Martinez v. City of Springfield
| Docket Number | 4-21-0290 |
| Decision Date | 14 July 2022 |
| Citation | 2022 IL App (4th) 210290 |
| Parties | FREDDY MARTINEZ, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. THE CITY OF SPRINGFIELD and SPRINGFIELD POLICE DEPARTMENT, Defendants-Appellees. |
| Court | United States Appellate Court of Illinois |
Appeal from the Circuit Court of Sangamon County, No. 2020CH- 99; the Hon. Adam Giganti, Judge, presiding.
Matthew Topic, Josh Loevy, Joshua Burday, Merrick Wayne, and Shelley Geiszler, of Loevy & Loevy, of Chicago, for appellant.
James Zerkle and Kateah M. McMasters, of City of Springfield, of Springfield, for appellees.
OPINION
¶ 1 In April 2020, plaintiff, Freddy Martinez, filed a complaint against defendants, City of Springfield and Springfield Police Department (collectively, Springfield) asserting a violation of the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) (5 ILCS 140/1 et seq. (West 2020)). Plaintiff sought a declaration Springfield violated FOIA, an order mandating Springfield produce the requested documents, attorney fees, and civil penalties.
¶ 2 Springfield subsequently provided records to plaintiffs satisfaction and moved for summary judgment on the complaint. The trial court found Springfield acted reasonably and granted the motion. Plaintiff appealed, arguing the trial court erred by (1) ruling on the propriety of Springfield's search and production of records when that issue became moot after Springfield produced the documents and (2) by denying him attorney fees. We agree with plaintiff on the second issue and reverse.
¶ 5 Approximately two weeks later, on February 5, 2020, Springfield responded to plaintiffs FOIA request. Springfield sent an e-mail stating, "The documents that you requested for this FOIA request are attached." The attached document was likely the February 4, 2020, letter from defense counsel to plaintiff that reveals no documents were produced. Regarding plaintiffs first request for documents, defense counsel reported Springfield "possesse[d] no responsive documentation." As to the second request, defense counsel stated plaintiffs request was unduly burdensome under section 3(g) of FOIA (5 ILCS 140/3(g) (West 2020)). In support of the response, defense counsel informed plaintiff an e-mail search for the term "Clearview" resulted in over 1000 e-mails and many of those e-mails were unrelated to Clearview AI. Counsel further maintained the third request was "vague and ambiguous" and Springfield was unable to determine what records plaintiff wanted.
¶ 6 Plaintiff responded to the e-mail later the same day. Plaintiff wrote to the "FOIA officer," stating FOIA required Springfield "meet and confer with" him before invoking the unduly burdensome exception. Plaintiff requested Springfield perform "another search for records and [provide] the communications between Smiddy and any email address" within a specified domain. Plaintiff concluded such "should be sufficient to satisfy my initial request and narrow the search to a more manageable format."
¶ 7 Beginning February 12, 2020, plaintiff sent two additional e-mails to the FOIA officer regarding his FOIA request. In the first e-mail, plaintiff asked the FOIA officer to confirm the office was performing an additional search for records. On February 19, 2020, plaintiff again inquired whether the office was going to perform an additional search and plaintiff reiterated his belief Springfield mistakenly treated his request as unduly burdensome under the law. On February 21, 2020, Springfield produced one record pertaining to Part 2 of his original request.
¶ 8 On April 24, 2020, plaintiff filed his three-count complaint against Springfield. Plaintiff highlighted the aforementioned facts. Plaintiff further asserted Springfield waived reliance on the unduly burdensome objection in section 3(g) by failing to meet the statutory deadline for their response. In count I, plaintiff asserted Springfield violated FOIA by failing to produce the nonexempt public records sought by plaintiff. In count II, plaintiff asserted a claim for failure to perform an adequate search for responsive records. In count III, plaintiff argued Springfield willfully, intentionally, or otherwise acting in bad faith violated the FOIA. Plaintiff sought a declaration Springfield violated the FOIA, an order for Springfield to produce the requested records, attorney fees and costs, and civil penalties.
¶ 9 A September 23, 2020, e-mail from plaintiffs counsel to Springfield indicates Springfield had agreed to conduct the additional search and had produced records to plaintiffs satisfaction. The e-mail does not establish on what date those events occurred.
¶ 10 In February 2021, Springfield moved for summary judgment. In the motion, Springfield admitted plaintiff submitted a FOIA request on January 21, 2020, and Springfield responded to the request on or about February 4, 2020. Springfield acknowledged its response to the FOIA request did not occur within five business days but maintained the "delayed response was corrected as soon as it was discovered." Springfield further admitted it agreed to conduct a search pursuant to plaintiffs amended request and stated its production satisfied plaintiff. Springfield maintained "the issue of producing records in response to Plaintiffs FOIA Request is now moot" and a civil penalty was inappropriate as its conduct was not willful. Springfield's written motion did not explicitly address attorney fees.
¶ 11 In plaintiffs response to the motion, plaintiff argued attorney fees were appropriate as Springfield failed to timely and appropriately respond to his FOIA request.
¶ 12 A hearing on defendant's motion for summary judgment was held on April 8, 2021. As to the matter of attorney fees, the parties disputed whether such fees could be ordered in the absence of a court order in plaintiffs favor. The trial court asked the parties to submit proposed orders to the court.
¶ 13 On April 12, 2021, the trial court granted Springfield's motion for summary judgment. The court found Springfield performed an adequate search for all records plaintiff requested. The court concluded plaintiffs FOIA request as to "Part 2" was unduly burdensome. As to "Part 3," the court found plaintiffs request failed to reasonably identify the records sought. The court further found Springfield did not willfully or intentionally violate FOIA or otherwise act in bad faith in responding to plaintiffs FOIA request.
¶ 14 This appeal followed.
¶ 17 Plaintiff initially argues the trial court erroneously ruled on claims made moot by Springfield's production of the requested documents. Plaintiff, citing our decision in Roxana Community Unit School District No. 1 v Environmental Protection Agency, 2013 IL App (4th) 120825, ¶¶ 41-42, 998 N.E.2d 961, maintains his first two claims in his complaint, claims asserting an inadequate search and production, became moot once Springfield provided the documents sought. Plaintiff argues the trial court thus erred in ruling on the propriety of Springfield's search and production.
¶ 18 Springfield counters the question of the adequacy of the search and production were not moot as the complaint sought civil penalties. Springfield argued the propriety of its actions was relevant to that request. Springfield concludes the trial court thus did not err in finding the search and production proper.
¶ 19 Illinois case law establishes once an agency provides the documents requested, even after a delay in violation of FOIA, the plaintiffs "prayers seeking or concerning production are moot." Roxana, 2013 IL App (4th) 120825, ¶ 42. However, case law further establishes other issues may remain viable, such as a request for attorney fees under section 11(i) (5 ILCS 140/11(i) (West 2020)) and a request for a civil penalty under section 11(j) (id. § 11(j)). Here, in his complaint, plaintiff requested both attorney fees and a civil penalty. Under FOIA, a civil penalty shall be ordered "[i]f the court determines that a public body willfully and intentionally failed to comply with this Act, or otherwise acted in bad faith." Id.
¶ 20 Plaintiff argues his claim for civil penalties did not keep the propriety of the search and production from becoming moot. Plaintiff reasons he was not seeking a civil penalty based on the Springfield's search and production of documents but based on Springfield's failure to respond timely to his request and Springfield's failure to offer an opportunity to confer and narrow the request as required by section 3(g) (id. § 3(g)). Because of this, he concludes, the adequacy of the search and production was irrelevant.
¶ 21 Given plaintiffs request for civil penalties, we find no error in the trial court's consideration of the adequacy of Springfield's...
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