Martinez v. Kurdziel

Decision Date07 July 1992
Docket NumberNo. 91-399-M,91-399-M
Citation612 A.2d 669
PartiesMaryann G. MARTINEZ et al. v. Genevieve S. KURDZIEL et al. P.
CourtRhode Island Supreme Court
OPINION

FAY, Chief Justice.

This is a petition for certiorari seeking to review a decision of the Superior Court granting the motions in limine of Genevieve S. Kurdziel and the town of Westerly (respondents) seeking to prevent Maryann G. Martinez and Louis Martinez (petitioners) from entering into evidence medical affidavits from out-of-state physicians and health-care providers pursuant to G.L.1956 (1985 Reenactment) § 9-19-27, as amended by P.L.1989, ch. 290, § 1. The trial justice granted the motions in limine because he found § 9-19-27 to be an unconstitutional statute and considered it unfair to require the respondents to go out of state to depose the witnesses. The petitioners assert that the trial justice erred in finding § 9-19-27 unconstitutional and therefore improperly excluded the affidavits and the opinions contained in the hospital records. We conclude that § 9-19-27 is a constitutional statute and is consistent with the rationale underlying the Rhode Island Rules of Evidence and other evidentiary standards. The trial justice must weigh the potential harm to the petitioners in furnishing necessary proof if the evidence is excluded against the hardship to the respondents if the evidence is admitted, as well as the possible availability of this evidence from other means, in deciding whether to admit the out-of-state medical affidavits. We therefore grant the petition for certiorari and vacate the decision of the trial court. We remand the case to the trial court to conduct the balancing test in ruling on the respondents' motions in limine in which they object to each of the petitioners' affidavits and accompanying medical records. The relevant facts are as follows.

The petitioners are plaintiffs in a civil action presently pending in Superior Court in Washington County arising out of the slip and fall of petitioner Maryann G. Martinez (Mrs. Martinez) on January 19, 1983, in a metered parking lot owned and operated by the town of Westerly. They alleged that the town was negligent in failing to maintain the parking lot and in failing to notify patrons of the slippery conditions, which negligence thereby became the proximate cause of Mrs. Martinez's fall. Mrs. Martinez alleges that she sustained numerous serious and permanent injuries to her arm, back, neck, spinal column, and nervous system, which injuries resulted in numerous hospitalizations and surgeries, leaving her permanently crippled and disabled.

Mrs. Martinez, a resident of Charlestown, Rhode Island, received the greater part of her medical care from physicians in Connecticut and at Connecticut hospitals. The petitioners filed a complaint in the Superior Court in Washington County on May 7, 1985. Mrs. Martinez sought to recover for her injuries resulting from respondents' negligence and for the pain and suffering from the injuries, the loss of earning capacity, and the loss of wages she has suffered and will continue to suffer in the future. Louis Martinez (Mr. Martinez) sought to recover for his loss of consortium because of the town's negligence and the resulting injuries to his wife. The petitioners' counsel sought to introduce the medical affidavits of the health-care providers at trial pursuant to § 9-19-27, the statutory provision for introducing out-of-state medical records and affidavits. The affidavits and records from the doctors purportedly contain their opinions of Mrs. Martinez's condition. The affidavits and records from the hospital record keepers verify hospital bills and records. The only affidavits evidenced in the record that were filed with the trial court come from these hospital record keepers, stating that the bills and/or records are true and accurate copies. On February 15 and March 7, 1991, respondents filed motions in limine and objections to the medical affidavits on February 29, March 6, and March 7, 1991, to prevent introduction at trial of those medical affidavits from hospitals, doctors, and health-care providers. The respondents asserted that § 9-19-27 was unconstitutional because the persons or entities executing the affidavits are nonresidents and not within the subpoena power of the Superior Court, thereby impermissibly denying respondents their right to cross-examination by allowing the affidavits into evidence for substantive purposes.

The Superior Court heard the motions in limine and on March 21, 1991, held that the medical affidavits of the physicians were inadmissible because § 9-19-27 was unconstitutional. Further, the trial justice mandated that if the hospital records contained opinions, those opinions had to be excised from those records in order for them to be admissible. By written order dated May 13, 1991, the trial justice stated in response to both pending motions in limine:

"To require a defendant to go to another state to conduct depositions of the plaintiff's doctors because the plaintiff will not produce the doctors and instead intends to introduce their affidavits, the Court feels is manifestly unjust and violates fundamental fairness, due process and equal protection. The defendant's motion in limine as it relates to the introduction of medical affidavits of the doctors is granted."

The petitioners subsequently filed a petition for writ of certiorari to review the trial court's decision, which petition was granted on September 13, 1991.

In this court petitioners assert that the trial justice erred in finding § 9-19-27 unconstitutional and granting respondents' motions in limine on this basis because, they contend, there is no constitutional right to cross-examination in a civil action, § 9-19-27 does not prevent cross-examination, and § 9-19-27 is consistent with other evidentiary rules. The respondents argue that the motions in limine were properly granted because admitting the out-of-state affidavits would violate their common-law right of cross-examination. Further, respondents assert that admission of out-of-state affidavits would be unconstitutional because it would violate principles of due process, fundamental fairness, and separation of powers. The respondents contend that admitting this evidence would also lead to widespread abuse because such admission would enable a plaintiff to go elsewhere purposely in order to obtain medical care and treatment and present the unchallenged opinion evidence from that treatment. Last, respondents assert that § 9-19-27 guarantees the opposing party the right to cross-examine the out-of-state affiant.

Section 9-19-27 provides for the introduction of opinion evidence through medical affidavits and records, expressly stating:

"(a) In any proceeding commenced in any court * * * an itemized bill and reports, whether originating within this state or any other state, including hospital medical records, relating to medical, dental, hospital services, prescriptions * * * and/or any report of any examination of said injured person, including, but not limited to, hospital medical records subscribed and sworn to under the penalties of perjury by the physician, dentist or authorized agent of the hospital rendering such services or by the pharmacist * * * shall be admissible as evidence of the fair and reasonable charge for such services and/or the necessity of such services or treatment, the diagnosis of said physician * * * the prognosis of such physician * * * the opinion of such physician * * * as to proximate cause of the condition so diagnosed, the opinion of such physician * * * as to disability or incapacity, if any, proximately resulting from the condition so diagnosed * * *. Nothing contained in this section shall be construed to limit the right of any party to the action to summon or depose, at his or her own expense such physician, dentist, pharmacist * * * or agent of such hospital for the purpose of cross examination with respect to such bill, record and report or to rebut the contents thereof, or for any other purpose, nor to limit the right of any party to the action to summon or depose any other person to testify in respect to such bill, record and/or report or for any other purpose."

This statute is not limited solely to in-state care but specifically encompasses the situation in which evidence is presented from an out-of-state health-care provider by allowing a party the opportunity to depose that witness at his or her own expense. Therefore, this statute has fashioned a specific exception to the hearsay rule for medical affidavits and records and the opinions contained therein.

The Rhode Island Rules of Evidence adopted in 1987 were specifically enacted to supersede any inconsistent statutory or case law in effect at the time of the adoption of the rules. Section 9-19-42, as enacted by P.L.1987, ch. 381, § 1. Rules 803 and 804 of the Rhode Island Rules of Evidence provide exceptions to the hearsay rule. Rule 803(24) is the catchall provision when the unavailability of a witness is not required, and Rule 804(b)(5), the catchall provision when the witness is unavailable according to specific enumerated categories.

Section 9-19-27 is therefore a provision that is similarly applicable to the general provision of Rule 804(b)(5) and should be similarly construed and applied. The exceptions express the considerations utilized by the trial justice in determining whether to admit the offered evidence. Rule 804(b)(5) provides:

"Other Exceptions. A statement not specifically covered by any of the foregoing exceptions but having equivalent circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness, if the court determines that (A) the statement is offered as evidence of a material fact; (B)...

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7 cases
  • State v. Brown
    • United States
    • Rhode Island Supreme Court
    • April 11, 2014
    ...the hearsay rule. The defendant asserted Rule 804(b)(5) in this case because Benitez was an unavailable witness. See Martinez v. Kurdziel, 612 A.2d 669, 673–74 (R.I.1992) (“Rule 803(24) is the catchall provision when the unavailability of a witness is not required, and Rule 804(b)(5), the c......
  • Gorostieta v. Parkinson
    • United States
    • Utah Supreme Court
    • December 15, 2000
    ...Cty. Rptr. LEXIS 11, **17 (affirming admission of bills where physician testified as to reasonableness and necessity); Martinez v. Kurdziel, 612 A.2d 669, 676 (R.I.1992) (holding that statute does not remove plaintiff's burden of proving causation and reasonableness); Castillo v. Am. Garmen......
  • S. Cnty. Post & Beam, Inc. v. McMahon
    • United States
    • Rhode Island Supreme Court
    • June 5, 2015
  • Boscia v. Sharples
    • United States
    • Rhode Island Supreme Court
    • November 12, 2004
    ...provides a mechanism for admission of opinion evidence through documentation, without the need for expert testimony. Martinez v. Kurdziel, 612 A.2d 669, 673 (R.I.1992). The statute protects the opponents of such evidence by requiring advance notice. Id. at 674. The defendants admit that the......
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