Martinez v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec.
| Decision Date | 16 August 2019 |
| Docket Number | 18-CV-01570 (KHP) |
| Parties | JORGE ALBERTO MARTINEZ JR., Plaintiff, v. COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY, Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Southern District of New York |
Plaintiff Jorge Alberto Martinez Jr. ("Plaintiff"), who is represented by counsel, commenced this action against Defendant Commissioner of the Social Security Administration (the "Commissioner"), pursuant to the Social Security Act (the "Act"), 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). Plaintiff seeks review of the Commissioner's post-remand decision that he was not disabled under sections 216(i) and 223(d) of the Act from the alleged onset date ("AOD") and date last insured of December 31, 2008 through January 14, 2012.
Plaintiff moved, pursuant to Rule 12(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, for judgment on the pleadings requesting either reversal of the administrative law judge's ("ALJ") second decision dated May 3, 2019, or, in the alternative, remand of the case (ECF No. 10 ("Plaintiff's motion")). The Commissioner cross-moved for judgment on the pleadings (ECF No. 13 ("Commissioner's motion")).
For the reasons set forth below, the Commissioner's motion is DENIED, and Plaintiff's motion is GRANTED in part. The Commissioner's decision denying Plaintiff's claim for social security disability benefits during the relevant period of December 31, 2008 through January 14, 2012 (the "relevant period") is remanded pursuant to sentence four of 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) for the sole purpose of obtaining vocational expert ("VE") testimony regarding whether there were a significant number of jobs existing in the national economy which Plaintiff could have performed during the relevant period, given his already-established age, background, and residual functional capacity ("RFC") during that period.
I. Summary of Claim and Procedural History
Plaintiff is 57 years old and lives with his mother in the Bronx. He completed tenth grade and worked in construction, maintenance, truck driving, and supervising commercial activity until around 2005. (Tr. 273.) Plaintiff initially stopped working because of diabetes and related ailments, such as a series of infections. (Id. at 59-60; see, e.g., id. at 586.) Since then, Plaintiff has remained unemployed due to various ailments, including left shoulder and left knee pain. (Id. at 59-60, 66-67.) Plaintiff testified that on a typical day, he has no energy, feels depressed, and has trouble sleeping. (Id. at 81, 85.) He claimed that he can leave his home for at most two hours a day, can only tolerate sitting for up to a couple of hours before his pain in his left knee forces him to lie down, and that he can walk up to three blocks using his cane. (Id. at 66-67, 82-85.) Plaintiff testified that he had lived with his wife and children, but she left him due to his ailments and inability to work, and that their children now live with her in Florida. (Id. at 78-79.) He subsequently moved in with his parents. (Id. at 80.)
Plaintiff alleges disability due to high blood pressure, hepatitis with possible cirrhosis of the liver, diabetes mellitus, status post arthroscopic repair of the left shoulder rotator cuff,suspected arthritis of the left knee, depressive disorder, panic disorder, and anxiety disorder. (ECF No. 1.) On June 24, 2010, Plaintiff filed a Title II application for a period of disability and disability insurance benefits. (Tr. 34.) Plaintiff also protectively filed a Title XVI application for supplemental security income. (Id.) These claims were denied on October 14, 2010. (Id.; id. at 151.) On November 9, 2010, Plaintiff submitted a request for a hearing. (Id. at 34.) Plaintiff appeared at a hearing on August 19, 2011 and at a subsequent supplemental hearing on February 21, 2012, both before ALJ Seth Grossman. (Id.) Plaintiff was represented by counsel at both hearings. (Id.) Plaintiff initially alleged disability beginning January 1, 2005, but Plaintiff's counsel later amended that date to December 31, 2008 at the supplemental hearing. (Id.)
In his initial decision dated March 2, 2012 (the "initial decision"), the ALJ issued a partially favorable decision concluding that Plaintiff was not disabled under sections 216(i) and 223(d) of the Act from the AOD of December 31, 2008 through January 14, 2012. (Tr. 47-49.) The ALJ instead determined that Plaintiff has been disabled under section 1614(a)(3)(A) of the Act beginning on January 15, 2012 through the date of that decision by directly applying of Medical-Vocational Rule 201.09. (Id.) On March 22, 2012, and April 24, 2012, Plaintiff submitted requests for the Appeals Council to review the ALJ's decision finding Plaintiff disabled beginning January 14, 2012, arguing that Plaintiff was disabled since December 2008. (Id. at 1142; see id. at 1140.) The Appeals Council denied Plaintiff's request to review the ALJ's initial decision on August 7, 2013. (Id. at 1087.) On September 17, 2013, Plaintiff requested that the Appeals Council reopen the case and review the ALJ's decisions to attribute moreweight to the testimony of some physicians and to discount the testimony of others. (See id. at 1148-1156.) Plaintiff sought reversal or remand for further proceedings before a different ALJ based on these alleged "errors of law and fact" and the ALJ's failure to "objectively and impartially review this case." (Id. at 1150.) On October 31, 2013, the Appeals Council denied Plaintiff's request to reopen and change the ALJ's initial decision. (Id. at 1091.)
In his initial decision, the ALJ followed the five-step sequential process contemplated under 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520 (a)(4)(i)-(v) in evaluating Plaintiff's claim. (Id. at 37-49.) At step one, the ALJ found that Plaintiff met the insured status requirements of the Act through December 31, 2008 and that Plaintiff had not engaged in substantial gainful activity since the AOD of December 31, 2008. (Id. at 37.) At step two, the ALJ determined that Plaintiff suffered from the following severe impairments: diabetes mellitus, high blood pressure, hepatitis with possible cirrhosis of the liver, status-post arthroscopic repair of the left shoulder rotator cuff, suspected arthritis of the left knee, depressive disorder, and panic/anxiety disorder. (Id.) In reaching these conclusions, the ALJ drew on the following evidence in the record: Plaintiff's diagnosis of liver disease, past hospitalizations due to diabetes-related complications, Dr. David Gonzalez's orthopedic examination of Plaintiff's shoulder, Plaintiff's shoulder surgery, Dr. Gonzalez's suspicion about left knee arthritis, and Dr. Parvesh Sharma's evaluation of Plaintiff's mental health. (Id.)
At step three, the ALJ found that Plaintiff's impairments, individually and collectively, failed to meet or medically equal the severity of the impairments listed in 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1 (the "Listings"). (Id.) The ALJ considered Listings 1.02 (Major dysfunction of a joint), 4.00 (Cardiovascular system), 5.05 (Chronic liver disease), and 9.00(Endocrine disorders), in connection with Plaintiff's physical impairments. (Id. at 37-38.) The ALJ concluded that Plaintiff's left knee condition did not satisfy Listing 1.02A because he did not exhibit "an inability to ambulate effectively." (Id. at 37.) Plaintiff's left shoulder condition did not satisfy Listing 1.02B because "he only has an impairment in one upper extremity, rather than in both." (Id.) The ALJ found that Plaintiff's high blood pressure had not resulted in any of the complications in Listing 5.05. (Id.) Finally, Plaintiff's diabetes had not resulted in "repeated episodes of diabetic ketoacidosis, chronic hyperglycemia, or hypoglycemia, as required by Listing 9.00." (Id.)
The ALJ evaluated Plaintiff's mental impairments under the criteria of Listings 12.04 (Affective disorders) and 12.06 (Anxiety-related disorders). (Id. at 38.) The ALJ found that Plaintiff had the following limitations: "mild restriction in activities of daily living, mild difficulties in maintaining social functioning, moderate difficulties in maintaining concentration, persistence or pace, and no episodes of decompensation, each of extended duration." (Id.) The ALJ found that Plaintiff's mental impairments did not satisfy the "paragraph B" criteria for Listings 12.04 or 12.06 because they did not "cause at least two 'marked' limitations or one 'marked' limitation and 'repeated' episodes of decompensation, each of extended duration." (Id. at 39.) He further found that Plaintiff's mental impairments failed to satisfy the "paragraph C" criteria for both Listings. (Id.) The ALJ noted that Plaintiff had not produced evidence that he experienced "repeated episodes of decompensation" or "a complete inability to function independently outside the area of his own home" among other "paragraph C" criteria. (Id.)
At step four, the ALJ assessed Plaintiff's RFC—the maximal amount of work Plaintiff is able to perform despite his limitations. 20 C.F.R. § 416.945(a)(1). The ALJ determined that,between the AOD of December 31, 2008 and January 15, 2012, Plaintiff had "the residual functional capacity to perform nearly the full range of sedentary work as defined in 20 CFR 404.1567(a) and 416.967(a)." (Tr. 39.) However, the ALJ found that Plaintiff could not "perform any overhead reaching with his left upper extremity, and is limited to the performance of simple, repetitive tasks." (Id.) In light of Plaintiff's RFC, the ALJ determined that, since the AOD of December 31, 2008, Plaintiff was unable to perform his past relevant work in the areas of construction, maintenance, and truck driving. (Id. at 47).
At step five, the ALJ considered Plaintiff's age, education, and RFC, which included both exertional and nonexertional limitations, to determine whether there were jobs...
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