Martinez Matute v. CNN Constr. Inc.
| Decision Date | 26 November 2019 |
| Docket Number | Civil Action No. 18-1926 (RMC) |
| Parties | Jose Renan MARTINEZ MATUTE, Plaintiff, v. CNN CONSTRUCTION INC., et al., Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Columbia |
J. Barrett Kelly, Clark Law Group, PLLC, Washington, DC, Anthony George Bizien, Zipin, Amster & Greenberg, LLC, Silver Spring, MD, for Plaintiff.
James Edward Rubin, Rubin Employment Law Firm, P.C., Rockville, MD, for Defendants.
ROSEMARY M. COLLYER, United States District Judge Jose Renan Martinez Matute complains that Defendants CNN Construction, Inc. (CNN) and Ali Shahparvari, CNN's owner and operator, failed to compensate him for overtime work that he performed on construction and remodeling projects in Maryland and the District of Columbia. Mr. Martinez Matute seeks unpaid wages and damages under the federal Fair Labor Standards Act and under Maryland and D.C. law. Before the Court is Defendants' motion for summary judgment.
The Complaint in this matter was filed on August 16, 2018. Count I alleges a violation of the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA), 29 U.S.C. § 201 et seq. ; Count II alleges a violation of the D.C. Minimum Wage Revision Act (DCMWRA), D.C. Code § 32-1001 et seq. ; Count III alleges a violation of the Maryland Wage and Hour Law (MWHL), Md. Code Ann., Lab & Empl. § 3-401 et seq. ; and Count IV alleges a violation of the Maryland Wage Payment and Collection Law (MWPCL), Md. Code Ann., Lab. & Empl. § 3-501 et seq. Mr. Martinez Matute, a Maryland resident, worked for CNN, located in Rockville, Maryland, from approximately May 2006 until June 2017. Compl. [Dkt. 1] ¶ 12. During his employment Plaintiff worked primarily on residential remodeling projects throughout Maryland and the District of Columbia. He seeks overtime pay from Defendants "only during a three-year lookback period, from August 16, 2018 to August 16, 2015." Joint Stipulation [Dkt. 13].1
Defendants filed their Answer on November 2, 2018. The Court held an initial scheduling conference on December 18, 2018 and set deadlines for discovery and dispositive motions. Defendants' motion for summary judgment is ripe for review.2
The Court has jurisdiction over Count I, alleging that Defendants violated the federal FLSA under 28 U.S.C. § 1331, which grants jurisdiction to federal district courts over "all civil actions arising under the Constitution, laws or treaties of the United States." When a district court has original jurisdiction over a claim, it has "supplemental jurisdiction over all other claims that are so related to [those] claims ... that they form part of the same case or controversy." 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a). Claims are from the same "case or controversy" when they " ‘derive from a common nucleus of operative fact,’ " such that the plaintiff would " ‘ordinarily be expected to try them all in one judicial proceeding.’ " Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Allapattah Servs., Inc. , 545 U.S. 546, 580, 125 S.Ct. 2611, 162 L.Ed.2d 502 (2005) (quoting United Mine Workers of Am. v. Gibbs , 383 U.S. 715, 725, 86 S.Ct. 1130, 16 L.Ed.2d 218 (1966) ). If the supplemental claims arise from the same case or controversy, a federal court decides whether to exercise its discretion to assert jurisdiction over the remaining claims by considering whether judicial economy, convenience, and fairness to litigants favor federal litigation. Osborn v. Haley , 549 U.S. 225, 245, 127 S.Ct. 881, 166 L.Ed.2d 819 (2007) (citing Gibbs , 383 U.S. at 726, 86 S.Ct. 1130 ).
Here, the allegations underlying the remaining state law claims derive from the same set of facts concerning Plaintiff's overtime work for CNN. Thus, the Court's exercise of supplemental jurisdiction over the remaining counts is appropriate.3
Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure states that summary judgment shall be granted "if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a) ; accord Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc. , 477 U.S. 242, 247, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). A fact is "material" if it is capable of affecting the substantive outcome of litigation. Anderson , 477 U.S. at 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505. A dispute is "genuine" if there is sufficient admissible evidence such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for a non-moving party. See Scott v. Harris , 550 U.S. 372, 380, 127 S.Ct. 1769, 167 L.Ed.2d 686 (2007).
Summary judgment is properly granted against a party who "after adequate time for discovery and upon motion ... fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial." Celotex Corp. v. Catrett , 477 U.S. 317, 322, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). In ruling on a motion for summary judgment, a court must draw all justifiable inferences in the nonmoving party's favor. Anderson , 477 U.S. at 255, 106 S.Ct. 2505. A nonmoving party, however, must establish more than "the mere existence of a scintilla of evidence" in support of its position. Id. at 252, 106 S.Ct. 2505. The nonmoving party must point to specific facts showing that a genuine issue of material fact requires trial. Celotex , 477 U.S. at 324, 106 S.Ct. 2548. The nonmoving party may not rely solely on allegations or conclusory statements. Greene v. Dalton , 164 F.3d 671, 675 (D.C. Cir. 1999). Rather, the nonmoving party must present specific facts that would enable a reasonable jury to find in its favor. Id. If the evidence "is merely colorable, or is not significantly probative, summary judgment may be granted." Anderson , 477 U.S. at 249-50, 106 S.Ct. 2505.
"Under the FLSA an employee is ordinarily entitled to pay equal to one and one-half times his normal hourly wage for all hours worked beyond forty per week." Robinson-Smith v. Gov't Emps. Ins. Co. , 590 F.3d 886, 892 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (citing 29 U.S.C. § 207(a)(1) ).4 "FLSA coverage comes in two forms: ‘enterprise’ and ‘individual.’ " Benton v. Laborers' Joint Training Fund , 121 F. Supp. 3d 41, 49 (D.D.C. 2015) ( Benton I ) (citing Tony & Susan Alamo Found. v. Sec'y of Labor , 471 U.S. 290, 295 n.10, 105 S.Ct. 1953, 85 L.Ed.2d 278 (1985) ). To establish enterprise coverage, "an employee must first show that the employer is an ‘enterprise,’ and then show that the enterprise is ‘engaged in commerce.’ " Id. (citing Malloy v. Ass'n of State & Territorial Solid Waste Mgmt. Officials , 955 F. Supp. 2d 50, 55 (D.D.C. 2013) ).5 To establish individual coverage, an employee must show that he personally "engaged in commerce or in the production of goods for commerce." 29 U.S.C. § 207(a)(1).
A plaintiff may attempt to show that he is individually covered under the FLSA in several ways, "including by showing that she is employed in industries that ‘serve as the actual instrumentalities and channels of interstate and foreign commerce,’ such as the telephone, transportation, or shipping industries; by showing that she is employed in a type of business that ‘regularly utilize[s] the channels of interstate and foreign commerce in the course of their operations,’ such as the banking, insurance, or publishing industries; or by showing that she directly participates in the actual movement of people or goods in interstate commerce." Benton v. Laborers' Joint Training Fund , 210 F. Supp. 3d 99, 106 (D.D.C. 2016) ( Benton III ) (citing 29 C.F.R. §§ 776.10, 776.11 ; Thorne v. All Restoration Servs., Inc. , 448 F.3d 1264, 1266 (11th Cir. 2006) ).
The parties have stipulated that Defendants do not constitute an "enterprise engaged in commerce or in the production of goods for commerce," see 29 U.S.C. § 207(a)(1), and, therefore, that there is no "enterprise coverage" under the FLSA. Joint Stipulation.6 Because there is no enterprise coverage, the case turns on whether Plaintiff has alleged facts to support individual coverage by the FLSA, that is, whether he was personally "engaged in commerce or in the production of goods for commerce" during his time of employment with CNN. See 29 U.S.C. § 207(a)(1).
The Complaint alleges that Plaintiff was covered by the FLSA when he worked for CNN because he "was an employee who, while engaged in employment duties, handled, and otherwise worked on goods and materials (namely building materials and tools) that were moved in or produced for commerce." Compl. ¶ 6. That is, the Complaint alleges that Plaintiff "engaged in commerce" by handling and working with building materials and tools that had themselves traveled in interstate commerce.7
Defendants argue that Plaintiff did not "engage in commerce" merely by handling goods and materials that moved in commerce. Defendants note that Plaintiff testified in deposition that he regularly purchased supplies at Home Depot for his employer. See Ex. 1., Opp'n, Martinez Matute Dep. Tr. [Dkt. 15-2] at 39:9-40:5. Plaintiff testified that he paid cash for these Home Depot purchases and was reimbursed by CNN. Defendants argue that Plaintiff's Home Depot purchases are insufficient to trigger FLSA coverage because local purchases from a merchant do not constitute interstate commerce. See McLeod v. Threlkeld , 319 U.S. 491, 494, 63 S.Ct. 1248, 87 L.Ed. 1538 (1943) (); Thorne , 448 F.3d at 1266-68 ().
Defendants further observe that the Complaint does not allege any additional grounds for individual coverage under the FLSA. They emphasize that Plaintiff "does not allege that he himself regularly and customarily crossed state lines like the plaintiff...
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