Martinez v. Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, Civ. No. 191-71.

• Decision Date: 06 April 1972
• Docket Number: Civ. No. 191-71.
• Citation: 343 F. Supp. 897
• Parties: Narciso Rabell MARTINEZ, Plaintiff, v. COMMONWEALTH OF PUERTO RICO et. al., Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Puerto Rico

343 F. Supp. 897

Narciso Rabell MARTINEZ, Plaintiff, v. COMMONWEALTH OF PUERTO RICO et. al., Defendants.

Civ. No. 191-71.

United States District Court, D. Puerto Rico.

January 18, 1972.

On Motion for Stay April 6, 1972.

Luis F. Abreu Elias, Rio Piedras, P. R., for plaintiff.

Gilberto Gierbolini, Sol. Gen., Candita R. Orlandi, Asst. Sol. Gen., Dept. of Justice, San Juan, P. R., for defendants.

FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

TOLEDO, District Judge.

This is an action filed on March 16, 1971, by plaintiff, Narciso Rabell Martinez, requesting of this Court to grant him injunctive, declaratory and other equitable relief under the provisions of Title 28, United States Code, Sections 1331, 1343 and 2201; Title 42 United States Code, Sections 1981-83, and the Sixth, Ninth and Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution of the United States of America. These remedies are sought on the alleged basis that plaintiff's civil rights, as guaranteed under Title 42, United States Code, Section 1983, would be violated if the Courts of the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico are not enjoined from continuing criminal proceedings already initiated and pending against him.

Plaintiff contends that due to the excessive and continuous adverse publicity given by the local press, including press statements made by high government officials, in criminal proceedings already initiated and pending against him in the courts of the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, his federal civil rights have been violated and thus it will be impossible for him to have a just and fair trial in said criminal proceedings.

On April 1, 1971, this Court issued an Order granting a temporary restraining order¹ and requiring the defendants to show cause why they should not be enjoined preliminarily and permanently from continuing proceedings against plaintiff in the Criminal Cases G-69-2813 and 2814 filed against him in the Superior Court of Puerto Rico, San Juan Part. The defendants filed on April 7, 1971, a motion to dismiss the complaint on the ground that this Court lacked jurisdiction to entertain this action: (a) by virtue of the decision of the Supreme Court of the United States delivered on February 23, 1971, in the case of Younger v. Harris et al., 401 U.S. 37, 91 S.Ct. 746, 27 L.Ed.2d 669 (1971); (b) for the issuance of an injunction to stay criminal prosecution in a State court is in contravention of an express Congressional precept, as enunciated in Title 28, United States Code, Section 2283; and (c) because the complaint fails to state a cause of action within the meaning of Title 42, United States Code, 1981-83. Defendants' motion to dismiss was heard on April 8, 1971, and was denied on the same date.

On April 13, 1971, the defendants filed an "Answer to Order to Show Cause, Amended Motion to Dismiss and Opposition to the Entering of a Preliminary and Permanent Injunction." In said pleading, defendants denied each and every allegation of the complaint; admitted that the cases pending against plaintiff in the local courts had been the subject of certain publicity in the communication media, but denied that such publicity would make it impossible for plaintiff to have a fair and just trial in said forum. In the same pleading the defendants also incorporated all the allegations contained in their motion to dismiss of April 7, 1971, and alleged further: (1) that defendant, San Juan Superior Court, was not a person within the meaning of the Civil Rights Act, Title 42, United States Code, Section 1983, nor under Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 81 S.Ct. 473, 5 L.Ed.2d 492 (1961); and that, (2) inasmuch as defendant, Superior Court Judge Vicente López Pérez disqualified himself to continue as judge in plaintiff's case, the complaint was left defendantless.

On May 19, 1971, the Court granted plaintiff leave to include additional party defendants to the original complaint.

Extensive oral and documentary evidence on behalf of the parties was heard and admitted into evidence at evidentiary hearings held on April 13, 14, May 18 and June 21, 23, 28 and 29, 1971.

On June 9, 1971, the respondents filed another motion to dismiss the complaint, incorporating in it all the previous allegations contained in their motions to dismiss of April 7 and April 13, 1971. Plaintiff further alleged that this Court lacked jurisdiction to entertain the action as to the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, one of the new party defendants included in the original complaint as granted by this Court on May 19, 1971, on the ground that: (1) the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico is neither a person nor a corporation within the meaning of the Civil Rights Act (Title 42, United States Code, Section 1983); and (2) the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico enjoys sovereign immunity and cannot be sued in the federal courts without its consent. This motion was argued on June 23, 1971, the matter was taken under advisement, and simultaneous memoranda requested. The evidentiary hearing was resumed on that same date and terminated on June 29, 1971: at which date the parties were allowed thirty (30) days to file simultaneous memoranda of law in support of their respective contentions.

On the basis of the foregoing, the files and record in the above captioned cause, and after considering the evidence which was introduced by the parties herein, and reviewing the memoranda submitted, and otherwise being duly advised on the premises, the Court makes the following:

FINDINGS OF FACT

Informations in Criminal cases Number G-69-2813 and 2814, were filed against Narciso Rabell Martínez, plaintiff herein, on April 29, 1969, before the Superior Court of Puerto Rico, San Juan Part, charging him with violations of Articles 11 and 12 of Law Number 67 of 1934, commonly known as the Explosives Law of Puerto Rico (Title 25, Laws of Puerto Rico Annotated, Section 481 et seq.), for acts which allegedly occurred on February 15, 1969.

After several continuances requested by said plaintiff and granted, on February 6, 1970, he moved the Commonwealth Court, under Rule 247 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure of the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, Title 34, Laws of Puerto Rico Annotated, to dismiss the charges pending against him, on the ground that the adverse publicity received in said cases from the local press, including press statements made by high government officials of Puerto Rico, had created a hostile climate against him and had denied him his right to a just and fair trial.

Said Motion to dismiss came on for hearing on October 5, 1970, after the Court had granted plaintiff further extensions of time requested. As a result of said hearing, the Superior Court of Puerto Rico, San Juan Part, entered, on October 21, 1970, a five-page resolution denying plaintiff's motion to dismiss in view of the fact that the adverse publicity allegedly received in plaintiff's cases, as viewed from the press statements attached to said motion: (a) limits itself to general information on what happened since the arrest of the accused until the indictment in the District Court; (b) no inflammatory language appeared from said press statements; (c) the facts of the indictment were not commented, nor they attempted to formulate policies for the judiciary. The Court further considered that the voir dire of the jury panel composed of 4,000 candidates provided the accused with all the opportunities to investigate all the candidates, and to choose twelve jurors capable of rendering a just and impartial verdict based solely on the evidence presented and in the light of the applicable law.

Plaintiff then requested a stay of the Commonwealth Superior Court proceedings and filed a petition before the Supreme Court of Puerto Rico for a writ of certiorari, seeking a review of the above mentioned resolution of the Commonwealth Superior Court. The writ was denied on December 9, 1970.

On March 11, 1970, plaintiff moved the Superior Court of Puerto Rico, San Juan Part, for an indefinite continuance of the criminal proceedings on the same ground of the alleged adverse publicity received in his case. Said motion was denied and the trial of the cases was finally set for April 6, 1971. It was after this denial for an indefinite continuance, that plaintiff filed this complaint before this Court.

In view of the above Findings of Fact, the Court makes the following:

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

Under the facts and record of this case, the Court does not have sufficient grounds to exercise its discretion in favor of plaintiff, and thus interfere with and halt proceedings already initiated in the courts of the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico. Such action would be in contravention of the express Congressional precept, as enunciated in the Anti-Injunction Act, Title 28, United States Code, Section 2283.² Moreover concurring with the great weight of authority, we have held that the Civil Rights Act, Title 42, United States Code, Sections 1983 et seq., has not superseded, abrogated, suspended or modified the Anti-Injunction Act.³

In the case of Valentín Pérez v. Gil, Civil No. 695-69, unpublished Memorandum and Order of March 31, 1970, it was held as follows:

"This statute, originally adopted in 1793 (Act of March 2, 1793), has been continued in effect by the 1948 Judicial Code Revision. (62 Stat. 968, 28 U.S.C. 2283). Its purpose is to prevent use of federal jurisdiction for the purpose of staying or interfering with proceedings currently pending in state courts. The section is comprehensive in scope and applies to all steps taken by the state court and by its ministerial officers and to any supplementary or ancillary proceeding taken with a view to making the suit or judgment effective, including execution on a judgment. Hill v. Martin, 296 U.S. 393, 403; 56 S.Ct. 2 78; 80 L.Ed. 293 (1935). See Warren, Federal and State Court Interference, 43 Harv.L. Rev. 345, 366-378 (1929-30).

It is evident that "proceedings", as defined by the Supreme Court, would be stayed in the Superior Court,

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