Martin v. Young
| Decision Date | 01 September 1955 |
| Docket Number | No. 34804.,34804. |
| Citation | 134 F. Supp. 204 |
| Parties | John D. MARTIN, Petitioner, v. Robert N. YOUNG, Commanding General Sixth United States Army, et al., Respondents. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Northern District of California |
Robert E. Hannon, Castro Valley, Cal., for petitioner.
Lloyd H. Burke, U. S. Atty., Richard H. Foster, Asst. U. S. Atty., San Francisco, Cal., for respondents.
Petitioner, a private in the United States Army, is imprisoned at the Presidio of San Francisco, within this District, waiting trial by a general court-martial of a charge preferred against him on April 8, 1955. By petition for the writ of habeas corpus, he seeks his release on the ground that the Department of the Army is without jurisdiction to try him by court-martial for the offense charged.
The issue tendered by the petition is solely one of law. The relevant facts are undisputed. On November 25, 1947, petitioner enlisted in the United States Army for a term of three years. Thereafter, by virtue of the Act of Congress of July 27, 1950, 64 Stat. 379, 10 U.S.C. A. § 628 note, his term of enlistment was extended one year. On November 27, 1950, during this term of enlistment as extended, petitioner was confined as a prisoner of war by the Chinese Communists in Korea. He was held as a prisoner of war until April 21, 1953, when he was returned to American military control. On August 3, 1953, he was honorably discharged from the Army, his enlistment having expired while he was a prisoner of war. The following day, petitioner reenlisted in the Army for a term of six years. He was serving this second period of enlistment when the charge, on which he is now waiting trial, was preferred on April 8, of this year. The charge against petitioner is that of violating Article 104 of the Uniform Code of Military Justice, 50 U.S.C.A. § 698, "Aiding the enemy", during the period between June 1951 and April 1953, while he was a prisoner of war.
The issue of law presented by these facts is whether the Army lost jurisdiction to court-martial petitioner for the offense charged when it discharged him from the term of enlistment, during which the offense was allegedly committed. Prior to the enactment of the Uniform Code of Military Justice in 1950, the armed forces had no jurisdiction to court martial persons for offenses, other than fraud, committed during a term of enlistment from which they had been discharged. This was so, even though the offender had reenlisted, and was still in military service when the charges were preferred. U. S. ex rel. Hirshberg v. Cooke, 1949, 336 U.S. 210, 69 S.Ct. 530, 93 L.Ed. 621. If the offense over which the armed forces had lost jurisdiction was committed outside the United States and was not embraced by a criminal statute having extra-territorial application, there was no United States tribunal in which the offender could be tried. Consequently, many members of the armed forces charged with committing such serious offenses as murder and robbery, while stationed outside the United States, could not be brought to trial. To bridge this gap in the law, the Congress enacted Article 3(a) of the Uniform Code of Military Justice in 1950, 64 Stat. 109, 50 U.S.C.A. § 553(a). Article 3(a) provides that: "Any person charged with having committed, while in a status in which he was subject to this code, an offense against this code, punishable by confinement of five years or more and for which the person cannot be tried in the courts of the United States or any State or Territory thereof or of the District of Columbia, shall not be relieved from amenability to trial by courts-martial by reason of the termination of said status." The Congress did not intend Article 3(a) to be a general grant of court-martial jurisdiction over persons who had been discharged from the armed forces. The legislative history of this statute makes it clear that the Congress meant what the plain language of the statute says — that the armed forces should have court-martial jurisdiction over persons charged with committing serious offenses during a term of enlistment which had terminated if, and only if, such person could not be tried in the civil courts.1
The precise question for decision, then, is whether petitioner could be tried in the courts of the United States for the offense the Military have lodged against him. That he could be so tried, is clear. The general charge against him is violation of Article 104 of the Uniform Code of Military Justice, Aiding the Enemy. The specification delineating the charge is as follows:
"Specification: In that Private John D. Martin, U. S. Army, Detachment No. 1, Casual, 6017 Area Service Unit, Station Complement, Camp Hanford, Washington, then held as a prisoner of war by the enemy, did, between on or about June 1951 and April 1953, at or near Prisoner of War Camp No. 3, North Korea, which camp was maintained for the purpose of interning United Nations prisoners of war, without proper authority, wrongfully, unlawfully, and knowingly collaborate, communicate, and hold intercourse, directly and indirectly with the enemy by joining with, participating in, and leading discussion groups and classes conducted by the enemy reflecting views and opinions that the United Nations and the United States were illegal aggressors in the Korean conflict, that it was the fault of the United States Government that he, the said John D. Martin, and others were prisoners of war in Korea, and that they, the said prisoners of war, should not have been sent to Korea; by extolling and attempting to convince other prisoners of war of the virtues of Communism; by participating in the preparation of Communist propaganda writings and articles designed to promote disloyalty and disaffection among the United States troops then and there held as prisoners of war by the enemy; by attacking the war aims of the United States, asserting that the United States had used germ warfare in Korea; by voluntarily attending social functions conducted by his captors; by living, eating, drinking with, and otherwise fraternizing with his captors; and by otherwise unnecessarily cooperating with his captors, thereby giving aid and comfort to the enemy."
The conduct described by this specification violates at least three criminal statutes under which petitioner could be tried in a United States District Court. They are as follows:
Though the latter statute does not by its terms specifically embrace acts committed outside the United States, it is the type of criminal statute which the Supreme Court held in United States v. Bowman, 1922, 260 U.S. 94, 43 S.Ct. 39, 67 L.Ed. 149, would be inferred to have extra-territorial application in the absence of a provision to the contrary.
Counsel for the government urges that the offense with which petitioner is charged does not necessarily measure up to the offenses embraced by these criminal statutes because proof of criminal intent is necessary for a conviction under these statutes, while it is not for a conviction under Article 104. It is a violation of Article 104, he contends, merely to communicate with the enemy without authorization regardless of the nature of the communication or the intent with which it is made. It is unnecessary to determine whether this interpretation of Article 104 is correct. For, the character of the offense charged does not depend primarily upon the particular article under which it is laid, but rather on the facts...
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Chambers v. Russell
...2(1) of the Uniform Code of Military Justice, with the aid of Article 3(a), such claim would be ill-founded. See Martin v. Young, D.C.N.D.Cal.1955, 134 F.Supp. 204. Cf. United States ex rel. Toth v. Quarles, 1955, 350 U.S. 11, 76 S.Ct. 1, 100 L.Ed. Military jurisdiction over petitioner is c......
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In re Taylor, 11588.
...would authorize this Court to entertain jurisdiction herein and issue a writ of habeas corpus in petitioner's behalf. Cf. Martin v. Young, D.C., 134 F.Supp. 204. As a consequence of that potential, we granted a show cause order herein, and thereafter held a hearing on the instant petition f......
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...term "enemy" as defined in the Trading with the Enemy Act of 1917, 50 U.S.C. App. [section] 2 (2000). (271) See, e.g., Martin v. Young, 134 F. Supp. 204, 207 (N.D. Cal. 1955) (suggesting that North Korea, although not the subject of a declaration of war, was an enemy for purposes of the fed......