Martinez v. Martinez
| Decision Date | 19 April 1988 |
| Docket Number | No. 860159-CA,860159-CA |
| Citation | 754 P.2d 69 |
| Parties | Karen C. MARTINEZ, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. Jess M. MARTINEZ, Defendant and Respondent. |
| Court | Utah Court of Appeals |
Neil C. Crist (argued), for Hansen, Crist & Spratley, Bountiful, for plaintiff and appellant.
Yasemin M. Salahor, Paul H. Liapis, Kent M. Kasting (argued), Salt Lake City, for defendant and respondent.
Before JACKSON, BILLINGS and DAVIDSON, JJ.
Plaintiff appeals from a decree of divorce entered by the Second District Court. We affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand.
The parties were married on June 22, 1968; subsequently, three children were born. At the time of marriage, both plaintiff and defendant were high school graduates and defendant was serving as an enlisted man in the U.S. Army. After defendant's discharge from the service, he accepted employment at Hill Air Force Base, Utah where he worked as an instrument repair mechanic with an annual gross salary of approximately $10,000.00. Defendant began his higher education in 1970. Defendant testified the parties discussed his pursuit of a degree and that plaintiff thought it was a "good idea" but that she "wasn't terribly in favor of it" because it would be time consuming. Plaintiff testified she was in favor of the decision because the family would "have a better future." Defendant completed his undergraduate program five and one-half years later. During this phase of his education, defendant supported the family on his wages and G.I. Bill benefits. Plaintiff gave birth to children in 1970, 1971, and 1975.
While an undergraduate, defendant decided to apply to medical school. The parties agree that defendant's application to medical school threatened their marriage. Plaintiff was concerned that defendant's lack of employment during four years would be financially detrimental to the family and that medical school would severely limit defendant's ability to "spend much time" with the children and plaintiff. Seeing that defendant was adamant, plaintiff agreed to "stick by him" during the next four years believing that, as a result of their mutual sacrifices, the family would eventually enjoy a higher standard of living.
Defendant entered medical school in 1977 and graduated in 1981. Family support was derived from student loans, savings, the remainder of defendant's G.I. Bill entitlement, $7,000.00 from defendant's mother's estate, and income from plaintiff's part-time employment.
Upon completion of medical school, defendant accepted an internship in Pennsylvania. Plaintiff reluctantly left Utah. The family's first residence in Pennsylvania was in an isolated location with no telephone and no playmates for the children. The family then rented a home in a larger town and plaintiff sought employment to supplement defendant's salary as an intern. Plaintiff testified that she found a position at a fast food restaurant but defendant did not want her to work there because it would be embarrassing. Because of the friction between the parties and defendant's admitted relationship with another woman, plaintiff requested they seek marital counseling but defendant refused. Because of plaintiff's lack of prospects for suitable employment in Pennsylvania and the marital discord, plaintiff and the children returned to the family home in Utah to wait for defendant to finish his medical training. Although plaintiff understood defendant intended to practice medicine in Utah, defendant completed his training and accepted employment in Pennsylvania.
Plaintiff filed a verified complaint for divorce on February 15, 1983. In a stipulation and separation agreement, signed by the parties and filed with the court on July 29, 1983, plaintiff agreed defendant could claim federal tax exemptions for two of the children while she retained the exemption for the third child. The settlement agreement also recognized the need to "make appropriate adjustments" in the support agreement in the event of future changes in financial circumstances.
After plaintiff hired new counsel, she filed a verified amended complaint in November 1983, in which the distribution of the tax exemptions remained the same. On May 9, 1985, however, plaintiff filed a motion for leave to amend the complaint which was subsequently granted. This amendment listed defendant's salary as $100,000.00 per annum and requested that the child support and alimony awards reflect the significant increase in defendant's income. Plaintiff requested attorney fees and costs which would reflect the current state of the litigation as opposed to that anticipated in 1983. Plaintiff also requested the trial court to strike the previously proposed distribution of federal tax exemptions for the children.
Trial to the court was held on May 31, 1985. The decree of divorce awarded custody of the children to plaintiff subject to reasonable visitation. Plaintiff received $300.00 per month per child in child support subject to an abatement of $100.00 per month per child in the event that a child should live with defendant for an extended period. The distribution of tax exemptions was as initially agreed in the stipulation and separation settlement. Alimony was awarded in the amount of $400.00 per month for a period of five years being nonterminable for a period of three years even if plaintiff remarried. Plaintiff was awarded attorney fees in the amount of $2,500.00. Plaintiff was also awarded the home subject to a mortgage and an equitable lien in favor of defendant for the sum of $17,528.00 payable upon the occurrence of enumerated, future contingencies. The award of the home to plaintiff necessitated that she continue to make monthly mortgage payments of $309.00.
Plaintiff presents the following issues for review: (1) did the award to defendant of the two tax exemptions violate federal law; (2) were the awards of attorney fees, child support, and alimony so inadequate as to constitute an abuse of discretion; and (3) is defendant's medical degree marital property subject to division?
Plaintiff contends the distribution of state and federal income tax exemptions for two of the children to defendant violates the Supremacy Clause of the U.S. Constitution in light of the 1984 Tax Reform Act and its effect on 26 U.S.C. § 152(e) (1988). 1
Subsection 152(e)(1) describes the normal situation where a custodial parent claims the tax exemption for a child. An exception is provided in subsection 152(e)(4)(A). The noncustodial parent may claim the exemption when there is a qualified pre-1985 instrument between the parents which states that the noncustodial parent shall be entitled to the exemption for the child and that parent provides at least $600.00 yearly for the child's support. The definition of a qualified pre-1985 instrument is stated in subsection 152(e)(4)(B) as:
(ii) which on such date contains the provision described in subparagraph (A)(i), and
(iii) which is not modified on or after such date in a modification which expressly provides that this paragraph shall not apply to such decree or agreement.
The parties stipulated to the distribution of the tax exemptions for the children in a separation agreement filed with the court in 1983. The distribution was incorporated in the verified amended complaint also filed that year. Subparagraphs (i) and (ii) of subsection 152(e)(4)(B) are satisfied by the 1983 filings. There was no written modification prior to January 1, 1985, which expressly revoked the distribution of tax exemptions during the period the stipulation and separation agreement was in effect. Therefore, defendant was entitled to the two exemptions as stipulated prior to the entry of the decree of divorce.
However, plaintiff's amended complaint in 1985 put the distribution of tax exemptions at issue in the divorce proceeding. The provisions of the separation agreement were no longer effective. Plaintiff requested the tax exemptions for all three children but the trial court's order did not honor that request. This result is contrary to the general provisions of section 152(e). Any argument that the stipulation and separation agreement qualifies as a pre-1985 instrument, where plaintiff willingly relinquishes her right to the exemptions under federal law, neglects plaintiff's rejection of its terms in the post-divorce period. By amending her complaint, plaintiff modified and affirmatively rejected the pre-divorce distribution. Plaintiff is entitled to the tax exemptions for all of the children in view of the award of custody to her and the failure of defendant to establish any exception to the general rule stated above.
Plaintiff argues the trial court abused its discretion in awarding attorney fees of only $2,500.00 when she asked for $7,871.00. Plaintiff clearly demonstrated a need for assistance. The court recognized that need by making the award. However, the court considered a written statement of attorney fees as a basis for the award. Extensive fees were generated by interest and preparation of the expert testimony offered to support the valuation of the medical degree. That argument was rejected by the lower court. We find no abuse of discretion in the award.
Because defendant did not cross appeal on this issue, we do not consider whether there was sufficient evidence presented to the trial court to justify any award of attorney fees. Newmeyer v. Newmeyer, 745 P.2d 1276 (Utah 1987).
Utah Code Ann. §§ 78-45-3,-4 (1987) establish the obligation of both parents to support their children and "[a] child's right to that support is paramount." Woodward v. Woodward, 709 P.2d 393, 394 (Utah 1985). The Utah Supreme Court continu...
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