Martinez v. Johnson

• Citation: 255 F.3d 229
• Decision Date: 22 June 2001
• Docket Number: No. 00-40813,00-40813
• Parties: (5th Cir. 2001) JOHNNY JOE MARTINEZ, Petitioner - Appellant v. GARY L JOHNSON, DIRECTOR, TEXAS DEPARTMENT OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE, INSTITUTIONAL DIVISION, Respondent - Appellee
• Court: United States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (5th Circuit)

Page 229

255 F.3d 229 (5th Cir. 2001)

JOHNNY JOE MARTINEZ, Petitioner - Appellant v. GARY L JOHNSON, DIRECTOR, TEXAS DEPARTMENT OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE, INSTITUTIONAL DIVISION, Respondent - Appellee

No. 00-40813

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS, FIFTH CIRCUIT

June 22, 2001

REVISED JULY 20, 2001

[Copyrighted Material Omitted] Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas.

Before KING, Chief Judge, and JONES and STEWART, Circuit Judges.

KING, Chief Judge:

Petitioner-Appellant Johnny Joe Martinez, a Texas death-row inmate, appeals the district court's denial of his 28 U.S.C. § 2254 petition challenging his conviction and death sentence. For the following reasons, we AFFIRM.

I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND

On July 15, 1993, nineteen-year-old Johnny Joe Martinez robbed a convenience store in Corpus Christi, Texas and murdered Clay Peterson, a college student working alone at the store. According to the facts developed at trial, at approximately 3:00 a.m., Martinez drove to the 7-Eleven convenience store with Ernest Wortmann,¹ an individual Martinez had met earlier that evening at a nightclub. Martinez testified to having consumed twelve to thirteen alcoholic drinks during an evening spent frequenting nightclubs. Martinez and Wortmann had left the last nightclub near closing time, planning to meet friends at a local park. As they were driving, Wortmann's car began overheating.

Because of this car trouble, they pulled into the 7-Eleven parking lot. Martinez entered the convenience store and asked Peterson where the restroom was located. After using the restroom, Martinez proceeded to shoplift several items from the store. Martinez exited the store and rejoined Wortmann. Martinez testified that as they waited for the car to cool down, Wortmann told Martinez that he used drugs, needed money, and was recently out of jail for robbing convenience stores. Martinez testified that he jokingly suggested to Wortmann that Wortmann should rob the 7-Eleven. Martinez testified that the two men then discussed how easy it would be to rob the store.

At approximately 3:20 a.m., Martinez re-entered the store. The security camera videotape shows Martinez asking Peterson for something from the store. As Peterson turned to retrieve the item, Martinez grabbed him from behind and put a small pocket knife to his throat. Martinez then forced Peterson around to the cash register. Peterson opened the cash register and allowed Martinez to remove the money. Martinez then stabbed Peterson in the neck once or twice, and Peterson fell face first on the floor. When Peterson tried to get up, Martinez stabbed him several more times in the back. The evidence demonstrated that Peterson was stabbed eight times. In addition, the medical examiner testified that Peterson suffered several scratches on his neck and defensive wounds to his hands.

After committing the crime, Martinez walked to a nearby beach. He testified that he fell to his knees and cried. Fifteen minutes after the murder, Martinez called 911 from a nearby motel, told the police dispatcher that he had stabbed the clerk at the convenience store, and announced that he would wait until police arrived. He asked the dispatcher what had happened to the man he had stabbed. Motel security testified that Martinez appeared tired and slightly intoxicated. The arresting officer testified, however, that Martinez did not appear to be under the influence of alcohol. Upon the officers' arrival, Martinez surrendered without resistence. He cooperated with the officers as they tried to find the murder weapon, which had been thrown away after the murder. The arresting officer described Martinez as cooperative and concerned about what had happened. In the police car, Martinez vomited. On the way to the station, Martinez asked whether he had killed the store clerk.

At the police station, Martinez confessed to killing Clay Peterson. The officer who interviewed Martinez described his demeanor as "upset" and "remorseful." The officer noted that Martinez did smell of alcohol, but he did not believe that Martinez was intoxicated. Martinez tried to explain his actions, fabricating stories and describing the murder in a manner that would later prove untrue.²

Martinez testified at the guilt-innocence phase of trial. He admitted that there was no justification for what he did. He insisted that he only intended to scare the clerk with the knife and that he could not remember all of his actions, including the stabbing. When asked on cross-examination why he stabbed the deceased, Martinez testified "I don't know. That's a question I will never be able to answer." He expressed bewilderment and remorse for his violent act. Based on the overwhelming evidence, including his confession and the security camera videotape, Martinez was found guilty of capital murder on January 26, 1994.

At the punishment phase of trial, the State presented no evidence, resting on the facts introduced at the guilt-innocence phase. The defense called several witnesses to demonstrate that Martinez had a non-violent disposition. The defense introduced testimony from Donna DeLeon, who supervised Martinez when he worked with mentally retarded children at a local hospital. DeLeon testified that Martinez was good with the residents and did not have a violent character. Verna D. Rodriguez, a friend who had known Martinez for most of his life, testified that she had never seen him behave violently and that she was surprised that he had committed the offense. Rodriguez also provided information that, despite having grown up in a violent neighborhood marked by poverty and abuse, Martinez had never acted violently. David Martinez, the petitioner's oldest brother, testified that their natural father had not stayed with the family and that their stepfather, Jesus Chavera, had been murdered. David Martinez testified that he had never known the petitioner to be involved with any criminal activity and that he had never known the petitioner to be violent except for a single school fight in junior high school. David Martinez testified that he trusted petitioner to care for his children and that there was nothing in the petitioner's past that would have indicated the possibility of a violent act. Frances B. Martinez, the woman who helped raise the petitioner, testified that he was "a good son," that she was surprised that he had been arrested, and that there was nothing in his past that would have indicated the possibility of a violent act. Finally, Esequiel Rodriguez, the Classification Coordinator and Counselor for the Nueces County Jail, testified that Martinez had adapted well to prison life and displayed no serious behavior problems.

The State presented no rebuttal case. After consideration of the special issues in Subsections 2(b) and 2(e) of Article 37.071 set forth in the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure,³ the jury answered the future dangerousness special issue (Subsection 2(b)) in the affirmative, and the mitigation special issue (Subsection 2(e)) in the negative. As a result of these answers, the trial judge automatically sentenced Martinez to death. See Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 37.071, § 2(g) ("If the jury returns an affirmative finding on each issue submitted under Subsection (b) of this article and a negative finding on an issue submitted under Subsection (e) of this article, the court shall sentence the defendant to death.").

II. PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

A. State Court Proceedings

On direct appeal to the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals ("CCA"), Martinez was again represented by trial counsel. Martinez raised six claims, including a primary challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence to support the jury's answer of "yes" to the future dangerousness special issue. On May 22, 1996, the CCA affirmed the conviction and death sentence. See Martinez v. State, 924 S.W.2d 693 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996).⁴ The CCA methodically analyzed the relevant precedent regarding future dangerousness and determined that "a rational jury could have determined beyond a reasonable doubt that appellant would be a continuing threat to society." Id. at 698. Four judges dissented from the affirmance of the death penalty, arguing that the CCA had found such evidence insufficient to support a finding of future dangerousness in cases in which the facts were more aggravated than the facts of the instant offense. See id. at 699 (Baird, J., dissenting in part); id. at 706 (Maloney, J., dissenting in part).

On March 13, 1997, pursuant to Article 11.071 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure, the CCA appointed Nathaniel Rhodes to represent Martinez in his state habeas corpus proceeding. Rhodes had not previously handled a state habeas corpus petition. Rhodes first filed a skeletal preliminary Application for a Writ of Habeas Corpus. This application contained boilerplate claims of generic constitutional error and was submitted in an effort to toll statutes of limitation that might arise as a result of a change in federal habeas corpus law.

On September 8, 1997, Rhodes filed Martinez's Amended Original Application for Habeas Corpus. The Amended Application was only five and one-half pages long and raised four claims. Two claims were repetitive of arguments previously rejected on direct appeal.⁵ The remaining two claims asserted record-based jury selection errors, but did not explain why these claims could not have been raised on direct appeal. In addition, pursuant to Article 11.071, § 8(b), Rhodes submitted proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law. These findings were two pages long, lacked citations to the record, and contained no case authority. The State submitted proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law with citations and legal authority; these findings were adopted by the trial court.

On April 29, 1998, pursuant to Article 11.071, § 9(f), the CCA denied relief. One judge dissented, stating:

Applicant is represented by counsel...