Martinez v. Johnson

• Decision Date: 15 May 2015
• Docket Number: No. EP–14–CV–00216–DCG.,EP–14–CV–00216–DCG.
• Parties: Edwing MARTINEZ, Plaintiff, v. Jeh JOHNSON, Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security; Alejandro Mayorkas, Director USCIS; James B. Comey, FBI Director; Raymond Adams, El Paso Field Office Director; and Does 1–10, Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Western District of Texas

104 F.Supp.3d 835

Edwing MARTINEZ, Plaintiff,

v.Jeh JOHNSON, Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security; Alejandro Mayorkas, Director USCIS; James B. Comey, FBI Director; Raymond Adams, El Paso Field Office Director; and Does 1–10, Defendants.

No. EP–14–CV–00216–DCG.

United States District Court, W.D. Texas, El Paso Division.

Signed May 15, 2015.

Felipe D.J. Millan, Felipe D.J. Millan, P.C., El Paso, TX, for Plaintiff.

Gary L. Anderson, Assistant United States Attorney, San Antonio, TX, for Defendants.

ORDER DENYING DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO DISMISS

DAVID C. GUADERRAMA, District Judge.

Presently before the Court is Defendants Jeh Johnson, Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security; Alejandro Mayorkas, Director USCIS; James B. Comey, FBI Director; Raymond Adams, El Paso Field Office Director; and Does 1–10's (collectively “Defendants”) “Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff's Complaint” (“Motion”) (ECF No. 25), filed on March 6, 2015. Plaintiff Edwing Martinez (“Plaintiff”) filed a Response (ECF No. 27) on May 1, 2015. After due consideration of the Motion, the Response, the record, and the applicable law, the Court enters the following Order.

I. BACKGROUND

Plaintiff filed his Complaint on June 10, 2014, pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1447(b), “to compel the Defendants to adjudicate the application by Plaintiff for naturalization.” Compl. 1, ECF No. 1. Plaintiff, who is a Lawful Permanent Resident, filed an application for naturalization with the United States Citizenship and Immigration Services (“USCIS” or “the agency”) on November 13, 2012. Compl. 2–3; Answer 3, ECF No. 18. USCIS conducted Plaintiff's naturalization interview on November 5, 2013. SeeCompl. 3; Mot. 1. Because USCIS had not made a determination regarding his application, Plaintiff initiated this action on June 10, 2014. Compl. 3. On June 19, 2014, the agency denied Plaintiff's application. SeeMot. 1, Ex. A.; Resp. 6. Defendants filed an Answer on November 10, 2014, and the instant Motion on March 6, 2015. The Motion challenges the Court's subject matter jurisdiction and seeks dismissal of the Complaint for failure to state claim upon which relief can be granted. SeeMot. 1.

II. DISCUSSION

A. Legal Standards

1. Subject Matter Jurisdiction

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1)allows a defendant to seek dismissal of an action for lack of subject matter jurisdiction over a plaintiff's claims. SeeFed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(1); see alsoFed.R.Civ.P. 12(h)(3). “Lack of subject matter jurisdiction may be found in any one of three instances: (1) the complaint alone; (2) the complaint supplemented by undisputed facts evidenced in the record; or (3) the complaint supplemented by undisputed facts plus the court's resolution of disputed facts.” Ramming v. United States,281 F.3d 158, 161 (5th Cir.2001)(per curiam) (citing Barrera–Montenegro v. United States,74 F.3d 657, 659 (5th Cir.1996)).

2. Failure to State a Claim upon which Relief Can Be Granted

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)allows a defendant to seek dismissal of an action for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. SeeFed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6). When faced with a Rule 12(b)(6)motion, a court must determine whether the plaintiff has asserted a legally sufficient claim for relief. A viable complaint must include “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face” to survive a Rule 12(b)(6)motion. See Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly,550 U.S. 544, 570, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007). To meet this “facial plausibility” standard, a plaintiff must “plead[ ] factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal,556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009)(citing Twombly,550 U.S. at 556, 127 S.Ct. 1955). A court generally accepts well-pleaded facts as true and construes the complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. See Gines v. D.R. Horton, Inc.,699 F.3d 812, 816 (5th Cir.2012)(citation omitted). But a court does not accept as true “conclusory allegations, unwarranted factual inferences, or legal conclusions.” Ferrer v. Chevron Corp.,484 F.3d 776, 780 (5th Cir.2007)(citation omitted). Factual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level on the assumption that all the allegations in the complaint are true (even if doubtful in fact). Twombly,550 U.S. at 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955(citations omitted). Courts must consider the complaint in its entirety, documents incorporated into the complaint by reference, and matters of which a court may take judicial notice. Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd.,551 U.S. 308, 322, 127 S.Ct. 2499, 168 L.Ed.2d 179 (2007).

3. Summary Judgment

Summary judgment is appropriate when “the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a). “A genuine dispute of fact exists when evidence is sufficient for a reasonable jury to return a verdict for the non-moving party, and a fact is material if it might affect the outcome of the suit.” Willis v. Cleco Corp.,749 F.3d 314, 317 (5th Cir.2014)(citation and internal quotation marks omitted). “A party seeking summary judgment always bears the initial responsibility of informing the district court of the basis for its motion, and identifying those portions of the record which it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact.” EEOC v. LHC Group, Inc.,773 F.3d 688, 694 (5th Cir.2014)(quoting Celotex Corp. v. Catrett,477 U.S. 317, 323, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986)). If the moving party meets this initial burden, “the onus shifts to ‘the nonmoving party to go beyond the pleadings and by her own affidavits, or by the depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, designate specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.’ ” Id.(quoting Celotex Corp.,477 U.S. at 324, 106 S.Ct. 2548). The Court must draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the nonmoving party. Id.(quoting Turner v. Baylor Richardson Med. Ctr.,476 F.3d 337, 343 (5th Cir.2007)).

B. Mootness

Defendants argue that this Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction because the case is moot. SeeMot. 5. “Generally, the mootness inquiry centers upon the concern that only live cases or controversies be decided by our courts.” In re Matter of Manges,29 F.3d 1034, 1038 (5th Cir.1994)(citations omitted). “Mootness can occur in two ways: (1) when the issues presented are no longer live, and (2) when the parties lack a legally cognizable interest in the outcome.” Eddins v. Excelsior Indep. Sch. Dist.,88 F.Supp.2d 695, 701 (E.D.Tex.2000)(citing Powell v. McCormack,395 U.S. 486, 496, 89 S.Ct. 1944, 23 L.Ed.2d 491 (1969)). Here, Defendants claim that the first circumstance applies, because “USCIS has acted on Plaintiff's naturalization application.” SeeMot. 5. The agency, however, acted on Plaintiff's naturalization application on June 19, 2014, after Plaintiff initiated this action. As discussed below, by that date, the agency no longer had jurisdiction over Plaintiff's naturalization application, which makes USCIS' determination void as ultra vires. See Agarwal v. Napolitano,663 F.Supp.2d 528, 532–34 (W.D.Tex.2009)(voiding as ultra viresUSCIS' adjudication of naturalization applications issued during the pendency of a § 1447(b)action).

Section 1447(b)provides that

[i]f there is a failure to make a determination under section 1446 of this title before the end of the 120–day period after the date on which the examination is conducted under such section, the applicant may apply to the United States district court for the district in which the applicant resides for a hearing on the matter. Such court has jurisdiction over the matter and may either determine the matter or remand the matter, with appropriate instructions, to the Service to determine the matter.

8 U.S.C. § 1447(b). Section 1447(b)plainly grants the Court jurisdiction over a naturalization application that has languished within the agency for more than 120 days either “to determine the matter or remand the matter, with appropriate instructions, to [USCIS] to determine the matter.” Id.

Whether USCIS retains concurrent jurisdiction over an applicant's naturalization application during the pendency of § 1447(b)action is another matter. Although the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals has not decided the issue, three other courts of appeals have found that the agency retains no such jurisdiction. See Bustamante v. Napolitano,582 F.3d 403, 404 (2d Cir.2009)(“We conclude that only the district court has jurisdiction to determine a naturalization application when, after USCIS has failed to adjudicate the application within 120 days of the initial examination, the applicant files a Section 1447(b)action.”); Etape v. Chertoff,497 F.3d 379, 381 (4th Cir.2007)(holding that “ § 1447(b)vests exclusive jurisdiction in the district court, depriving [USCIS] of jurisdiction to adjudicate an application unless instructed to do so by the district court”); United States v. Hovsepian,359 F.3d 1144, 1159 (9th Cir.2004)(en banc) (“Based on the text of § 1447(b), the context of related statutory provisions, and Congress' policy objectives, we hold that the district court ha [s] exclusive jurisdiction over [the] naturalization applications.”). Similarly, at least three district courts within this Circuit and numerous courts around the country agree with this conclusion. See Agarwal,663 F.Supp.2d at 532–34(collecting cases); Castro v. Napolitano,No. 3:09–cv–39 (W.D.Tex. Sept. 16, 2009); Dimopoulos v. Blakeway,No. 2:07–cv–127, 2007 WL 922224 (S.D.Tex. Mar. 23, 2007).

The Court finds these authorities persuasive and holds that § 1447(b)vests exclusive jurisdiction in district courts, depriving USCIS of jurisdiction to adjudicate an application for naturalization once an applicant files a § 1447(b)action. Because the agency did not have jurisdiction...