Martinez v. Heckler

• Citation: 807 F.2d 771
• Decision Date: 16 January 1987
• Docket Number: No. 85-5564,85-5564
• Parties: , Unempl.Ins.Rep. CCH 17,114 Eleuterio MARTINEZ, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Margaret M. HECKLER, Secretary of Health and Human Services, Defendant-Appellee.
• Court: United States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (9th Circuit)

Page 771

807 F.2d 771

16 Soc.Sec.Rep.Ser. 68, Unempl.Ins.Rep. CCH 17,114

Eleuterio MARTINEZ, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Margaret M. HECKLER, Secretary of Health and Human Services Defendant-Appellee.

No. 85-5564.

United States Court of Appeals Ninth Circuit.

Argued and Submitted Nov. 4, 1986.

Decided Nov. 13, 1986.

Designated for Publication Jan. 7, 1987.

As Corrected Jan. 16, 1987.

Martin Taller, Rucker & Tucker, Anaheim, Cal., for plaintiff-appellant.

David R. Mazzi, Dept. of Health & Human Services, San Francisco, Cal., for defendant-appellee.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Central District of California.

Before ALARCON, BRUNETTI, and NOONAN, Circuit Judges.

BRUNETTI, Circuit Judge:

Eleuterio Martinez appeals the district court judgment affirming the decision of the Secretary of Health and Human Services (the Secretary) denying disability benefits. Martinez contends that (1) the district court erred by not addressing the issue of whether the hypotheticals presented by the administrative law judge contained conflicting facts and omissions; (2) the district court erred in not considering the vocational expert's testimony regarding Martinez's need to alternatively sit and stand due to pain limitations; and (3) the finding that Martinez can perform work that exists in significant numbers in the national economy is not supported by substantial evidence.

We disagree and affirm.

I FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS BELOW

Martinez injured his back on September 3, 1980 while attempting to lift a rim and tire onto a truck wheel. On September 29, 1980, he filed for supplemental security income benefits based on disability due to the back injury. That application was denied on October 24, 1980. On October 15, 1981, he filed for disability insurance benefits, alleging disability since the September 3, 1980 accident. That application was also denied, and the denial was upheld on reconsideration. A request for a hearing was filed, and the Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) issued a decision on June 15, 1983, finding that Martinez had the residual functional capacity for a narrow range of light activity, with the light level capacity for standing and walking, but with a requirement to change positions from sitting to standing, and with lifting limitations of five to ten pounds. The ALJ found this capacity consistent with alternative, unskilled work as a hand assembler or bench machine operator, and found that there were a significant number (approx. 4,250) of jobs available in the local economy.

The ALJ's decision was approved by the Appeals Council after it considered additional evidence submitted by Martinez. Martinez thereafter brought an action in the United States District Court seeking to set aside the decision of the Secretary. Findings and Recommendations were made by the United States Magistrate, and objections were filed. The magistrate filed his final Report and Recommendation, and the district court adopted the magistrate's findings and recommendations.

II STANDARD OF REVIEW

The Secretary's decision denying benefits will be disturbed only if it is not supported by substantial evidence or based on legal error. Nyman v. Heckler, 779 F.2d 528, 530 (9th Cir.1985), amended on other grounds, No. 85-3726 (9th Cir. Feb. 24, 1986). Substantial evidence is "such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion." Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401, 91 S.Ct. 1420, 1427, 28 L.Ed.2d 842 (1971) (quoting Consolidated Edison Co. v. NLRB, 305 U.S. 197, 229, 59 S.Ct. 206, 216, 83 L.Ed. 126 (1938)). We consider the record as a whole, weighing both the evidence that supports and detracts from the Secretary's conclusion. Jones v. Heckler, 760 F.2d 993, 995 (9th Cir.1985); see also Swanson v. Secretary of Health & Human Services, 763 F.2d 1061, 1064 (9th Cir.1985).

III ANALYSIS

To qualify for disability benefits, the claimant must establish that a medically determinable physical or mental impairment prevents him from engaging in substantial gainful activity. The claimant must demonstrate that the impairment is expected to result in death or to last for a continuous period of at least twelve months. Jones, 760 F.2d at 995; Gallant v. Heckler, 753 F.2d 1450, 1452 (9th Cir.1984); In hearings arising out of a claimant's initial application for benefits, the claimant has the burden of proving he is disabled. Swanson, 763 F.2d at 1064; Gallant, 753 F.2d at 1452. The claimant establishes a prima facie case of disability by showing that a physical or mental impairment prevents him from performing his previous occupation. Gallant, 753 F.2d at 1452. The burden then shifts to the Secretary to show that the claimant can perform other types of work existing in the national economy, given his residual functional capacity, age, education, and work experience. Id. See also 20 C.F.R. Secs. 404.1520(f), 404.1560-.1568 (1985).

                42 U.S.C. Sec. 423(d)(1)(A).  Additionally, the impairment must result from anatomical, physiological, or psychological abnormalities which are demonstrable by medically acceptable clinical or laboratory diagnostic techniques.   Gallant, 753 F.2d at 1452;  42 U.S.C. Sec. 423(d)(3)
                

A. The Hypotheticals.

Martinez argues that the district court erred by not addressing the issue of whether the hypotheticals presented by the administrative law judge contained conflicting facts and omissions.

The ALJ asked the vocational expert what kind of jobs were available to a person that had the following limitations:

Assuming ... that the claimant retains the ability to stand and walk, sufficient to do light work, however he is unable to do the lifting requirements for light work. That is, his lifting would be restricted to no more than 5 to 10 pounds maximum....

* * *

[and] assuming ... that the claimant had to change positions during the day, but could otherwise work at a bench, that is, he would have to alternate standing and sitting, ... would he be able to do those jobs that were outlined by you?

In answer to this question, the vocational expert testified that there would be 3,750 to 4,250 jobs available.

After this examination, counsel for the claimant included other, more limiting restrictions:

Assuming ... that Mr. Martinez was limited as far as his walking ability so that he couldn't walk more than ... 1/2 block at a time, that he had to walk with a cane, and also assuming that he could not stand more than a half hour at a time, and then after the first half hour his limitation would even be further reduced,...."

As the magistrate noted, "[t]he hypothetical questions posed by plaintiff's counsel obviously contain more and different restrictions than those posed by the administrative law judge." The administrative law judge was not bound to accept those restrictions as true.

Martinez has certain medical impairments that could reasonably be expected to produce a certain amount of pain and limitation. In the recent decision of Green v. Heckler, 803 F.2d 528 (9th Cir.1986), we encountered a similar situation. There too, the claimant experienced a substantial amount of pain. However, in that case, as in this, the claimant's testimony indicated that he experienced significantly more pain than would normally be expected for a person with his impairments. As we stated in that case:

[t]he Secretary is not required to believe a claimant's complaints of pain. The Secretary can disregard such self-serving testimony whenever the claimant fails to submit objective medical findings establishing a medical impairment that could reasonably be expected to produce the claimed pain. Nyman, 779 F.2d at 531; Taylor v. Heckler, 765 F.2d 872, 876 (9th Cir.1985). However, she must make specific findings justifying that decision. Miller v. Heckler, 770 F.2d 845, 848 (9th Cir.1985); Bellamy v. Secretary of Health and Human Services, 755 F.2d 1380, 1382 (9th Cir.1985).

Green, 803 F.2d at 531.

As we also stated, "[s]ection 423(d)(5)(A) states that an individual's The Claimant also argues that the hypothetical presented to the vocational expert, Dr. Workman, "failed to address limitations of movement such as bending, stooping, squatting, and reaching which are logically consistent with a five to ten pound weight restriction and the necessity to stand and sit at will." Although bending, stooping, squatting, and reaching may be consistent with lifting and standing restrictions, it does not follow that they must be consistent with these limitations. Again, these factual determinations, uniquely suited for the administrative hearing must be upheld as long as they are supported by substantial evidence. The ALJ's determination in this case is supported by substantial evidence.

                statement as to pain ... shall not alone be conclusive evidence of disability....  Objective medical evidence of pain ... must be considered in reaching a conclusion as to whether the individual is under a disability."    Id.  The hypothetical suggested by claimant's counsel added considerations more restrictive than those suggested by the ALJ.  Based on his evaluation of the evidence, the administrative law judge was free to accept or reject those restrictions.  Administrative hearings are uniquely suited for such factual determinations, and we will not overturn them as long as they are supported by substantial evidence.   Nyman v. Heckler, 779 F.2d 528, 530 (9th Cir.1985);  Sample v. Schweiker, 694 F.2d 639, 642 (9th Cir.1982).  The claimant was examined numerous times by several physicians.  Although there is some conflicting evidence, clearly, the weight of medical evidence supports the hypothetical questions posed by the ALJ
                

B. Martinez's Need to Alternatively Sit or Stand.

Martinez also argues that the district court erred in not considering the vocational expert's testimony regarding Martinez's need to alternatively sit and stand due to pain limitations. The ALJ asked the expert to assess the number of jobs...