Martinez v. Bakery & Confectionery Union & Indus. Int'l Pension Fund (In re Bakery & Confectionery Union & Indus. Int'l Pension Fund Pension Plan)

• Decision Date: 06 June 2012
• Docket Number: Nos. 11 CV 1471 (VB), 11 CV 9203 (VB), 12 CV 141 (VB), 12 CV 142 (VB), 12 CV 913 (VB).,s. 11 CV 1471 (VB), 11 CV 9203 (VB), 12 CV 141 (VB), 12 CV 142 (VB), 12 CV 913 (VB).
• Citation: 865 F.Supp.2d 469
• Parties: In re BAKERY AND CONFECTIONERY UNION AND INDUSTRY INTERNATIONAL PENSION FUND PENSION PLAN. Salvador Martinez, et al., Plaintiffs v. The Bakery & Confectionery Union & Industry International Pension Fund and Bakery & Confectionery Union and Industry International Pension Fund Board of Trustees, Defendants. Ronald Blackwell, et al., Plaintiffs, v. The Bakery & Confectionery Union & Industry International Pension Fund; John Beck, Plan Manager; and Bakery & Confectionery Union & Industry International Pension Fund Board of Trustees, Defendants. Phillip G. Scott and Terry Wayne Finch, individually and as representatives on behalf of a class of similarly situations persons, Plaintiffs, v. Bakery & Confectionery Union & Industry International Pension Fund, et al., Defendants. Terry Moore, Plaintiff, v. The Bakery & Confectionery Union & Industry International Pension Fund and Bakery & Confectionery Union and Industry International Pension Fund Board of Trustees, Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Southern District of New York

865 F.Supp.2d 469

In re BAKERY AND CONFECTIONERY UNION AND INDUSTRY INTERNATIONAL PENSION FUND PENSION PLAN.

Salvador Martinez, et al., Plaintiffs

v.The Bakery & Confectionery Union & Industry International Pension Fund and Bakery & Confectionery Union and Industry International Pension Fund Board of Trustees, Defendants.

Ronald Blackwell, et al., Plaintiffs,

v.The Bakery & Confectionery Union & Industry International Pension Fund; John Beck, Plan Manager; and Bakery & Confectionery Union & Industry International Pension Fund Board of Trustees, Defendants.

Phillip G. Scott and Terry Wayne Finch, individually and as representatives on behalf of a class of similarly situations persons, Plaintiffs,

v.Bakery & Confectionery Union & Industry International Pension Fund, et al., Defendants.

Terry Moore, Plaintiff,

v.The Bakery & Confectionery Union & Industry International Pension Fund and Bakery & Confectionery Union and Industry International Pension Fund Board of Trustees, Defendants.

Nos. 11 CV 1471 (VB), 11 CV 9203 (VB), 12 CV 141 (VB), 12 CV 142 (VB), 12 CV 913 (VB).

United States District Court, S.D. New York.

June 6, 2012.

Thomas O. Sinclair, Miles Clayborn Williams, Sinclair Williams, LLC, Birmingham, AL, Scarlett M. TuleyW. Daniel Miles, III, Beasley Allen Crow Methvin Portis & Miles PC, Montgomery, AL, for Scott Plaintiffs in No. 12-cv-00142.

Lynn L. Sarko, Derek W. Loeser, Erin M. Riley, Sarah H. Kimberly, Keller Rohrback L.L.P., Seattle, WA, David S. Preminger, Keller Rohrback L.L.P., New York, NY, Christopher A. SeegerDiogenes P. Kekatos, Seeger Weiss, LLP, New York, NY, William D. Frumkin, Elizabeth Hunter, Sapir & Frumkin LLP, White Plains, NY, for Plaintiffs in No. 11-cv-1471.

Charles J. Fleishman, Paul A. Fleishman, The Fleishman Law Firm, Los Angeles, CA, David P. Martin, The Maurer Law Firm PLLC, Fishkill, NY, R. Brett Adair, Adair Law Firm LLC, Birmingham, AL, David P. Martin, Jason E. Burgett, The Martin Law Group LLC, Tuscaloosa, AL, for All Other Plaintiffs.

Patricia McConnell, Meyer, Suozzi, English & Klein, P.C., New York, NY, Jeremiah A. Collins, Bredhoff & Kaiser, P.L.L.C., Washington, DC, Glenn Rothner, Rothner Segall Greenstone and Leheny, Pasadena, CA, for Defendants.

MEMORANDUM DECISION

BRICCETTI, District Judge.

These actions involve challenges to a change made to a pension fund in which all plaintiffs participate by dint of having worked in eligible positions as bakers in various factories for various employers throughout the country. After the Court held a joint conference with all parties represented, it was decided that the most efficient manner to resolve these cases would be through motions and cross motions for judgment on the pleadings pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(c). Now pending before the Court are these motions.¹ For the following reasons, the Court GRANTS plaintiffs' motions and DENIES defendants' motions.

The Court has subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331.

BACKGROUND

For purposes of ruling on the motions, the Court accepts the allegations of the operative complaints as true and also reviews exhibits submitted with the motions.

The complaints in these cases allege similar conduct. Plaintiffs are participants in the Bakery and Confectionery Union and Industry International Pension Fund Pension Plan (“Plan”). This action arises from an amendment to the plan that affected how plan participants would be eligible to receive their full pension benefits. Plaintiffs challenge this amendment, alleging it violates Section 204(g) of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (“ERISA”), 29 U.S.C. § 1054(g).

Defendant plan is an “employee pension benefit plan” within the meaning of ERISA. Under the plan, a participant with 25 years of service is eligible to retire with a “normal” pension at 65 years old. Alternatively, under “Plan C” (also known as the “Golden 90”), when a participant's age (in years and months) combined with his service (in years and months) exceeds 90, the participant may retire at the full benefit level, except that participants who commenced participation after December 3, 1998, must have a minimum of 10 years of service.² Similarly, under “Plan G” (“Golden 80”), a participant may retire at the full benefit level when the sum of his age and service equals 80. ³

Prior to July 1, 2010, a participant could leave covered employment before he reached the 80– or 90–level and then age into the relevant plan when the sums of his age and service reached the relevant level. In addition, the surviving spouse of a participant could defer receipt of the benefit until the decedent would have aged into the full benefit of the plan. The amendment eliminated the ability for participants who were no longer in covered employment to age into the relevant plan. This change is relevant to plaintiffs who were either laid off due to plant closings or reductions in force or those who had accepted buy-outs to retire. Many of these plaintiffs are unable to find work in covered employment.

DISCUSSION

At any time after the pleadings close and before trial commences, a party may move for judgment on the pleadings under Rule 12(c). See Citibank, N.A. v. Morgan Stanley & Co. Int'l, PLC, 724 F.Supp.2d 407, 414 (S.D.N.Y.2010). “The standard for addressing a Rule 12(c) motion for judgment on the pleadings is the same as that for a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim.” Cleveland v. Caplaw Enters., 448 F.3d 518, 520 (2d Cir.2006). In a challenge under Rule 12(c), the Court must accept as true the non-movant's allegations and draw all reasonable inferences in the non-movant's favor. See id. at 521;Sheppard v. Beerman, 18 F.3d 147, 150 (2d Cir.1994). The Court need not accord “[l]egal conclusions, deductions or opinions couched as factual allegations ... a presumption of truthfulness.” In re NYSE Specialists Sec. Litig., 503 F.3d 89, 95 (2d Cir.2007). The allegations in a complaint must meet a standard of “plausibility.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 564, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007). A claim is facially plausible “when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that [plaintiff is entitled to relief].” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009).

“On a 12(c) motion, the court considers the complaint, the answer, any written documents attached to them, and any matter of which the court can take judicial notice for the factual background of the case.” L–7 Designs, Inc. v. Old Navy, LLC, 647 F.3d 419, 422 (2d Cir.2011). In addition, the Court may review any document incorporated by reference in one of the pleadings. Sira v. Morton, 380 F.3d 57, 67 (2d Cir.2004). A document is considered incorporated by reference if it is “in a pleading ... adopted by reference elsewhere in the same pleading or in any other pleading....” Fed.R.Civ.P. 10(c). The Court may also consider a document not specifically incorporated by reference but on which the complaint heavily relies and which is integral to the complaint. See Chambers v. Time Warner, Inc., 282 F.3d 147, 153 (2d Cir.2002). If the Court is presented with material outside of the pleadings, it should exclude the material in its consideration of the motion. See id., at 154.

ERISA “was enacted for the purpose of assuring employees that they would not be deprived of their reasonably-anticipated pension benefits; an employer was to be prevented from ‘pulling the rug out from under’ promised retirement benefits upon which his employees had relied during their long years of service.” Amato v. Western Union Int'l, Inc., 773 F.2d 1402, 1409 (2d Cir.1985) (citing 29 U.S.C. § 1001(a) (Congressional findings and declaration of policy)). Initially, ERISA did not protect early retirement benefits. See Gluck v. Unisys Corp., 960 F.2d 1168, 1185 (3d Cir.1992) ( “ERISA permitted the reduction of early retirement benefits prior to July 31, 1984, but not after.”).

In 1984, Congress enacted the Retirement Equity Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98–397, 98 Stat. 1426 (1984) (“REA”), which amended Section 204(g) of ERISA to protect early retirement benefits in certain circumstances. Section 204(g) created the anti-cutback rule and “was intended to prevent retirement plans from being amended to reduce or eliminate a participant's early retirement subsidy.” Hunger v. AB, 12 F.3d 118, 119 (8th Cir.1993). It protects “accrued benefits” provided by a plan. ERISA defines an “accrued benefit” as “the individual's accrued benefit determined under the plan and ... expressed in the form of an annual benefit commencing at normal retirement age.” 29 U.S.C. § 1002(23). Section 204(g) provides

(1) The accrued benefit of a participant under a plan may not be decreased by an amendment of the plan....

(2) For purposes of paragraph (1), a plan amendment which has the effect of—

(A) eliminating or reducing an early retirement benefit or a retirement-type subsidy (as defined in regulations), or

(B) eliminating an optional form of benefit,

with respect to benefits attributable to service before the amendment shall be treated as reducing accrued benefits. In the case of a retirement-type subsidy, the preceding sentence shall apply only with respect to a participant who satisfies(either before or after the amendment) the preamendment conditions for the subsidy....

29 U.S.C. § 1054(g)(1), (2). “The plain language of the statute reveals that once a benefit is found to be a retirement-type subsidy, it is considered an accrued benefit.” Bellas v. CBS, Inc., 221 F.3d 517, 534 (3d Cir.2000); Amato v. Western Union Int'l, Inc., 773 F.2d 1402.But see Lear Siegler Aerospace Products Holding Corp. v. Smiths Industries, Inc., 1990 WL 422417, at *11, 1990 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2887, at *30 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 16, 1990) (“Unlike normal retirement benefits, the early retirement subsidy at issue is not an accrued benefit since it is contingent on an...