Martinez-Cuevas v. Deruyter Bros. Dairy, Inc.

• Decision Date: 05 November 2020
• Docket Number: No. 96267-7,96267-7
• Citation: 196 Wash.2d 506,475 P.3d 164
• Parties: Jose MARTINEZ-CUEVAS and Patricia Aguilar, individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated, Petitioners, v. DERUYTER BROTHERS DAIRY, INC., Geneva S. DeRuyter, and Jacobus N. DeRuyter, Respondents, and Washington State Dairy Federation and Washington Farm Bureau, Intervenor-Respondents.
• Court: Washington Supreme Court

196 Wash.2d 506

475 P.3d 164

Jose MARTINEZ-CUEVAS and Patricia Aguilar, individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated, Petitioners,

v. DERUYTER BROTHERS DAIRY, INC., Geneva S. DeRuyter, and Jacobus N. DeRuyter, Respondents,andWashington State Dairy Federation and Washington Farm Bureau, Intervenor-Respondents.

No. 96267-7

Supreme Court of Washington.

Filed: November 5, 2020

Lori Jordan Isley, Columbia Legal Services, 6 S. 2nd St. Ste. 600, Yakima, WA, 98901-2680, Andrea L. Schmitt, Columbia Legal Services, 711 Capitol Way S. Ste. 706, Olympia, WA, 98501-1237, Joachim Morrison, Attorney at Law, 300 Okanogan Ave. Ste. 2a, Wenatchee, WA, 98801-6940, Marc Cote, Anne Elizabeth Silver, Frank Freed Subit & Thomas LLP, 705 2nd Ave. Ste. 1200, Seattle, WA, 98104-1798, for Petitioners.

John Ray Nelson, Foster Garvey PC, 618 W. Riverside Ave. Ste. 300, Spokane, WA, 99201-5102, for Respondent/Cross-Appellant.

Timothy J. O'Connell, Anne Marie Dorshimer, Stoel Rives LLP, 600 University St. Ste. 3600, Seattle, WA, 98101-3197, for Intervenor-Respondents.

Christopher GM Esq. Fargo-Masuda, Attorney at Law, 2947 76th Ave. Se Apt. 92d, Mercer Island, WA, 98040-2727, John Ballif Midgley, Nancy Lynn Talner, ACLU of Washington Foundation, P.O. Box 2728, Seattle, WA, 98111-2728, for Amicus Curiae American Civil Liberties Union of Washington.

Brendan V. Monahan, Sarah Lynn Clarke Wixson, Stokes Lawrence Velikanje Moore & Shore, 120 N. Naches Ave., Yakima, WA, 98901-2757, Lance Alan Pelletier, Stokes Lawrence PS, 1420 5th Ave. Ste. 3000, Seattle, WA, 98101-2393, for Amici Curiae Washington State Tree Fruit Association, and Hop Growers of Washington.

Kenneth Wendell Masters, Masters Law Group PLLC, 241 Madison Ave. N., Bainbridge Island, WA, 98110-1811, for Amici Curiae The Farmworker Justice Project, and Marc Linder.

Jesse Andrew Wing, Tiffany Mae Cartwright, MacDonald Hoague & Bayless, Jeffrey Lowell Needle, Attorney at Law, 705 2nd Ave. Ste. 1500, Seattle, WA, 98104-1745, for Amicus Curiae Washington Employment Lawyers Association.

Kathleen Phair Barnard, Barnard Iglitzin & Lavitt LLP, 18 W. Mercer St. Ste. 400, Seattle, WA, 98119-3971, Rebecca A. Smith, National Employment Law Project, 300 Lenora St. Unit 357, Seattle, WA, 98121-2411, Mario Martinez, Martinez, Aguilasocho & Lynch, P.O. Box 1998, Bakersfield, CA, 93303, for Amici Curiae National Employment Law Project, Familias Unidas Por La Justicia, and United Farm Workers of America.

Madsen, J. ¶ 1 This case concerns the constitutionality of RCW 49.46.130(2)(g), the provision exempting agricultural workers from the overtime pay requirement set out in the Washington Minimum Wage Act, ch. 49.46 RCW. At issue here is whether the trial court properly granted partial summary judgment to an affected class of agricultural workers who argued that the exemption violates article I, section 12 of our state constitution and the equal protection clause. For the following reasons, we affirm as to article I, section 12.

BACKGROUND

¶ 2 Jose Martinez-Cuevas and Patricia Aguilar worked for DeRuyter Brothers Dairy as milkers. DeRuyter milkers used mechanized equipment to milk close to 3,000 cows per shift, 24 hours a day, three shifts a day, 7 days a week.

¶ 3 In 2016, Martinez-Cuevas and Aguilar filed the present class action suit along with about 300 fellow DeRuyter dairy workers. The amended complaint claimed that DeRuyter failed to pay minimum wage to dairy workers, did not provide adequate rest and meal breaks, failed to compensate pre- and post-shift duties, and failed to pay overtime. The complaint also sought a judgment declaring RCW 49.46.130(2)(g)¹ unconstitutional.

¶ 4 The parties eventually reached a class settlement resolving all but the overtime pay claims. The trial court approved the settlement. The parties stipulated to class certification of the remaining claims. In February 2018, the trial court permitted the Washington State Dairy Federation and Washington Farm Bureau to intervene as defendants.

¶ 5 Martinez-Cuevas and Aguilar moved for summary judgment. They alleged that class members generally worked over 40 hours per week without receiving overtime pay and labored in dangerous conditions. The workers claimed that the agricultural industry was powerful while the agricultural workers were poor, and the exemption was racially motivated to impact the Latinx population, which constitutes nearly 100 percent of Washington dairy workers. Consequently, the workers argued, the agricultural exemption for overtime pay violates article I, section 12 of the Washington State Constitution because it grants a privilege or immunity to the agricultural industry pursuant to a law implicating a fundamental right of state citizenship—the right of all workers in dangerous industries to receive workplace health and safety protections.

¶ 6 The workers further argued that RCW 49.46.130(2)(g) violates the equal protection guaranty of the Washington Constitution. Because the Minimum Wage Act was based on the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, 29 U.S.C. §§ 201 - 219, which allegedly used race as the basis for exempting farmworkers from overtime compensation, the workers claim that the Minimum Wage Act incorporated the racist motivations underlying the federal statute. Clerk's Papers (CP) at 114, 105 & n.5 (citing Anfinson v. FedEx Ground Package Sys., Inc. , 174 Wash.2d 851, 867-70, 281 P.3d 289 (2012) (recognizing the Minimum Wage Act definition of "employee" was based on the Fair Labor Standards Act)). These motivations are unrelated to protecting the health and safety of workers; because health and safety protections are a fundamental right under article II, section 35, the workers argue that strict scrutiny applies and that RCW 49.46.130(2)(g) fails this and any other level of scrutiny.

¶ 7 DeRuyter and the intervenors filed cross motions for summary judgment. They argued that RCW 49.46.130(2)(g) implicates no fundamental right and does not benefit one class over another or violate equal protection. DeRuyter and intervenors disputed the dairy workers’ evidence regarding racial bias against Latinx, arguing the agricultural exemption could not be motivated by racial bias because when it was originally passed in 1959, most agricultural workers were white.

¶ 8 After oral argument, the trial court issued a letter order granting in part and denying in part the workers’ motion for summary judgment. Eschewing the contention that article II, section 35 creates a fundamental right of state citizenship to employee protection laws, the court instead found in favor of the workers based on a different fundamental right—the right to work and earn a wage. The trial court noted that the right to work "treats a class of workers in a significantly different fashion than other wage earners engaged in the business of selling their labor." CP at 1213-14.

¶ 9 The court reserved for trial the question of whether the legislature had a reasonable ground for providing a privilege or immunity to the agricultural industry in the form of the overtime exemption and did not rule on the constitutionality of RCW 49.46.130(2). As a result, the court denied summary judgment for DeRuyter and the intervenors, denied motions to strike portions of the workers’ briefing, and certified the summary judgment order for discretionary review. Martinez-Cuevas and Aguilar moved for discretionary review here, which we granted.

ANALYSIS

¶ 10 At issue is whether RCW 49.46.130(2)(g) violates the privileges or immunities clause or equal protection, article I, section 12 of the Washington State Constitution. We review the constitutionality of a statute de novo. Schroeder v. Weighall , 179 Wash.2d 566, 571, 316 P.3d 482 (2014). As with a court's construction of statutes, interpreting the meaning of constitutional provisions begins with the plain language of the text. Malyon v. Pierce County , 131 Wash.2d 779, 799, 935 P.2d 1272 (1997) ; Wash. Water Jet Workers Ass'n v. Yarbrough , 151 Wash.2d 470, 477, 90 P.3d 42 (2004). Similarly, we review "a trial court's order on cross motions for summary judgment and related evidentiary rulings de novo." Wilkinson v. Chiwawa Cmtys. Ass'n , 180 Wash.2d 241, 249, 327 P.3d 614 (2014). An order granting summary judgment may be affirmed on any legal basis supported by the record. Coppernoll v. Reed , 155 Wash.2d 290, 296, 119 P.3d 318 (2005) (citing LaMon v. Butler , 112 Wash.2d 193, 200-01, 770 P.2d 1027 (1989) ).

Article I, section 12

¶ 11 "No law shall be passed granting to any citizen, class of citizens, or corporation other than municipal, privileges or immunities which upon the same terms shall not equally belong to all citizens, or corporations." WASH. CONST. art. I, § 12. Passed during a period of distrust toward laws that served special interests, the purpose of article I, section 12 is to limit the sort of favoritism that ran rampant during the territorial period. Ockletree v. Franciscan Health Sys. , 179 Wash.2d 769, 775, 317 P.3d 1009 (2014) (plurality opinion) (citing ROBERT F. UTTER & HUGH D. SPITZER, THE WASHINGTON STATE CONSTITUTION: A REFERENCE GUIDE 26-27 (G. Alan Tarr ed., 2002)).

¶ 12 Washington courts have at times interpreted article I, section 12 consistent with the federal equal protection clause, but we have also recognized that the text and aims of article I, section 12 are different. Id. at 775-76, 317 P.3d 1009. Historically, this court has read the antifavoritism framework of article I, section 12 as limited to fundamental rights of state citizenship. State v. Vance , 29 Wash. 435, 458, 70 P. 34 (1902) (interpreting the state privileges and immunities clause consistent with article IV, section 2 of the federal constitution). These fundamental rights, according to the dissent, were recognized in Corfield v. Coryell as Lockean "natural rights." 6 F. Cas. 546, 551-52 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1823) (No. 3,230). Dissent at ––––; but see Richard L. Aynes, Constricting the Law of Freedom: Justice Miller, The...