Martinez v. GREAT AMERICAN INSURANCE CO. OF NEW YORK

Decision Date03 July 1968
Docket NumberCiv. A. No. 67-93-SA.
Citation286 F. Supp. 141
PartiesRamiro MARTINEZ et al., Plaintiffs, v. GREAT AMERICAN INSURANCE COMPANY OF NEW YORK, Defendant.
CourtU.S. District Court — Western District of Texas

Jerry P. Heltzel, Richard Tinsman, Tinsman & Cunningham, San Antonio, Tex., for plaintiffs.

Carl Wright Johnson, W. R. Simcock, San Antonio, Tex., for defendant.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

SPEARS, Chief Judge.

Plaintiffs, who claim a cause of action against one Jesus Barrientes (the insured) for injuries and damages growing out of an accident on September 7, 1967, involving an automobile owned and driven by the insured, brought this suit seeking a judgment declaring that an insurance renewal certificate issued to the insured by the defendant (insurer), and covering said automobile was in effect on the date of the accident. After a trial without a jury, this Court holds that the plaintiffs are entitled to the declaratory judgment sought. The matters hereinafter set forth shall constitute the findings of fact and conclusions of law in support of the judgment.

On July 8, 1966, the insured, at that time an employee of Lackland Air Force Base located just outside San Antonio, Texas and near Hondo, Texas, purchased an automobile liability insurance policy from the defendant-insurer, through its agent, Wood & Wood Insurance Agency (the agency) of Hondo. A portion of the premium was paid in cash and the balance, which has never been paid, was carried on the books of the agency as an account receivable due to it from the insured. The agency paid the defendant-insurer the full amount of the premium, less their commission.

Sometime prior to the date the policy was to expire, the agency sent to the defendant-insurer's service office in San Antonio a list of insurance policies eligible for renewal in the month of July, 1967. The agency thereafter received an envelope from said service office containing all of the July renewal certificates, including one covering the policy of the insured, and a bill for the premiums on all renewals.

On July 5, 1967, the agency sent a letter to the insured reading as follows:

"Your car insurance policy will be due on 7-8-67 and would appreciate you dropping us a line below yes or no if you want to renew same again this year."

The following "demand" letter was written by the agency to the insured on July 26, 1967:

"The company demands that if we do not send in the money for this policy to them within a week from this date, that we return the policy to them for cancellation. * * *"

Subsequently, on August 29, 1967, the agency received from the San Antonio office of defendant-insurer a letter stating:

"Attached is a copy of our letter of July 12.1 We would appreciate your forwarding this information to our office by September 12. If we have not received it by that time we shall assume you have been unable to secure the cooperation of our insured and we will issue notice of cancellation * * *."

On September 1, 1967, the agency returned the insured's renewal certificate to the defendant-insurer with the following transmittal letter:

"Enclosed please find automobile renewal certificate of Policy No. 4-69-64-14-VF, Jesus Barrientes, to cancel as far back as possible as we cannot hear from him."

Testimony of Mrs. Jo Wood, a partner in the agency, was to the effect that she was sure the company dated the policy back "some", because "they knew we were losing money on it".

The July 26, 1967 letter from the agency to the insured, written some eighteen days after the expiration date of the original policy, indicates that the agency considered the renewal certificate to be in effect at that time, otherwise there would have been no occasion to threaten cancellation. The letter of August 29, 1967 from the company to the agency fully supports a finding that the defendant-insurer itself treated the policy as one in effect at least until September 12, 1968.

Sometime between April 1967 and September 1967, Lackland Air Force Base issued to the insured a windshield decal, effective until July 6, 1968, indicating that the insured had obtained the...

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4 cases
  • Dailey v. Elicker
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — District of Colorado
    • 24 d5 Março d5 1978
    ...unethical nor unusual, however, for an insurance agent to act on behalf of both the insurer and the insured. Martinez v. Great American Ins. Co., 286 F.Supp. 141, 143 (W.D.Tex.1968); 16 Appleman, supra, § 8725. See American Fire & Casualty Co. v. Finn, 341 U.S. 6, 71 S.Ct. 534, 95 L.Ed. 702......
  • Tighe v. Security Nat. Life Ins. Co., 39121
    • United States
    • Nebraska Supreme Court
    • 7 d4 Fevereiro d4 1974
    ...for the trier of facts. 6 Couch on Insurance 2d, S. 32:286, p. 519, S. 31:64, p. 72. The case of Martinez v. Great American Ins. Co. of New York, 286 F.Supp. 141 (U.S.D.C., W.D.Tex., 1968), is an example of a case where the court held there was a waiver of the right of the insurance company......
  • Zuniga v. Allstate Ins. Co., 04-83-00516-CV
    • United States
    • Texas Court of Appeals
    • 12 d3 Junho d3 1985
    ...policy, Allstate unilaterally agreed to provide coverage until December 29, 1981. Zuniga and Romo cite Martinez v. Great American Insurance Company of New York, 286 F.Supp. 141 (1968) as a case involving the precise facts as the instant case on appeal. Martinez involved a renewal policy und......
  • Zemko v. Allstate Ins. Co.
    • United States
    • Connecticut Superior Court
    • 17 d5 Fevereiro d5 1984
    ...Agency, Zemko was entitled to rely on the fact that he was insured by Allstate on May 29, 1981. See Martinez v. Great American Ins. Co. of New York, 286 F.Supp. 141, 142 (W.D.Tex.1968); Tighe v. Security National Life Ins. Co., 191 Neb. 271, 277-78, 214 N.W.2d 622 For the foregoing reasons,......

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