Martinez v. City of Denver
| Decision Date | 05 April 2019 |
| Docket Number | Civil Action No. 17-cv-03140-NYW |
| Parties | CELENA MARTINEZ, Plaintiff, v. CITY AND COUNTY OF DENVER, d/b/a Department of Aviation, Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Colorado |
This matter comes before the court on Defendant the City and County of Denver's d/b/a Department of Aviation ("Defendant" or "the Department") Motion for Summary Judgment ("the Motion") [#33, filed December 20, 2018]. Plaintiff Celena Martinez ("Plaintiff" or "Ms. Martinez") filed a Response on January 23, 2019 [#36] and the Department filed a Reply on February 1, 2019 [#37]. The matter is now fully briefed and ready for decision. The undersigned Magistrate Judge fully presides over this matter pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c), the Order of Reference dated February 13, 2018 [#15] and the Parties' consent [#10; #13]. After careful consideration of the Motion and the applicable law, the court finds there is no genuine issue of material fact and Defendant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Therefore, Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment is GRANTED.
Ms. Martinez filed this action on December 27, 2017, bringing three claims for sex/pregnancy discrimination, race-based discrimination, and unlawful retaliation. [#1 at ¶¶ 33- 61]. Ms. Martinez, formerly an employee at Denver International Airport, asserts that she was discriminated against as a nursing mother and as a Hispanic woman during her employment as a contract administrator at the Department. See generally [#1]. In the Complaint, Ms. Martinez references a "Right to Sue" Letter issued by the Equal Opportunity Employment Commission dated March 17, 2015. [Id. at ¶ 7].
Defendant filed the instant Motion for Summary Judgment on December 20, 2018 at the close of discovery. [#33]. Plaintiff filed a Response, contesting several of Defendant's facts and proffering several of her own. [#36]. Defendant filed a Reply brief contesting several of these material facts. [#37]. Accordingly, before the court can proceed to the legal issues and underlying merit of the case, the court must first address the proffered material facts and the corresponding objections.
1. Plaintiff began her employment with the City and County of Denver in April 2002 and began working at Denver International Airport ("DIA") as a contract administrator in December 2012. [#33 at 1 ¶ 1; #36 at 2 ¶ 1].
2. Plaintiff was on maternity leave from June 6, 2014 through August 17, 2014, and worked part-time from August 18, 2014 through September 22, 2014. [#33 at 1 ¶ 2; #36 at 2 ¶ 1].
3. Upon her return, Plaintiff needed to express milk and was given a vacant office ("the vacant office") to use for that purpose and a laptop to work from while she pumped. [#33 at 1 ¶ 3; #36 at 2 ¶ 1].
4. In mid-January 2015, the vacant office was assigned to another employee and Plaintiff was directed to the nursing mothers' room ("the nursing room").2 [#33-3 at ¶ 6].
5. Beginning January 5, 2015, Plaintiff made a series of complaints about the nursing room which Defendants attempted to address. [#33-3 at ¶ 7 (); #33-5 at 1 (); #33-6 (email exchange between Plaintiff and Department employee Susan Moore wherein Ms. Moore states that she has forwarded on the complaint to "Sherry Grams" to "check [it] out"); #33-7 (late February/early March 2015 email exchange between Department employees Ian Alexander, Sherry Grams, and Susan Moore regarding ongoing cleaning efforts); #33-8 (mid-March email exchange regarding gnats in the nursing room and Defendant's efforts to remediate); #33-9 (February 26, 2015 email from Department employee John Sarmiento stating that the nursing room had "a detailed cleaning and has been sterilized"); #33-10 (email exchange between Dani Brown, Greg Hegarty, Plaintiff, and Susan Moore where the employees solicit Plaintiff's advice for the nursing room and further discussion over remediating an unspecified issue with the floor drain and a too-bright light)].
6. Based on Plaintiff's concerns about the condition of the nursing room, Defendant allowed Plaintiff to work from home until her concerns could be resolved. Therefore, Plaintiff worked from home intermittently from mid-January 2015 through March 2, 2015. [#33-3 at ¶ 8].3
7. When she was at the office, Plaintiff was permitted to express breast milk in the vacant office until it was reassigned to another employee. [#33-3 at ¶¶ 4, 8].4
8. Plaintiff applied for an Airline Real Estate Director position and a Director of Food and Beverage Concessions, both at DIA, on June 11, 2015. [#33-11 at 1-5 (Airline Real Estate Director job posting); id. at 6-12 (Plaintiff's application); #33-12 at 1-5 (); id. at 6-11 (Plaintiff's application)].5
9. The posting for Director of Food and Beverage Concessions was cancelled and not filled. [#33-1 at ¶ 4 (Senior Human Resources Business Partner Janice Hathaway's affidavit); #33-2 at 97:7-196 ()].7
10. Angela Padalecki, another Department employee, was offered the Airline Real Estate Director position on September 4, 2015, and she accepted on September 10, 2015. Ms. Padalecki was pregnant at the time. [#33-11 at 13-24 (Angela Padalecki's application); #33-1 at ¶ 6 ()].
11. Plaintiff submitted EEOC Charge No. 846-2015-15689 on September 25, 2015, asserting sex discrimination and retaliation ("the September 25 Charge"). [#33-14; #36 at 2 ¶ 1].
12. Angela Padalecki became Plaintiff's supervisor in February 2016. [#1 at ¶ 26; #36 at 2 ¶ 1].
13. In April 2016, Plaintiff received her 2015 performance evaluation and received satisfactory scores. [Id. at ¶ 27; #36 at 2 ¶ 1].
14. On July 6, 2016, Plaintiff received a contemplation of discipline letter ("the July 6 Letter"). [#33-1 at ¶ 9; #33-15 (the letter); #36 at 2 ¶ 1].
15. The conduct described in that letter led to Plaintiff being disciplined with a written reprimand on August 22, 2016. [#33-1 at ¶ 9; #33-16 (notification of reprimand); #36 at 2 ¶ 1].
16. Plaintiff received a second contemplation of discipline letter on December 22, 2016 ("the December 22 Letter"). [#33-1 at ¶ 10; #33-17 (the letter); #36 at 2 ¶ 1].
17. The conduct described in that letter led to Plaintiff being disciplined with a temporary reduction in pay on January 24, 2017. [#33-1 at ¶ 10; #33-18 (notification of reprimand); #36 at 2 ¶ 1].
18. Plaintiff received a third contemplation of discipline letter on June 23, 2017 ("the June 23 Letter").8 [#33-1 at ¶ 11; #33-19 (the letter); #36 at 2 ¶ 1].
19. The conduct described in that letter led to Plaintiff's termination on July 18, 2017. [#33-1 at ¶ 11; #33-20 (notification of dismissal); #36 at 2 ¶ 1].
20. Between 2006 to 2016, Plaintiff received several accolades and letters of commendation and/or recommendation. [#36-1].9
21. Martinez emailed Department Human Resources employee Karen K. Niparko, stating, "When I told my supervisor that I was planning to report the discrimination and retaliation to you, she essentially told me that if I did that, it would be bad for my career in the long term." [#36-5 at 3].10
The court declines to adopt the remainder of Plaintiff's proffered undisputed facts for a variety of reasons. For example, Ms. Martinez asserts "[i]mportantly a number of Martinez's fellow employees who where [sic] not requesting milking alternative and have not complained were routinely permitted to work the flexible hours." [#36 at 4 ¶ 10 (citing Exhibit 14)]. But Plaintiff's cited evidence, Exhibit 14, does not support this proposed fact. Rather, Exhibit 14 is a collection of pictures of the nursing mother's room at the Airport. [#36-14]. At summary judgment, it is Plaintiff's responsibility to support her alleged undisputed facts, and apprise the court of how to find such evidence in the record. Alvariza v. Home Depot, 506 F. Supp. 2d 451, 459 (D. Colo. 2007) .
Similarly, some of the proffered facts were characterized in a manner that was not consistent with the evidence in the record. For instance, Ms. Martinez offered the following as an undisputed fact: [#36 at 3 ¶ 5]. But an examination of Exhibit 4 upon which this proffered fact is based reflects no remarks from Mr. Maxfield. [#36-4]. In addition, Plaintiff's own deposition undercuts her suggestion that Mr. Maxfield's comments indicated bias against lactating mothers or women generally, rather Mr. Maxfield's comment wasreferring to Plaintiff's work while physically in the act of expressing breast milk. [#33-2 at 3 (35:9-15) ]. Plaintiff may not simply pick and choose portions of her deposition testimony that support her claims, while ignoring those portions that undercut them. See e.g. Williams v. Platt, No. CIV-03-281-C, 2006 WL 2042605, at *2 (W.D. Okla. July 18, 2006).
Summary judgment is appropriate only if "the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any...
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