Martinez v. IBP, Inc.

• Citation: 961 S.W.2d 678
• Decision Date: 22 January 1998
• Docket Number: No. 07-97-0110-CV,07-97-0110-CV
• Parties: Ramona MARTINEZ, Appellant, v. IBP, INC., d/b/a IBP, Inc. of Nebraska, Appellee.
• Court: Court of Appeals of Texas

Page 678

961 S.W.2d 678

Ramona MARTINEZ, Appellant, v. IBP, INC., d/b/a IBP, Inc. of Nebraska, Appellee.

No. 07-97-0110-CV.

Court of Appeals of Texas,

Amarillo.

Jan. 22, 1998.

Rehearing Overruled March 26, 1998.

Law Offices of Len Olson, Len Olson, Law Offices of Steven L. McBride, Steven L. McBride, Amarillo, for appellant.

Underwood, Wilson, Berry, Stein & Johnson, P.C., Kelly Utsinger, Chad Pierce, Amarillo, for appellee.

Before BOYD, C.J., and DODSON and QUINN, JJ.

QUINN, Justice.

Ramona Martinez (Martinez) sued IBP, Inc., d/b/a IBP, Inc. of Nebraska (IBP), her ex-employer, for negligence, gross negligence, and retaliatory discharge. IBP joined issue and moved for summary judgment. The trial court granted IBP's motion, rendered a final summary judgment, and decreed that Martinez take nothing. Martinez appealed, asserting eight points of error. Purportedly, the trial court erred in granting judgment because 1) IBP cited grounds for summary judgment in documents other than its motion, 2) the waiver she executed which relinquished her right to sue IBP was void as a matter of law, 3) IBP did not move for summary judgment on the issue of gross negligence, 4) evidence created a material issue of fact concerning whether the waiver was executed under duress, 5) the doctrine of election of remedies was inapplicable, 6) ratification was either inapplicable or unproven, 7) evidence created a material question of fact regarding her discharge in retaliation "for filing a claim for benefits under [IBP's] Workplace Injury Settlement Program," and 8) the doctrine of estoppel was inapplicable. We affirm.

Background

Martinez began working for IBP on October 31, 1994. Within a week, she suffered an injury on the job. Apparently, a 30 to 40 pound parcel of meat fell on her. IBP was immediately notified of the incident. Though the company was not a subscriber to a statutory workers' compensation plan, it nevertheless had its own plan for remediating job related injuries. The plan was called "Workplace Injury Settlement Program" (WIS Program). Additionally, in exchange for receiving benefits thereunder, the employee had to sign a document effectively relinquishing his or her right to sue the company at common law. Martinez was informed of this condition during her initial orientation and prior to her injury. Moreover, once she had notified IBP of the accident, the employer tendered to her an "Acceptance and Waiver" form. Executed by her on November 10, 1994, the form read:

I have been injured at work and want to apply for payments offered by IBP to me under its Workplace Injury Settlement Program. To qualify, I understand I must accept the rules of the Program. I have been given a copy of the Program summary. I accept the Program.

I understand I am giving up the right to sue the Company and perhaps others because of my injury. I understand that the Company would not be able to use certain common law defenses against me, but that the Company would never pay anything until a court decided that the Company caused my injury since the Company does not provide benefits under the Texas Workers' Compensation laws. I am giving up any rights I or any family member have [sic] to sue either the Company or anyone for whom the Company is responsible in exchange for being able to participate in the Program.

Once the form was signed, Martinez received medical attention from two physicians at IBP's expense. The expenses paid by the company totaled $2,531.61. According to the company, she also received an offer of light duty work, which was allegedly rejected.

By the end of January 1995, Martinez had retained legal counsel and sued IBP for damages. The damages were founded upon claims of negligence and gross negligence. Eventually, she amended her petition to aver a claim of retaliatory discharge. The latter occurred when IBP allegedly fired her on March 2, 1995, after she had "notified her supervisor, sought medical attention, and later, in good faith, requested that I.B.P. put in a claim pursuant to the Texas Workers' Compensation Act." The termination occurred, according to Martinez, because she "had pursued a valid workers' compensation claim."

Of course, IBP denied Martinez's allegations. So too did it posit that she was not terminated on March 2 but placed on leave of absence. Her discharge did not allegedly happen until March 2, 1996, after she failed to bid on a job pursuant to the terms of a general collective bargaining agreement. Under the agreement, an employee could not be on leave of absence for more than a year without bidding for a job. Finally, exceeding that period ended in termination, asserted IBP.

Point One

In her first point, Martinez opined that the trial court erred in granting summary judgment because the "grounds cited by IBP in its Reply [to her response to the motion for summary judgment] and Brief ... could not, as a matter of law, support its summary judgment." We disagree and overrule the point.

1. Applicable Law

It is true that the motion for summary judgment must itself state the specific grounds on which judgment is sought. TEX.R. CIV. P. 166a(c). What this means is that a court may not grant judgment for reasons unmentioned in the motion. Sysco Food Serv., Inc. v. Trapnell, 890 S.W.2d 796, 805 (Tex.1994). Thus, reasons proffered in a document other than the motion itself may not provide basis for judgment. McConnell v. Southside Independent Sch. Dist., 858 S.W.2d 337, 341 (Tex.1993); but see Howell v. Murray Mort. Co., 890 S.W.2d 78, 85 (Tex.App.--Amarillo 1994, writ denied) (stating that the court may consider grounds mentioned in a brief which is incorporated by reference into the motion).

Yet, before we can hold that the trial court violated the foregoing restriction, the appellant must show that the ground relied upon by the trial court was not mentioned in the motion. For instance, assume that a movant sought summary judgment on the basis of A, B, and C and that A and B were mentioned in the motion but C was alluded to only in a separate brief. And, further assume that in granting the motion, the trial court did not disclose the ground upon which it relied. In that situation, the court could have conceivably relied upon ground C. Yet, it could have also found grounds A and/or B dispositive. For this reason, logic would require the party complaining of the judgment to negate the applicability of A and B before it could be said that C somehow influenced the outcome. Until this is done, we can hardly say that C tainted the decision. Finally, this is no different than the burden already imposed upon a non-movant on appeal. It is correctly his obligation to show why none of the grounds upon which the trial court could have acted are legitimate when several grounds are alleged but none are mentioned by the court as controlling. See Miller v. Galveston/Houston Diocese, 911 S.W.2d 897, 899 (Tex.App.--Amarillo 1995, no writ) (holding this to be the appropriate standard of review when the court's order is silent about the ground on which it relied).

2. Application of Law

At bar, IBP sought judgment upon the grounds of waiver, estoppel, release, ratification, election of remedies, the absence of causation, and the existence of a legitimate reason for termination. Furthermore, each was expressly mentioned in its motion for summary judgment. Whether the court acted upon these or others which may have been stated elsewhere is unknown for the judgment was general in nature. ¹ Additionally, Martinez does not attempt to prove that the court found some unmentioned ground dispositive. Rather, she simply argues that because the court said it considered IBP's motion, Martinez's response thereto, IBP's reply to that response, the summary judgment proof, objections to summary judgment proof, and argument of counsel, "the trial court improperly considered such [unmentioned] grounds [which] ... hopelessly tainted" the proceedings. Under these circumstances, we are unable to say that the directives in Rule 166a(c), Sysco, or McConnell were violated. Nor can we say that the trial court acted upon a ground asserted somewhere other than IBP's motion for summary judgment.

Points Two and Four

In her second point, Martinez contends that the trial court erred in granting summary judgment upon the claim of negligence because the waiver she signed was void as a matter of law. So too was it subject to avoidance because she supposedly signed it while under duress, as she explains in point four. We overrule both points.

As illustrated under point one, IBP says that it was entitled to summary judgment because Martinez had contractually relinquished her right to sue under the common law. Furthermore, the summary judgment grounds encapsulating that argument included waiver, release, election of remedies, ratification, and estoppel. Since the court granted summary judgment it undoubtedly relied upon one or more of those defenses. But, because the particular defense or defenses utilized by the court went unmentioned, Martinez now must rebut each one. Miller v. Galveston/Houston Diocese, 911 S.W.2d at 899. And, her attempt to do so below was twofold, as it is here. First, she suggests that none of the defenses were applicable because their foundation, the Acceptance and Waiver form, violated public policy and, therefore, was void. Then she posits that if not void as against public policy, it was nevertheless avoidable since she signed it under duress. We now address each contention.

1. Void Contract

Martinez argues that public policy bars a non-subscribing employer from limiting its liability for injuries suffered by its employee. That this is so is allegedly illustrated by § 406.035 of the Texas Labor Code and the cases of Hazelwood v. Mandrell Indus. Co., Ltd., 596 S.W.2d 204 (Tex.Civ.App.--Houston [1st Dist.] 1980, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Texas Health Enterpr., Inc. v. Kirkgard, 882 S.W.2d 630 (Tex.App.--Beaumont 1994,...