Martinez v. Cnty. of Sonoma
| Decision Date | 04 January 2016 |
| Docket Number | Case No. 15-cv-01953-JST |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Northern District of California |
| Parties | MYRAH MARTINEZ, et al., Plaintiffs, v. COUNTY OF SONOMA, et al., Defendants. |
Plaintiffs Myrah Martinez, Kitara McCray, Madison Marlene Marvel, and R.M., a minor (collectively, "Plaintiffs"),1 have filed this section 1983 putative class action against Defendants County of Sonoma ("the County"), Sonoma County Human Services Department ("HSD"), Sonoma County Family, Youth, and Children's Services ("FYCS"), Jerry Dunn (the Director of Human Services for Defendant HSD), Nick Honey (the Director of Defendant FYCS), Stacie Kabour (the Administrator and Manager of the Valley of the Moon Children's Home), and Defendant Does 1 to 100, "who are and/or were officers, agents, employees, contractors, subcontractors, or other persons and or entities who . . . ordered, participated in and or condoned the abuses of plaintiffs" and the putative class members. ECF No. 36 ¶¶ 6-16. Defendants now move to dismiss the state law claims in Plaintiffs' Second Amended Class Action Complaint ("SAC"). ECF No. 37. For the reasons set forth below, the Court will deny in part and grant in part Defendants' motion to dismiss, and will deny Defendants' motion to strike.
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Valley of the Moon Children's Home ("VMCH") is a temporary housing facility for juveniles who have been removed from their homes while they await placement in foster care. ECF No. 36 ¶ 19. Sonoma County operates this emergency shelter for abused and neglected children who have been removed from their homes. Id. ¶¶ 18-19. Defendant Kabour manages VMCH under the direction of Defendants HDS, FYCS, and its administrators, Defendants Dunn and Honey. Id. ¶ 18. Plaintiffs were juveniles placed in VMCH for various periods between 1995 and 2014. Id. ¶¶ 6-9. Plaintiffs claim that employees of VMCH violated the putative class members' federal and state rights pursuant to customs and policies promulgated by Defendants. Id. ¶¶ 21-31. Specifically, Plaintiffs allege that all female class members were subject to regular strip searches, and that Defendant Does regularly searched the belongings of all class members, restricted access to their cell phones, physically restrained them, locked them in rooms, prevented them from talking to family and friends, and denied them access to private telephone conversations. Id. ¶ 28-29.
Plaintiff Myrah Martinez is 20 years old and was housed in VMCH several times from 1995 through 2005. Id. ¶ 6. Plaintiff Martinez was strip searched over twenty times while she was housed at VMCH. Id. ¶ 21. These strip searches, which sometimes occurred by force, required her to strip naked and have private parts of her body inspected. Id. Her personal possessions were also searched daily after she returned to VMCH from school or other outside activities. Id.
Plaintiff Kitara McCray is 18 years old and was housed in VMCH for approximately three months beginning in September 2012. Id. ¶ 7. "[W]henever she returned [to VMCH] from school or other outside activity," Plaintiff McCray was required to submit to bodily searches, including a search of her bra whereby she was required to "pull [her bra] away from her body and expose herbreasts." Id. ¶ 22. Plaintiff McCray was also required to submit to searches of her backpack and personal possessions upon returning to VMCH. Id.
Plaintiff Madison Marlene Marvel is 19 years old and was housed in VMCH during 2011. Id. ¶ 8. Plaintiff Marvel was strip searched upon entry to VMCH and required "to expose private areas of her body for inspection." Id. ¶ 23. In addition to having her personal possessions searched daily, staff members confiscated Marvel's cell phone while she was at VMCH, and Marvel was only permitted to use a phone with the staff's prior approval of the number she sought to dial. Id.
Plaintiff R.M. is 17 years old and was housed in VMCH "at various times from the age of 6 until 2014." Id. ¶ 9. Plaintiff R.M. had his person and possessions searched every time he returned to VMCH. Id. ¶ 24. He was also "placed in restraints, locked in rooms, denied access to his twin brother who was also housed at VMCH while R.M. was there, and [] was subjected to extreme psychological abuse." Id.
Plaintiffs assert that these individual experiences represent the customs, policies, and practices promulgated by Defendants. Id. ¶¶ 29-30. Plaintiffs allege Community Care Licensing, a division of the California Department of Social Services, has investigated and cited VMCH for "seizures of residents' cell phones, unreasonable searches of personal possessions, denial of opportunity to make confidential telephone calls, locking of bedrooms thereby denying residents the opportunity to enter their own rooms, and other deficiencies." Id. ¶ 30. Additionally, Plaintiffs allege that "incident reports establish the use of unjustifiable restraints (610 within the last five years, 41 resulting in injuries), and sexual abuse and assault." Id.
In response to the harm he suffered at VMCH, Plaintiff R.M. presented a "Group/Class Claim" to the Board of Supervisors for the County of Sonoma on April 27, 2015. Id. ¶ 2. On April 30, 2015, Plaintiffs filed a Class Action Complaint against Defendants. ECF No. 1. Plaintiffs then filed a First Amended Class Action Complaint ("FAC") on May 8, 2015. ECF No. 10. On June 15, 2015, Defendants filed a motion to dismiss the FAC, ECF No. 19, which motion the Court granted in part and denied in part on September 14, 2015, ECF No. 35.
Plaintiffs filed the SAC on September 30, 2015. ECF No. 36. The SAC raises thefollowing eight claims:3 (1) Unlawful Search (Violation of the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments; 42 U.S.C. § 1983); (2) Unlawful Seizure of Property (Violation of the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments; 42 U.S.C. § 1983); (3) Special Relationship (Substantive Due Process; Violation of the First, Fourth, and Fourteenth Amendments; 42 U.S.C. § 1983); (4) Unlawful Policy, Custom, and/or Practice (Violation of the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments; 42 U.S.C. § 1983); (5) Failure to Train and/or Supervise (Violation of the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments; 42 U.S.C. § 1983); (6) Unlawful Search (California Welfare and Institutions Code section 16001.9, et seq.; California Government Code sections 815.2(a) and 820); (7) Unlawful Seizure of Property (California Welfare and Institutions Code section 16001.9, et seq.; California Government Code sections 815.2(a) and 820); and (8) violation of California's Bane Act (California Civil Code section 52.1, et seq.; California Government Code sections 815.2(a) and 820). ECF No. 36 at 11-17. Plaintiffs seek declaratory and injunctive relief, compensatory, general, and special damages, punitive damages, attorneys' fees, and recovery for the cost of the suit. Id. at 18.
On October 14, 2015, Defendants filed a motion to dismiss all of the state law claims brought by all of the Plaintiffs, except R.M., because these Plaintiffs allegedly failed to timely submit their claims under the California Government Claims Act. ECF No. 37 at 2. Defendants also seek to dismiss the state law claims as to Plaintiff R.M. based on R.M.'s alleged failure to include sufficient facts regarding the timing of the underlying events in his claim submitted to the Board of Supervisors of the County of Sonoma. Id. Defendants also move to strike portions of the SAC that refer to Plaintiffs' being physically restrained by Defendants. Id. Defendants do not, however, challenge Plaintiffs' federal claims.
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As several of Plaintiffs' claims arise under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, this Court has subject matter jurisdiction over those claims pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331. The Court has supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiffs' state law causes of action under 28 U.S.C. § 1367.
A complaint must contain "a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief to "give the defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests." Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2); Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). "To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face." Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (internal quotation marks omitted). "A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Id. The Court must "accept all factual allegations in the complaint as true and construe the pleadings in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party." Knievel v. ESPN, 393 F.3d 1068, 1072 (9th Cir. 2005). Dismissal can be based on the lack of a cognizable legal theory or the absence of sufficient facts alleged under a cognizable legal theory. Robertson v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 749 F.2d 530, 533-34 (9th Cir. 1984). "The tenet that a court must accept a complaint's allegations as true is inapplicable to threadbare recitals of a cause of action's elements, supported by mere conclusory statements." Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 663 (2009). District courts "should grant leave to amend even if no request to amend the pleading was made, unless [the court] determines that the pleading could not possibly be cured by the allegation of other facts." Henry A. v. Willden, 678 F.3d 991, 1005 (9th Cir. 2012).
Plaintiffs allege three claims against Defendants under California state law. Defendants assert that none of the Plaintiffs have adequately pleaded compliance with the California Government Claims Act, which requires that personal injury claims for money damages against a public...
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