concerned, Mr. Hughes had died three weeks before, in late November of that year.

This Court held that, because the initially unfavorable decision remained in effect until overruled, and that because Mr. Hughes died before the favorable decision was issued, the law would not permit his widow to receive the additional award to which the Appeal Board thought him entitled.²

[I]n the case now under consideration no award had "been made" at the date of the death of the claimant. On that date there was in

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