Martinez v. Colo. Oil & Gas Conservation Comm'n
| Decision Date | 23 March 2017 |
| Docket Number | Court of Appeals No. 16CA0564 |
| Citation | 434 P.3d 689 |
| Parties | Xiuhtezcatl MARTINEZ, Itzcuahtli Roske-Martinez, Sonora Brinkley, Aerielle Deering, Trinity Carter, and Emma Bray, minors appearing by and through their legal guardians Tamara Roske, Bindi Brinkley, Eleni Deering, Jasmine Jones, Robin Ruston, and Diana Bray, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. COLORADO OIL AND GAS CONSERVATION COMMISSION, Defendant-Appellee, and American Petroleum Institute and Colorado Petroleum Association, Intervenors-Appellees. |
| Court | Colorado Court of Appeals |
Colorado Environmental Law, LTD., Katherine Lynn Toan Merlin, Boulder, Colorado; Minddrive Legal Services, LLC, James Daniel Leftwich, Boulder, Colorado; Wild Earth Advocates, Julia Olson, Eugene, Oregon; for Plaintiffs-Appellants
Cynthia H. Coffman, Attorney General, Jake Matter, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Brittany K. Beckstead, Assistant Attorney General, Denver, Colorado, for Defendant-Appellee
Ryley Carlock & Applewhite, Richard C. Kaufman, Julie A. Rosen, Matthew K. Tieslau, Denver, Colorado, for Intervenors-Appellees
Western Environmental Law Center, Kyle Tisdel, Taos, New Mexico, for Amici Curiae Colorado Chapter Global Catholic Climate Movement, 350 Colorado, Eco-Justice Ministries, Denver Catholic Network and Global Climate Movement, The Rocky Mountain Peace and Justice Center, Wall of Women Colorado, Colorado People's Alliance, Citizens for a Healthy Fort Collins, Transition Fort Collins, The Fort Collins Sustainability Group, Citizens for a Healthy Community, Be the Change, The Colorado Coalition for a Livable Climate, Clean Energy Action, The Climate Culture Collaborative, Co-Op Members Alliance, The Community for Sustainable Energy, Eco Elders, Vibrant Planet, EnergyShouldBe.org, Frack Free Colorado, Lakewood Renewable Energy Lakewood, North Metro Neighbors for Safe Energy, and Protect Our Loveland
Cynthia H. Coffman, Attorney General, Claybourne F. Clarke, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Laura Terlisner Mehew, Benjamin Saver, Assistant Attorneys General, Denver, Colorado, for Amicus Curiae Colorado Department of Public Health and Environment
Kevin Lynch, Timothy Estep, Denver, Colorado, for Amici Curiae Our Health, Our Future, Our Longmont; Sierra Club; Earthworks; and Food & Water Watch
Opinion by JUDGE FOX
¶ 1 Through their legal guardians, Xiuhtezcatl Martinez, Itzcuahtli Roske-Martinez, Sonora Brinkley, Aerielle Deering, Trinity Carter, and Emma Bray (collectively Petitioners), who reside and recreate in Colorado, appeal the district court's order and final judgment affirming a decision of the Colorado Oil and Gas Conservation Commission (the Commission) denying Petitioners' rulemaking petition. The American Petroleum Institute and the Colorado Petroleum Association (collectively Intervenors) intervened in the district court and filed an appellate brief supporting the district court's order. Additionally, on appeal, twenty-nine agencies and interest groups join as amici curiae, collectively filing three amici briefs.1
¶ 2 This appeal concerns the scope of authority and obligation delegated to the Commission by the General Assembly in the Oil and Gas Conservation Act (the Act), §§ 34-60-101 to - 130, C.R.S. 2016, to regulate oil and gas production in the interests of public health and safety. The district court affirmed the Commission's order after concluding that the Commission lacked authority to consider a proposed rule that would require it to readjust the Act's balance between the development of oil and gas resources and protection of public health, safety, and welfare. Because we agree with Petitioners that this conclusion was erroneous, we reverse the judgment of the district court and the decision of the Commission and remand to the district court to return the case to the Commission for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
¶ 3 Hydraulic fracturing (fracking) is a modern process used to stimulate oil and gas production from an existing well by injecting water mixed with other chemicals and materials which cause, and hold open, fractures in a well bore allowing oil and gas to flow to the well bore via the newly created fractures. City of Longmont v. Colo. Oil & Gas Ass'n , 2016 CO 29, ¶ 1, 369 P.3d 573.
¶ 4 The Commission is charged with generally regulating oil and gas resource production in Colorado. See § 34-60-105, C.R.S. 2016; § 34-60-106, C.R.S. 2016.
¶ 6 The Commission solicited and received written stakeholder comments and held a hearing, on April 28, 2014, where parties favoring and opposing the proposed rule testified.
¶ 7 The Commission ultimately denied the petition, concluding that (1) the proposed rule mandated action that was beyond the limited statutory authority delegated by the General Assembly in the Act; (2) review by a third party—as Petitioners requested—contradicted the Commission's nondelegable duty to promulgate rules under section 34-60-106(11)(a)(II) and is contrary to the Act; and (3) the public trust doctrine, which Petitioners relied on to support their request, has been expressly rejected in Colorado.2
¶ 8 The Commission also concluded that "the Commission and the Colorado Department of Public Health and the Environment (CDPHE) are currently addressing many of the Petitioners' concerns through more gradual changes in regulation within their relative jurisdictions." In reaching its conclusions, the Commission largely relied on a memo from the Colorado Attorney General's Office which advised that the Commission lacked jurisdiction to adopt the proposed rule as written, and that there is no statutory basis to withhold drilling permits pending the Petitioners' proposed impact reviews.3
¶ 9 On July 3, 2014, Petitioners appealed the Commission's decision to the district court pursuant to the State Administrative Procedure Act, § 24-4-106, C.R.S. 2016. The parties filed briefs and Petitioners requested oral argument.
¶ 10 The district court, ruling on the briefs, applied the two-part test from Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. , 467 U.S. 837, 104 S.Ct. 2778, 81 L.Ed.2d 694 (1984), and concluded that the Act's language is clear and unambiguous and requires a balance between the development of oil and gas resources and protecting public health, safety, and welfare. The district court further concluded that the Commission did not act arbitrarily or capriciously in relying on the advice of the Attorney General's Office, and that it rationally decided to deny the petition after considering input from stakeholders on both sides of the fracking issue. Thus, the district court affirmed the Commission.
¶ 11 Petitioners contend that the district court and the Commission erred in interpreting the Act. We agree.
¶ 12 The parties agree that Petitioners preserved their argument for appeal.
¶ 13 We may overturn an administrative agency's determination only if we conclude that the agency (1) acted arbitrarily or capriciously; (2) made a determination that is not supported by the record; (3) erroneously interpreted the law; or (4) exceeded its constitutional or statutory authority. Sapp v. El Paso Cty. Dep't of Human Servs. , 181 P.3d 1179, 1182 (Colo. App. 2008). The district court exercises no factfinding authority in its review of an agency decision and is in the same position as this court, so we engage in the same type of record review as did the district court. Id.
¶ 14 We review statutory construction de novo. Archuletta v. Indus. Claim Appeals Office , 2016 COA 66, ¶ 11, 381 P.3d 374. While we defer to an agency's policy determinations in rulemaking proceedings, that deference does not extend to "questions of law such as the extent to which rules and regulations are supported by statutory authority." Simpson v. Cotton Creek Circles, LLC , 181 P.3d 252, 261 (Colo. 2008). Under Chevron , the first step in reviewing an agency's interpretation of a statute involves using traditional tools of statutory construction to determine whether the language of the statute is clear and whether the legislature has spoken directly to the question at issue. 467 U.S. at 842-43, 104 S.Ct. 2778. We begin interpreting a statute by looking to the plain and ordinary meaning of the language. Robinson v. Legro , 2014 CO 40, ¶ 14, 325 P.3d 1053. We "read and consider the statutory scheme as a whole to give consistent, harmonious and sensible effect to all its parts." Id. (citation omitted). We presume the legislature intended the entire statute to be effective and avoid constructions that would render any part meaningless. Id. "When we interpret a comprehensive legislative scheme, we must give meaning to all portions thereof and construe the statutory provisions to further the legislative intent." Droste v. Bd. of Cty. Comm'rs , 159 P.3d 601, 605 (Colo. 2007). If the statutory intent is plain and unambiguous, our inquiry ends there. See Chevron , 467 U.S. at 842-43, 104 S.Ct. 2778.
¶ 15 The Commission is a creature of state statute and has only the powers conferred on it by the Act. Chase v. Colo. Oil & Gas Conservation Comm'n , 2012 COA 94, ¶ 26, 284 P.3d 161. The Act grants the Commission broad jurisdiction and empowers it to "make and enforce rules, regulations, and orders" and "to do whatever may reasonably...
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