Martinez v. Carnival Corp.

• Decision Date: 24 February 2014
• Docket Number: No. 12–15164.,12–15164.
• Parties: Melvin Gualberto Medina MARTINEZ, Plaintiff–Appellant, v. CARNIVAL CORPORATION, a.k.a. Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc., Defendant–Appellee.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Eleventh Circuit

744 F.3d 1240

Melvin Gualberto Medina MARTINEZ, Plaintiff–Appellant,

v.CARNIVAL CORPORATION, a.k.a. Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc., Defendant–Appellee.

No. 12–15164.

United States Court of Appeals, Eleventh Circuit.

Feb. 24, 2014.

Joel S. Perwin, Joel S. Perwin, PA, Bruce Margulies, Rivkind Pedraza & Margulies, PA, Miami, FL, for Plaintiff–Appellant.

Cameron Wayne Eubanks, Curtis J. Mase, Valentina M. Tejera, Mase Lara Eversole, PA, Miami, FL, for Defendant–Appellee.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida. D.C. Docket No. 1:12–cv–22293–UU.

Before MARCUS, DUBINA, and WALKER,^* Circuit Judges.

DUBINA, Circuit Judge:

Appellant Melvin Gualberto Medina Martinez (“Martinez”) appeals the district court's order compelling arbitration of his claims pursuant to the Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards (“CREFAA”), 9 U.S.C. §§ 201–208. Martinez argues his claim of Jones Act negligence, 46 U.S.C. § 30104, does not fall within his employment contract (“Seafarer's Agreement”) with Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc. (“Carnival”) and, therefore, is not within the scope of the contract's arbitration clause. We agree with the district court that arbitration is required, and therefore, we affirm the district court's order compelling arbitration.

I.

Martinez is a Honduran citizen who suffered a back injury while employed as a mason aboard Carnival's vessel, the Fascination. Martinez worked ten hours per day, seven days a week, and was required to lift and transport boxes of tiles and cement and heavy rolls of carpet. During his employment, Martinez developed back pain, which he reported to his supervisor. After his condition worsened, and he began to feel pain not only in his back but also in his lower extremities, Martinez sought further medical care.

Martinez had back surgery in Panama, performed by Carnival's selected physician, Dr. Avelino Gutierrez. After the surgery, Martinez continued to experience serious orthopedic and neurological problems, including numbness in both legs, difficulty urinating, need for a catheter, sexualdysfunction, and psychological problems. Carnival sent Martinez to Miami, where he continued to receive medical treatment.

The Seafarer's Agreement, which covered the terms of Martinez's employment, included an arbitration clause stating that, except for wage disputes, “any and all disputes arising out of or in connection with this Agreement, including any question regarding its existence, validity, or termination, or Seafarer's service on the vessel, shall be referred to and finally resolved by arbitration.” [R. DE 1–1 at 6, ¶ 7.]

After his injury, Martinez filed suit against Carnival in Florida state court, asserting claims of Jones Act negligence, unseaworthiness, and failure to provide adequate maintenance and cure. In his Jones Act claim, Martinez alleged that the physician chosen and paid by Carnival negligently performed his back surgery. Carnival removed the case to the federal district court and filed a motion to compel arbitration. The district court granted the motion, dismissed as moot all other pending motions, and closed the case for administrative purposes. Martinez then timely appealed.

II.

“We review the district court's interpretation of [an] arbitration clause de novo.” Hemispherx Biopharma, Inc. v. Johannesburg Consol. Invs., 553 F.3d 1351, 1366 (11th Cir.2008).

III.

As we must, we first address our jurisdiction to hear this case. Carnival contends that we lack jurisdiction because the district court's order compelling arbitration was a non-appealable interlocutory order, not a final appealable decision. We are unpersuaded.

The Federal Arbitration Act provides that a party may appeal “a final decision with respect to an arbitration.” 9 U.S.C. § 16(a)(3). A final decision “is a decision that ends the litigation on the merits and leaves nothing more for the court to do but execute the judgment.” Green Tree Fin. Corp.-Ala. v. Randolph, 531 U.S. 79, 86, 121 S.Ct. 513, 519, 148 L.Ed.2d 373 (2000) (internal quotation marks omitted). Yet, a party may not appeal “an interlocutory order ... compelling arbitration.” 9 U.S.C. § 16(b)(3).¹ Thus, a district court order compelling arbitration and dismissing a plaintiff's claim is a final decision within the meaning of § 16(a)(3). Hill v. Rent–A–Center, Inc., 398 F.3d 1286, 1288 (11th Cir.2005). In contrast, a district court order compelling arbitration and staying the proceedings before the court is an interlocutory order that cannot be appealed. Am. Express Fin. Advisors, Inc. v. Makarewicz, 122 F.3d 936, 939 (11th Cir.1997). Carnival essentially argues that because the district court simply granted the motion to compel and closed the case for administrative purposes, but did not dismiss the case, its order was more akin to a stay of the proceedings; thus, the district court's decision was an interlocutory order that may not be appealed under § 16(b)(3).

The Supreme Court has adopted a functional test for finality, examining what the district court has done, and has reiterated that a decision is final if it “ends the litigation on the merits and leaves nothing for the court to do but execute the judgment.” Ray Haluch Gravel Co. v. Cent. Pension Fund of the Int'l Union of Operating Eng'rs & Participating Emp'rs, ––– U.S. ––––, 134 S.Ct. 773, 779, 187 L.Ed.2d 669 (2014); Green Tree, 531 U.S. at 86, 121 S.Ct. at 519;Catlin v. United States, 324 U.S. 229, 233, 65 S.Ct. 631, 633, 89 L.Ed. 911 (1945). Our court has applied the same test for finality, see, e.g., W.R. Huff Asset Mgmt. Co. v. Kohlberg, Kravis, Roberts & Co., 566 F.3d 979, 984 (11th Cir.2009); Pitney Bowes, Inc. v. Mestre, 701 F.2d 1365, 1368 (11th Cir.1983), and looks to the practical effect of the district court's order, not to its form. See Thomas v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield Ass'n, 594 F.3d 823, 829 (11th Cir.2010) (“In making [§ 1291 finality] determinations, ‘we take a functional approach, looking not to the form of the district court's order, but to its actual effect.’ ”) (quoting Birmingham Fire Fighters Ass'n 117 v. Jefferson Cnty., 280 F.3d 1289, 1293 (11th Cir.2002)). In Young v. Prudential Insurance Co. of America, 671 F.3d 1213 (11th Cir.2012), looking to the substance of the district court's order, we held that it was not final even though it dismissed the case on the merits because the order had remanded part of the case, but “in substance,” left unresolved whether the plaintiff was entitled to relief. Id. at 1215.

The pertinent question we address in this case is not whether the district court's administrative closure is the functional equivalent of a dismissal, but rather, whether the district court's order, on the record before us, ended the litigation on the merits and left nothing more for the district court to do but execute the judgment. The district court granted Carnival's motion to compel, dismissed as moot all other motions, and administratively closed the case. Notably, the district court's order did not stay the proceedings, nor did it contemplate any further action on this case. Although the district court did not dismiss the case, the court's order left all further merits determinations to the arbitrator.² Thus, the order effectively “end[ed] the litigation on the merits and [left] nothing more for the [district] court to do but execute the judgment.” Green Tree, 531 U.S. at 86, 89, 121 S.Ct. at 519, 521 (internal quotation marks omitted) (determining that an order of the district court compelling the parties to arbitrate and dismissing all the claims before it was a final and appealable decision).

We acknowledge that administratively closing a case is not the same as dismissing a case. See Fla. Ass'n for Retarded Citizens, Inc. v. Bush, 246 F.3d 1296, 1298 (11th Cir.2001) (per curiam) (stating that a “closed” case does not prevent the district court from reactivating a case). Moreover, an administrative closure is not dispositive of finality. However, our focus is not on the district court's label, but rather, on the effect of the district court's order. See Thomas, 594 F.3d at 829. When the district court compels arbitration and disposes of all pending motions, it leaves the court with nothing more to decide, and it effectively and functionally has issued a decision that “ends the litigation on the merits.” Ray Haluch, ––– U.S. at ––––, 134 S.Ct. at 779.

In a prior case, we addressed the finality of an administratively closed case. See Brandon, Jones, Sandall, Zeide, Kohn, Chalal & Musso, P.A. v. MedPartners, Inc., 312 F.3d 1349 (11th Cir.2002) (per curiam), abrogated by Ray Haluch, ––– U.S. ––––, 134 S.Ct. 773. In Brandon, we determined that the district court order was not final even though it administratively closed the case because the district court explicitly retained jurisdiction to award attorneys' fees. Id. at 1355. The district court in Brandon, unlike the district court in the present case, acknowledged that it still had other matters to resolve. Id. at 1353. Our court even noted that in most cases when a district court “rule[s] on all the relief requested,” and “close [s]” the case in its order, “that conduct would lead us to conclude that the order was final.” Id. at 1354. Thus, even under the analysis utilized in Brandon, the district court order in the present case would be final because it disposed of all pending motions and did not retain jurisdiction to confirm the arbitration award or to award attorneys' fees associated with the arbitration. See also Emp'rs Ins. of Wausau v. Bright Metal Specialties, Inc., 251 F.3d 1316, 1321 (11th Cir.2001) (“[G]enerally speaking, a decision of the district court is final when it disposes of all the issues framed by the litigation and leaves nothing for the district court to do but execute the judgment.”).

The slight distinction between an administratively closed case and a dismissed case does not resolve the question of...