Martinez v. County of Los Angeles

• Decision Date: 11 July 1996
• Docket Number: No. B088915,B088915
• Citation: 54 Cal.Rptr.2d 772,47 Cal.App.4th 334
• Court: California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals
• Parties: , 96 Cal. Daily Op. Serv. 5221, 96 Daily Journal D.A.R. 8373 Sabrina MARTINEZ et al., Plaintiffs and Appellants, v. COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES et al., Defendants and Respondents.

Page 772

54 Cal.Rptr.2d 772

47 Cal.App.4th 334, 96 Cal. Daily Op. Serv. 5221,

96 Daily Journal D.A.R. 8373

Sabrina MARTINEZ et al., Plaintiffs and Appellants, v. COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES et al., Defendants and Respondents.

No. B088915.

Court of Appeal, Second District, Division 5, California.

July 11, 1996.

Moreno, Becerra & Guerrero, Danilo J. Becerra, Montebello, and Arnoldo Casillas, Long Beach, for Plaintiffs and Appellants.

DeWitt W. Clinton, County Counsel, S. Robert Ambrose, Assistant County Counsel, and Dennis M. Gonzalez, Principal Deputy County Counsel, and Manning, Marder & Wolfe, Irvine, and Robert S. Wolfe, Washington, DC, for Defendants and Respondents.

GODOY PEREZ, Associate Justice.

Plaintiffs Sabrina Martinez and Maria Canales appeal the summary judgment entered for defendants the County of Los Angeles, the county's sheriff's department, Sheriff Sherman Block and Deputies Jerry Gleason and Thomas Gibson. For the reasons set forth below, we affirm that judgment.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Shortly before 9 p.m. on November 24, 1992, an anonymous tipster phoned the Los Angeles County Sheriff's Department ("the department") to report that an Hispanic man high on PCP was running around the intersection of Olympic Boulevard and McBride with a knife in his hand. Deputies Jerry Gleason and Thomas Gibson were on patrol nearby and answered the call.

When the deputies arrived in the area, they did not immediately see a man with a knife. Instead, they saw two juveniles spray-painting graffiti on a nearby Lucky's supermarket and arrested them. The taggers were handcuffed and the deputies were talking with the owner of the store when they heard shouting and saw Luis Martinez ("Martinez") standing on the south side of Olympic Boulevard with a knife in his hand. A photo of the knife is in the record. It is a carving-type kitchen knife with an 8-inch blade and a 4-inch wooden handle.

Martinez yelled, " 'Over here. Here I am, I'm the one you want. I'm the one you're looking for.' " Martinez crossed the street and came toward the deputies, seemingly oblivious to the traffic around him. As a result, motorists heading down Olympic were forced to brake or swerve. Gleason placed one of the taggers in the back of the patrol car and Gibson placed the other behind himself on the curb.

Martinez walked toward the deputies in a motion described by the deputies and other eyewitnesses as slow, stiff, rigid, deliberate, lethargic and mechanical. All who saw Martinez, including the deputies and eyewitnesses Blanca Gutierrez and Alonzo Ramirez, said Martinez appeared to be under the influence of drugs or alcohol. Deputies Gleason and Gibson believed, based on Martinez's body movements and irrational behavior, combined with their training, experience and knowledge, that Martinez was under the influence of PCP. Both deputies were aware that a person on PCP may have extraordinary strength and a high tolerance to pain. ¹

Martinez kept walking toward the deputies, holding the knife in a variety of positions ranging from waist high with the blade pointed skyward to by his head above his shoulders. Gibson testified at his deposition that Martinez mostly kept the knife in the latter position. Both deputies drew their pistols and told Martinez to stop, drop the knife and talk about his problems. Martinez kept advancing with the knife in his hands, shouting, " 'Go ahead, kill me or I'm going to kill you' " and " 'Shoot me. Shoot me.' "

Blanca Gutierrez heard the deputies tell Martinez several times to drop the knife. Another eyewitness, Rayvon Delone Hale, heard Gibson and Gleason tell Martinez to drop the knife at least 14 times. The deputies kept retreating as Martinez advanced, repeating their admonitions that he drop the knife. As the deputies retreated, they came closer to the supermarket. Blanca Gutierrez said Martinez walked toward the deputies "with a macho-type look and it appeared as if he wanted to stab them."

When Martinez got to within 10 or 15 feet of the deputies, they each fired their pistols. Gibson initially fired two rounds and Gleason just one. Gibson testified that Martinez looked down for a second, looked back at him and tried to take another step forward. In response, Gibson fired three more shots. Gleason also saw Martinez flinch and begin to take another step, but did not fire any more shots because he was still "sizing up the situation." Alonzo Ramirez said the deputies shot Martinez "once or twice while standing and several times after he went down." Rayvon Delone Hale stated in his declaration that the deputies were still shooting as Martinez "was going down or ... was down on the ground already...."

Deputy Gibson fired because Martinez maintained eye contact with him, could not be reasoned with and kept coming. Gibson testified: "In my opinion, there was no other alternative because we had the juveniles we had handcuffed on the curb, we had the store owner, there was other people around at that point in time when he made that final movement. I felt that he was actually going to go after us. And I have the responsibility to protect myself, my partner, and the citizens. I felt there was no other alternative for me." Deputy Gleason fired for the same reasons.

An ambulance was called and Martinez was rushed to the hospital, but he died that night. His mother, plaintiff and appellant Maria Canales, and his daughter, plaintiff and appellant Sabrina Martinez appearing by and through her guardian ad litem, Nicole Keller, sued the department, the County of Los Angeles, Sheriff Sherman Block, Gleason and Gibson for Martinez's death. ² The complaint stated three causes of action: two for federal civil rights violations under 42 U.S.C. section 1983, one against the County defendants and one against Gibson and Gleason; and one for wrongful death under state common law principles against respondents for the shooting death of Martinez.

Respondents later moved for summary judgment on several grounds, including that the shooting was reasonable and justified, barring the entire complaint under federal and California immunity principles. On October 13, 1994, the trial court granted summary judgment on that basis and judgment was entered October 31, 1994. This appeal followed. Because we affirm the judgment on the same immunity ground as did the trial court, we need not reach the other grounds for affirmance raised by respondents.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

Summary judgment is granted when a moving party establishes the right to the entry of judgment as a matter of law. (Code Civ.Proc., § 437c, subd. (c).) In reviewing an order granting summary judgment, we must assume the role of the trial court and redetermine the merits of the motion. In doing so, we must strictly scrutinize the moving party's papers. (Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Superior Court (1992) 4 Cal.App.4th 544, 549, 5 Cal.Rptr.2d 674.) The declarations of the party opposing summary judgment, however, are liberally construed to determine the existence of triable issues of fact. (Sosinsky v. Grant (1992) 6 Cal.App.4th 1548, 1556, 8 Cal.Rptr.2d 552.) All doubts as to whether any material, triable, issues of fact exist are to be resolved in favor of the party opposing summary judgment. (Ibid.)

While the appellate court must review a summary judgment motion by the same standards as the trial court, it must independently determine as a matter of law the construction and effect of the facts presented. (Saldana v. Globe-Weis Systems Co. (1991) 233 Cal.App.3d 1505, 1510-1511, 1513-1515, 285 Cal.Rptr. 385.)

Recent amendments to the summary judgment statute have changed the burden of proof. A defendant moving for summary judgment meets his burden of proof of showing that a cause of action has no merit if that party shows that one or more elements of the cause of action, even if not separately pleaded, cannot be established, or that there is a complete defense to the action. (Code Civ.Proc., § 437c, subd. (o)(2).) Once the defendant does so, the burden shifts back to the plaintiff to show that a triable issue of one or more material facts exists as to that cause of action or defense. In doing so, the plaintiff cannot rely on the mere allegations or denial of his pleadings, "but, instead, shall set forth the specific facts showing that a triable issue of material fact exists...." (Ibid.; see Union Bank v. Superior Court (1995) 31 Cal.App.4th 573, 590, 37 Cal.Rptr.2d 653.)

DISCUSSION

1. Appellants' Civil Rights Claim Is Barred By The Deputies' Qualified Immunity From Suit

Appellants' second and third causes of action are brought under 42 U.S.C. section 1983 (hereafter "section 1983"), which provides civil redress for deprivation of constitutional rights. It was enacted " 'to provide protection to those persons wronged by the misuse of power.' [Citation.]" (Wilson v. Meeks (10th Cir.1995) 52 F.3d 1547, 1552, hereafter "Wilson.") Section 1983 creates no substantive civil rights, however, only a procedural means for their enforcement. (Wilson v. Meeks, supra, 52 F.3d at p. 1552.) ³ Since it is a federally derived cause of action, federal law governs. (Elene H. v. County of Los Angeles (1990) 220 Cal.App.3d 1445, 1451, 269 Cal.Rptr. 783.)

"Qualified immunity is an affirmative defense against section 1983 claims. [Citation.] Its purpose is to shield public officials 'from undue interference with their duties and from potentially disabling threats of liability.' [Citation.] The defense provides immunity from suit, not merely from liability. [Citation.] Its purpose is to spare defendants the burden of going forward with trial. [Citation.]" (Wilson, supra, 52 F.3d at p. 1552.) Because it is an immunity from suit, not just a mere defense to liability, it is important to resolve immunity questions at the earliest possible stage in litigation. (Hunter v. Bryant (1991) 502 U.S. 224, 227, 112 S.Ct. 534, 536, 116 L.Ed.2d 589; accord Elene H. v. County of Los Angeles, sup...