Martinez v. Food City, Inc.

• Decision Date: 07 October 1981
• Docket Number: No. 80-2008,80-2008
• Citation: 658 F.2d 369
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Fifth Circuit
• Parties: 25 Wage & Hour Cas. (BN 170, 65 A.L.R.Fed. 823, 92 Lab.Cas. P 34,081, 9 Fed. R. Evid. Serv. 161 Raul Lara MARTINEZ, et al., Plaintiffs-Appellees, v. FOOD CITY, INC., d/b/a Foodland, Defendant-Appellant. Summary Calendar. . Unit A *

Page 369

658 F.2d 369

25 Wage & Hour Cas. (BN 170, 65 A.L.R.Fed. 823,

92 Lab.Cas. P 34,081, 9 Fed. R. Evid. Serv. 161

Raul Lara MARTINEZ, et al., Plaintiffs-Appellees, v.FOOD CITY, INC., d/b/a Foodland, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 80-2008

Summary Calendar.

United States Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit.

Unit A ^*

Oct. 7, 1981.

William C. Church, San Antonio, Tex., for defendant-appellant.

Joseph Eduardo Pena, Laredo, Tex., for plaintiffs-appellees.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas.

Before AINSWORTH, REAVLEY and RANDALL, Circuit Judges.

RANDALL, Circuit Judge:

Raul Lara Martinez, Jose Luis de Leon and Eliseo Farias Martinez, all former employees of AppellantFood City, Inc., brought this action under the Fair Labor Standards Act,29 U.S.C. § 201, et seq.(1976)("FLSA"), to recover unpaid overtime wages.After trial, the jury found the Appellant liable for uncompensated overtime hours and awarded damages to each of the three plaintiffs.The trial court then awarded an additional, equal amount as liquidated damages, and attorney's fees, pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 216(1976).Appellant raises three issues on this appeal: (1) whether the trial court erred in denying Appellant's motion for a new trial, based on allegations of jury misconduct; (2) whether the trial court correctly ruled that the three-year statute of limitations would be applicable, rather than two years, 29 U.S.C. § 255(a)(1976); and (3) whether the trial court abused its discretion in awarding liquidated damages.We affirm.

I.FACTUAL BACKGROUND

Appellant is a corporate employer operating several retail food stores in the Laredo, Texas, area.Each of the Appellees was employed by Appellant for various periods between August, 1973 and November, 1978.Raul Lara Martinez and Eliseo Farias Martinez were employed as "stockers," and Jose Luis de Leon was employed as an assistant manager.The duties of a stocker, as described at trial, consisted of unloading merchandise as it arrived at the store and restocking the supply of merchandise on the shelves.Appellant maintained a time-card system for its employees.The system contained a mechanical clock, and each employee would punch in on his individual card as he arrived and punch out when he left work.Appellees charged that they were required by management to punch their cards out but continue working, or leave the cards blank to be filled in by management, and accordingly the cards did not reflect all overtime hours worked.This suit was brought to recover the unpaid wages for these hours, in addition to the liquidated damages and attorney's fees prescribed by the Act.

At voir dire, the district judge asked several questions to identify any members of the panel who had been involved in claims for unpaid wages, specifically with reference to a time-card system.In response to this questioning, a panel member stated that she had had an employment experience in which she was required to punch out and continue work, and also that her husband had been involved in a wage dispute with his employer.This panel member was not included in the jury.Following this specific questioning, the district judge asked generally whether any panel member felt he could not be fair and impartial for any reason.No panel member responded, and neither attorney proposed additional questions.

At trial Appellees introduced their time cards for the relevant periods, the testimony of a former store manager, testimony of another former "stocker," and the testimony of Appellees themselves.These witnesses testified generally that the amount of work required by management could not be performed within a normal 40-hour week, therefore requiring substantial overtime work, but that employees were not permitted to fully record their overtime hours on their time cards.Appellant introduced testimony from various management officials denying any knowledge of uncompensated overtime.Several witnesses for Appellant stated that it would have been corporate policy to immediately terminate any employee who continued to work after punching out.Appellant also called an employee who denied ever being required to punch out and continue work.

After the close of the evidence, but before submission of the case to the jury, the trial court ruled that it would not submit to the jury the question whether the violations, if any, were "willful" for purposes of determining the applicable statute of limitations.29 U.S.C. § 255(1976).That section provides that a two-year statute of limitations applies to actions under the FLSA, but that a three-year period applies if the violations were "willful."Relying on a number of Fifth Circuit cases directly addressing this issue, the trial court ruled as a matter of law that any violations found would be willful, and the three-year period would apply.

The jury returned special interrogatories finding that Appellant was liable to each Appellee for uncompensated overtime.At the request of Appellant the jury was polled and each juror assented to the verdict.As the jury was discharged, the district judge commented that the jurors were now relieved of the prohibition against discussing the case with anyone, and were free to talk with the attorneys or anyone else if they desired.The judge commented, "Sometimes the attorneys or the parties or other people like to talk to a juror and find out what things impressed you or didn't impress you or that sort of thing."

A hearing was subsequently held on liquidated damages and attorney's fees.Although Appellant had initially told the court it had no further evidence on the issue of good faith, it submitted the affidavit of the president and principal stockholder of Appellant.The affidavit stated that the president had always required compliance with the FLSA, and that he had never had any indication that employees were working overtime without compensation.The trial court thereafter entered final judgment awarding, as liquidated damages, an additional amount equal to the jury's award to each Appellee.The court also awarded reasonable attorney's fees.

Appellant then hired an investigator, Humberto Tijerina, to conduct post-verdict interviews with members of the jury.Tijerina obtained the affidavit of juror Rosa Maria Castillo.In her affidavit, juror Castillo states that during deliberations, juror Carrizales told the jury that the Appellant"should be taught a lesson" for hiring Mexican nationals holding green cards, and that juror Arias had described a personal experience working "off the clock" and observed that it was common practice in the Laredo area.Appellant submitted this affidavit, together with the affidavit of Tijerina and another investigator, in support of its motion for a new trial.

The district judge set a hearing on Appellant's motion and both sides submitted briefs.At the initial hearing, the court ruled that jurors Castillo and Carrizales were incompetent to provide testimony or affidavits relating to the statements allegedly made during deliberations, citing Federal Rule of Evidence 606(b), but that the court would hear testimony as to whether any juror had misrepresented or intentionally concealed information during the voir dire examination.Appellant asserted this theory only with respect to juror Arias, and the hearing was adjourned to locate Arias.At the second day of hearings, Arias took the stand and was examined by Appellant's counsel and the trial court.In response to repeated questioning, Arias admitted working for 14 years on a time-card system but denied ever being required to work overtime without compensation, and denied making the alleged statements during jury deliberations.Arias also denied making such statements to the Appellant's investigator, Tijerina.Tijerina then testified that he had a conversation with Arias during which Arias told him about employees working off the clock at the place of his former employment.According to Tijerina, however, Arias had never claimed to have made any statements regarding such experiences during jury deliberations.Tijerina was examined by Appellees' counsel and by the court.At the close of this testimony, the trial court denied Appellant's motion for a new trial.

II.JURY MISCONDUCT¹

The decision to grant or deny a motion for new trial is within the sound discretion of the trial judge, and will not be reversed absent an abuse of that discretion.Ellis v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc., 650 F.2d 94, 97(5th Cir.1981).When the alleged ground for new trial is jury misconduct, the trial court's discretion extends not only to the decision whether or not to grant the motion, but also to the procedures appropriate for investigating the allegations.United States v. Reyes, 645 F.2d 285, 288(5th Cir.1981);Vezina v. Theriot Marine Service, Inc., 610 F.2d 251, 252(5th Cir.1980);United States v. Khoury, 539 F.2d 441, 443(5th Cir.1976), cert. denied429 U.S. 1040, 97 S.Ct. 739, 50 L.Ed.2d 752(1977).We cannot say, on this record, that the trial court's actions with regard to the new trial motion were either clearly erroneous or an abuse of its discretion.

As to alleged statements by juror Carrizales to the effect that Appellant should be "taught a lesson,"the trial court correctly ruled that juror testimony or affidavits would be incompetent under Federal Rule of Evidence 606(b).This rule is a codification of long-standing practice in the federal courts, ² and provides:

Upon an inquiry into the validity of a verdict or indictment, a juror may not testify as to any matter or statement occurring during the course of the jury's deliberations or to the effect of anything upon his or any other juror's mind or emotions as influencing him to assent to or dissent from the verdict or indictment or concerning his mental processes in connection therewith, except that a juror may testify on the question whether extraneous prejudicial information...