Martineau v. Wier
| Decision Date | 09 September 2020 |
| Docket Number | Case No. 3:16-cv-2650-SAL |
| Citation | 485 F.Supp.3d 637 |
| Parties | Paige MARTINEAU, Plaintiff, v. Joel WIER, Diane Wier, and Richard Guest, Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of South Carolina |
Paige Martineau, Grantham, NH, pro se.
Bess Jones DuRant, Thornwell Forrest Sowell, III, Sowell and DuRant LLC, Columbia, SC, for Defendants Joel Wier, Richard Guest.
Bess Jones DuRant, Sowell and DuRant LLC, Columbia, SC, for Defendant Diane Wier.
On October 13, 2009, Plaintiff Paige Martineau was the victim of a knife attack at the hands of Defendant Richard Guest. Defendants Joel and Diane Weir are Guest's relatives who owned the apartment building where the attack occurred and where they provided Guest a place to live. Plaintiff settled her claims against Mr. Guest and the Wiers in October of 2012. She now seeks, however, to rescind the settlement agreement as fraudulently induced.
Plaintiff, proceeding pro se , filed this action on July 27, 2016, against Guest in addition to Joel and Diane Wier (collectively, "Defendants"). The Complaint alleges that Guest is mentally ill and that the Wiers knew of Guest's propensity for violence prior to the attack. Plaintiff further alleges she was fraudulently induced to settle her claims by the Wiers’ deceit regarding their knowledge of Guest's disposition, and the Complaint alleges seven state law tort claims against Defendants in connection with the attack.
This matter is now before the Court on remand from the Fourth Circuit, which vacated this Court's prior grant of summary judgment1 in favor of Defendants. The Court previously granted summary judgment for Defendants based on judicial estoppel, as Plaintiff did not disclose the instant claims as an asset in bankruptcy. See ECF No. 68. On remand, Defendants have re-briefed the arguments not reached by the district court in granting their first dispositive motion. ECF No. 70. Plaintiff filed a response on November 18, 2019, ECF No. 72, and Defendants filed a reply. ECF No. 75. This matter is accordingly ripe for consideration.
In 2009, Plaintiff was a senior at the University of South Carolina. On October 13th of that year, she was alone at her former boyfriend's apartment building when she was attacked with a knife by Richard Guest, who lived in the apartment below. Guest was arrested and charged with kidnapping as well as assault and battery with intent to kill; however, he was determined incompetent to stand trial. The Complaint asserts claims for intentional infliction of emotional distress, assault, and battery against Guest in connection with the attack.
Plaintiff alleges that Defendants Joel and Diane Wier owned the apartment building where the attack occurred, and Plaintiff submits that Joel and Diane Wier possessed extensive knowledge of Guest's mental illness and dangerous propensities prior to the attack upon Plaintiff. Specifically, Plaintiff alleges that Diane Wier is the trustee of a "mental health trust" for the benefit of Guest. Diane Wier also allegedly attempted to have Guest involuntarily committed at a facility in France some months before the attack. Finally, Plaintiff alleges that both Joel and Diane Wier were aware of poems, authored by Guest, about "bloody stabbings." In possessing this knowledge, Plaintiff alleges that Joel and Diane Wier exhibited various forms of negligence and gross negligence by assuming yet failing to discharge the duties associated with caring for a dangerous and mentally ill relative. Importantly, Plaintiff contends that she did not learn of the Wiers’ knowledge of Guest's disposition until after she signed a release of all claims she has asserted in this action.
Nearly four years prior to filing this lawsuit and more than three years after the attack occurred, Plaintiff–then represented by counsel–executed a settlement and release of all claims arising out of the attack. ECF No. 21-2.2 The release is dated October 22, 2012, and purports to release Defendants from all damages "on account of, or in any way resulting from, or in connection with an assault on October 13, 2009." ECF No. 21-2 at 1. Attached to the release is the incident report, detailing the attack for which Plaintiff released Defendants from liability and which forms the basis of seven of Plaintiff's eight causes of action. Id. at 4-6. Plaintiff does not dispute that the release, if binding, renders this lawsuit subject to dismissal. Instead, Plaintiff alleges in her first cause of action that the release was fraudulently induced and, therefore, subject to rescission.
In support of this argument, Plaintiff alleges that during settlement negotiations, "Joel and Diane Wier represented to Plaintiff Martineau that they had no knowledge of Richard Harold Guest's mental illness or potential dangerousness." ECF No. 1 at ¶ 17. Joel Wier allegedly first made representations to this effect in response to direct questioning during a phone call with Plaintiff in the summer of 2012, some time after June 20th. See id. at ¶¶ 13, 16, 18-22; see also ECF No. 24 at 11. Plaintiff submits these statements fraudulently induced her to enter the settlement agreement, as evidence of the Wiers’ prior knowledge of Guest's dangerousness would have increased the value of Plaintiff's disputed claims against the Wiers.
Plaintiff learned the representations were false, she alleges, when she "learned that there were additional documents in the case." Id. at ¶ 24. Specifically, on December 30, 2013, Plaintiff obtained access to the criminal file associated with Guest's prosecution. Plaintiff submits these documents establish the Wiers’ knowledge of Guest's mental illness and dangerous propensities. Id. at ¶ 25-27; see also ECF No. 72 at 6 (). Accordingly, Plaintiff now contends that the October 22, 2012 settlement was fraudulently induced and does not bar her underlying tort claims against the Wiers and Guest in connection with the attack.
On June 29, 2015, before she filed this action, Plaintiff filed a petition for relief under Chapter 7 of the Bankruptcy Code. ECF No. 21-3; In re Paige Jacqueline Martineau , C/A No. 4:15-bk-02767-JJT (Bankr. M.D. Pa. 2015). In doing so, Plaintiff did not list the claims she now asserts against Defendants as an asset. ECF No. 21-3 at 9 (). On November 15, 2016, however–shortly after Defendants raised a judicial estoppel argument in this case–Plaintiff amended her bankruptcy disclosures to include the instant claims. The claims were subsequently exempted from Plaintiff's bankruptcy estate, and the bankruptcy court closed her reopened case on February 21, 2017. Nevertheless, Plaintiff's initial failure to list the causes of action she now asserts formed the basis for this Court's now-vacated grant of summary judgment in favor of Defendants. ECF No. 52. The Court previously held that (1) only the bankruptcy trustee had Article III standing to bring this action at the time it was filed, and (2) Plaintiff was judicially estopped from asserting claims that she did not initially disclose to the bankruptcy court.
On appeal, the Fourth Circuit held that Plaintiff did have Article III standing to sue and that Plaintiff's bankruptcy only implicated whether Plaintiff was the real party in interest. Martineau v. Wier , 934 F.3d 385, 392 (4th Cir. 2019). In addition, the Fourth Circuit vacated and remanded for further consideration the propriety of applying judicial estoppel in light of all facts and circumstances bearing on Plaintiff's intent to mislead the courts. See id. at 393.
After this action was remanded, Defendants re-briefed several bases for dismissing Plaintiff's claims pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. They assert, among other things, that Plaintiff's underlying tort claims are all barred by the applicable three-year statute of limitations, which ran on October 13, 2012, and Plaintiff's remaining claim for fraudulent inducement fails to plausibly show damages. Plaintiff responds, in part, by arguing that the Wiers’ fraud tolls the statute of limitations. The parties agree that the fraud claim is timely, but Plaintiff does not address the issue of whether her fraud claim plausibly shows entitlement to relief if her remaining claims are barred by the statute of limitations.
After a careful review of the record, the parties’ arguments, the Fourth Circuit's opinion, and the applicable law, the Court declines to apply the doctrine of judicial estoppel to bar Plaintiff's claims. The Complaint, however, establishes that the statute of limitations has run on Plaintiff's underlying tort claims, and the Court cannot identify a plausible theory of recovery on Plaintiff's fraudulent inducement claim. Accordingly, Defendants’ motion to dismiss is granted.
Under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), a party may move to dismiss for "failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted." When considering a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, the Court must accept the plaintiff's factual allegations as true and draw all reasonable inferences in the plaintiff's favor. See E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. Kolon Indus. , 637 F.3d 435, 440 (4th Cir. 2011). The Court need not, however, accept the plaintiff's legal conclusions. Ashcroft v. Iqbal , 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009). On a motion to dismiss, the Court's task is limited to determining whether the complaint states a "plausible claim for relief." Id. at 679, 129 S.Ct. 1937. Although Rule 8(a)(2) requires only a "short and plain statement of the claim showing that the...
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