Martinez v. Nw. Mem'l Healthcare
| Decision Date | 07 October 2021 |
| Docket Number | 19-cv-04923 |
| Parties | LIDIA MARTINEZ, Plaintiff, v. NORTHWESTERN MEMORIAL HEALTHCARE, Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Northern District of Illinois |
To win a claim of race-based employment discrimination under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1965, an employee must establish both that she suffered an adverse action by her employer and that such action was “because of” the employee's race. If the employee fails to establish either of those conditions, her claim must fail. It follows from this binary framework that merely firing or retaliating against an employee-without proof that racial animus motivated that conduct-cannot lead to liability under Title VII.
Plaintiff Lidia Martinez worked at Defendant Northwestern Memorial Hospital until Northwestern fired her. What caused Northwestern to give Martinez the proverbial pink slip is disputed. Northwestern argues that it reasonably believed Martinez was stealing from patients in violation of the Hospital's Rules for Personal Conduct. (Dkt. 57 at 1-2 6-8.) Martinez counters that the Hospital terminated her based on her race and as retaliation for Martinez's having complained about race-based discrimination. (Dkt. 104 at 4.) In this lawsuit, Martinez sets forth a six-count complaint: termination based on race (Count I); retaliation for complaints regarding race (Count II); harassment based on race (Count III); wrongful termination in violation of Illinois public policy (Count IV); breach of contract (Count V); and fraudulent or negligent misrepresentation Count VI). (See generally Dkt. 6.)[1]
Martinez's claims fail as a matter of law. As explained below, Martinez has neither established a prima facie case of race discrimination, nor has she identified sufficient facts in the record to show that she suffered race-based retaliation harassment, or a hostile work environment during her employment. Martinez also cannot show sufficient evidence of a public policy that Northwestern violated in firing her or that Northwestern violated the terms of any written or oral employment contract. Finally, Martinez's fraudulent misrepresentation claim is both inadequately pleaded and bereft of facts sufficient to show a genuine, material issue for which a trial is needed. Accordingly, Northwestern is entitled to summary judgment on all counts.
Northwestern Hospital engaged Lidia Martinez as a full-time employee in November 2015. (Dkt. 56 ¶ 7.) Manager Tina Reagan hired Martinez for an open Patient Registration Representative position on the overnight shift. (Id. ¶¶ 14-15.) Martinez's job responsibilities included registering patients, collecting patients' insurance and payment information, and collecting payments for services. (Id. ¶¶ 20- 23.) Reagan was one of six managers, each of whom reported to Sara Williamson, Director of the Patient Services Center, who in turn reported to Lydia Splan, the Vice President of Access. (Id. ¶ 16.)
Shortly after she was hired, Martinez received a copy of Northwestern's Rules for Personal Conduct set of standards and behavior and signed that she had read and reviewed those rules. (Id. ¶ 7.) Martinez also signed indicating that she read and reviewed Northwestern's Privacy and Confidentiality: Patient, Employee, and Hospital Information document. (Id. ¶ 8.) As a Patient Registration Representative, Martinez had access to a wide range of personal information protected by the Privacy Policy. (Id. ¶¶ 21-24.) In addition to digital information, Patient Registration Representatives collected patients' personal valuables, which are placed into a safe. (Id. 25-26.) The safe requires a numerical code to open, and many Patient Registration Representatives do not have access to the code or the safe. (Id.)
In August 2017, Northwestern received multiple telephone calls claiming that three Registration staff members-Danielle Coleman, Juenell Jackson, and Ashia Cowin-misused patient information, including credit card information. (Id. ¶¶ 27- 31.) Reagan reported the calls to Williamson and Span, as well as employees in Compliance, Human Resources, and Security. (Id. ¶¶ 32-33.) Northwestern then verified the complaints. (Id. ¶¶ 35-40.) Northwestern coordinated with the Chicago Police Department to seek further evidence, and, after Williamson and Splan determined sufficient evidence to justify the decision, tasked Reagan with terminating Coleman's employment. (Id. ¶¶ 46-47.) Reagan provided Coleman with a Disciplinary Action Report and termination notice. (Id.)
After Coleman's termination, a whistleblower within Northwestern reached out to Security to share “screenshots” of text messages that the whistleblower alleged to be a conversation with Jackson. (Id. ¶¶ 52-54.) The text messages explained various malfeasance planned by Coleman, Jackson, and Cowin-as well as a co-worker “Lydia” who allegedly obtained the code to the valuables' safe. (Id. ¶ 53.) Reagan informed Williamson and Human Resources that she was confident Jackson sent the text messages due to references to Jackson's personnel review earlier that day. (Id. ¶¶ 55-56.) Splan decided, and Williamson agreed, that Jackson and Cowin should be terminated given the text messages and the misconduct further informed by Security's investigation. (Id. ¶¶ 57-59.) Reagan prepared the Disciplinary Action Reports and terminated Cowin on August 31 and Jackson on September 1. (Id. ¶¶ 62- 63.)
Between the terminations of Cowin and Jackson, the whistleblower shared text messages with Security, also allegedly from Jackson, alleging that Martinez shared the safe's code with Cowin. (Id. ¶ 62.) The text messages also stated that Martinez occasionally stole bags out of the safe. (Id.) Williamson, Splan, and HR decided to terminate Martinez's employment as well. (Id. ¶ 65.) Martinez's Disciplinary Action Report incorrectly copied the information in Jackson's Report claiming misuse of credit card information. (Id. ¶ 67.) Martinez's report cited to the policy under which Martinez was terminated (“Violation of NMHC CR Policy #04.0022 Rules for Personal Conduct, Section II B16”) regarding stealing others' property. (Id. ¶ 68.) Northwestern took additional security measures following the four employees' termination. (Id. ¶¶ 70-78.)
Martinez contends that unlawful discrimination motivated her termination rather than the allegations that she took valuables from the safe. (Dkt. 105 ¶ 10.) Martinez alleges that, shortly after she transitioned from a temp role to a full-time role, her supervisor (Reagan) exhibited racial animus by stating she did not want to see minority employees further their careers. (Id. ¶ 4.) As one example of the hostility Reagan is alleged to have shown to minorities, Reagan sometimes brought snacks or treats for the first and second shifts, as opposed to the allegedly more minority-represented third shift. (Id. ¶ 5.) Martinez also claims that she was occasionally frustrated with comments made by her shift's Operations Coordinator, Anthony Wallace. (Id. ¶ 13.) Martinez argues that there was little evidence accusing her of theft beyond the text messages, and that, had Martinez been Caucasian, Northwestern would have more fully investigated the claim before termination. (Id. ¶¶ 20-36.) Martinez further alleges that, shortly after her termination, she observed a Caucasian male asking for directions to Reagan's office to interview for Martinez's position. (Id. ¶¶ 18-19.) And Martinez contends that complaining to Wallace contributed to her termination. (Id. ¶ 12.) Finally, Martinez alleges that, when she was hired as a full-time employee, Northwestern entered into an oral contract with her guaranteeing her employment so long as she met Northwestern's standards. (Id. ¶ 77.)
Summary judgment is warranted only if “the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” Jewett v. Anders, 521 F.3d 818, 821 (7th Cir. 2008) (quoting Magin v. Monsanto Co., 420 F.3d 679, 686 (7th Cir. 2005); see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c); Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986). Rule 56(c) “mandates the entry of summary judgment, after adequate time for discovery and upon motion, against a party who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial.” Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 322. As the “ ‘put up or shut up' moment in a lawsuit, summary judgment requires a non-moving party to respond to the moving party's properly-supported motion by identifying specific, admissible evidence showing that there is a genuine dispute of material fact for trial.” Grant v. Trs. of Ind. Univ., 870 F.3d 562, 568 (7th Cir. 2017) (quotations omitted). All facts, and any inferences to be drawn from them, are viewed in the light most favorable to Plaintiff as the non-moving party. See Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 378 (2007).
1. Title VII and 42 U.S.C. § 1981 Race Discrimination Claim
Martinez claims that, when it terminated her employment, Northwestern illegally discriminated against her on the basis of her Hispanic race in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act and 42 U.S.C. § 1981. (Dkt. 6 ¶¶ 61-71.)
Northwestern contends that Martinez has not pleaded sufficient facts to support this Count. For the reasons explained below, the Court agrees with Northwestern.
Because they require the plaintiff to prove the same prima facie...
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